THE THRESHOLD OF RELIGION

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THE THRESHOLD OF RELIGION

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PAMPHLET

TO

MY WIFE

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

AT the International Congress for the History of Religions held recently in Oxford, several friends who listened to the paper on "The Conception of *Mana*," which appears fourth in the present collection, were kind enough to suggest that it ought to be published under one cover with various scattered essays wherein aspects of the same subject had previously been examined. The essays in question were: "Pre-Animistic Religion," *Folk-Lore*, June 1900, pp. 162-182; "From Spell to Prayer," *Folk-Lore*, June 1904, pp. 132-165; "Is Taboo a Negative Magic?" *Anthropological Essays, presented to Edward Burnett Tylor in honour of his 75th birthday, October 2*, 1907, pp. 219-234; and "A Sociological View of Comparative Religion," *Sociological Review*, January 1908, pp. 48-60. By the kind leave of the Editor of *Folk-Lore*, the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, and the Editor of the *Sociological Review*, it has been possible to proceed to the realization of this idea, conceived as I have shown amid the fervent courtesies of a festive occasion. Now, however, that in cold blood one contemplates the accomplished deed, the doubt not unnaturally arises whether, after all, it was worth while to reprint

articles that in their original form received, from experts at all events, as full and favourable an attention as their author could venture to expect.

It is true that the veteran psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt of Leipzig, has, in his important *Völkerpsychologie* (Vol. II., Pt. II., 171 foll.), done me the honour of associating my name with what, under the designation of *die präanimistische Hypothese*, he treats as a representative theory of the origin of religion, formulated in direct opposition to the Tylorian "animism." Had I any such ambitious doctrine to promulgate, I suppose I ought to embrace every opportunity of sowing my opinions broadcast. But, to be frank, I scarcely recognize myself in the *rôle* imputed to me. In the paper on "Preanimistic Religion" I had no intention of committing myself to a definite solution of the genetic problem. For me the first chapter of the history of religion remains in large part indecipherable. My chief concern was simply to urge that primitive or rudimentary religion, as we actually find it amongst savage peoples, is at once a wider, and in certain respects a vaguer, thing than "the belief in spiritual beings" of Tylor's famous "minimum definition." It therefore seemed advisable to provide the working anthropologist with a new category under which he could marshal those residual phenomena which a strictly animistic interpretation of rudimentary religion would be likely to ignore, or at all events to misrepresent. Before our science ventures to dogmatize about genesis, it must, I think, push on with

the preliminary work of classifying its data under synoptic headings. My essay, then, more immediately served its turn when it succeeded in introducing a new classificatory term into the vocabulary of the working anthropologist. This, I think, it can be said to have done in view of the use to which the word " pre-animistic " has been put by writers such as Dr Preuss, Dr Farnell, Mr Clodd, Mr Warde Fowler, Mr Hodson, and others. I take it, however, that " non-animistic " would have served most of their purposes almost as well.

At the same time it would be untrue to deny that the term " pre-animistic " was used by me designedly and with a chronological reference. What I would not be prepared to lay down dogmatically or even provisionally is merely that there was a pre-animistic *era* in the history of religion, when animism was not, and nevertheless religion of a kind existed. For all I know, some sort of animism in Tylor's sense of the word was a primary condition of the most primitive religion of mankind. But I believe that there were other conditions no less primary. Moreover, I hold that it can be shown conclusively that, in some cases, animistic interpretations have been superimposed on what previously bore a non-animistic sense.

I would go further still. I hold that religion in its psychological aspect is, fundamentally, a mode of social behaviour. To emphasize this point, which scarcely receives explicit attention in the previous

essays, the fifth paper of this series is appended. Now I agree with those psychologists who hold that the most deep-seated and persistent springs of social behaviour are furnished less by our ideas than by our emotions, taken together with the impulses that are therein manifested.[1] Thus awe, in the case of religion, will, on this view, have to be treated as a far more constant factor in religion than any particular conception of the awful. Such awe, we may therefore expect, will be none the less of marked effect on social behaviour, because the power of representing the awful under clear-cut and consistent ideal forms is relatively backward. Hence I am ready to assume that, before animism, regarded as an ideal system of religious beliefs, can have come into its kingdom, there must have been numberless dimly-lighted impressions of the awful that owned no master in the shape of some one systematizing thought. It is, I think, because Wundt mistakes my "pre-animistic religion" for a system of ideas, of alleged priority to animism, that he accuses me of making the evolution of thought proceed from abstract to concrete instead of the other way about. My theory is not concerned with the mere thought at work in religion, but with religion as a whole, the organic complex of thought, emotion and behaviour.

[1] I would refer especially to the recently-published work of my friend, Mr William M'Dougall (*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Methuen & Co., 1908), where this position is set forth more lucidly and plausibly than in any other psychological treatise known to me. His account of the emotions that underlie religion is especially illuminating. *See* 128 foll., and again 302 foll.

In regard to religion thus understood I say, not that its evolution proceeds from abstract to concrete—which would be meaningless—, but that it proceeds from indistinct to distinct, from undifferentiated to differentiated, from incoherent to coherent. And that, I claim, is a hypothesis which has the best part of evolutionary science at its back.

I have said enough, I hope, to show that, in regard to Tylor's animism, I am no irreconcilable foe who has a rival theory to put forward concerning the origin of religion. May I now be permitted to say a word about the attitude adopted in my second, third and fourth papers towards the views of another great anthropologist—I mean Dr Frazer? It is more or less of a corollary from the position taken up in the first essay, that magic and religion are differentiated out from a common plasm of crude beliefs about the awful and occult. As far as Dr Frazer denies this, so far I would declare against him. If he means, for example, to exclude taboo from the sphere of religion (as he seems to do when he identifies it with a negative magic, and identifies magic in its turn with the natural science of the primitive man), then in my opinion he understands religion in so narrow a sense that, for historical purposes, his definition simply will not work. I cannot, for instance, imagine how the British Sunday is to be excluded from the sphere of British religion. On the other hand, if he would consent not to press the analogy—for surely it is hardly more—between primitive man's magic and

what we know as natural science, I venture to think that his " magical " and my " preanimistic " could be used as well-nigh convertible terms. Be this as it may, I would gratefully acknowledge that by far the richest collection in existence of what are for me pre-animistic phenomena is contained in that masterpiece of anthropological research, *The Golden Bough*.[1]

Finally, I ought, perhaps, to say something about the criticisms that have been levelled against the principles my suggestions embody. Apart from Wundt's objections, which have already been considered and, I hope, met, they amount to very little. The flowing tide is with us. Thus the contentions of my first essay were, some time after its first appearance (it was read to the British Association in September 1899, and published in *Folk-Lore* in the course of the following year), independently reaffirmed by Mr Hewitt's important article, "*Orenda* and a Definition of Religion," in the *American Anthropologist*, N.S., Vol. IV. (1902), 33 foll. Again, hardly had my essay " From Spell to Prayer " seen the light in 1904, when MM. Hubert and Mauss published their far more systematic " Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la Magie " in *L'Année Sociologique*, Vol. VII., which no less independently reaffirmed my view of the common participation of magic and religion in notions of the *mana* type. Further, Mr

[1] I note also that Dr Haddon, in his useful little book, *Magic and Fetishism* (A. Constable & Co., 1906), seems to find no difficulty in accepting Dr Frazer's main findings about magic, whilst at the same time endorsing my account of the psychology of the magical process.

Hartland has lent his great authority to this group of opinions, and has presented the whole case in the most telling fashion in his brilliant " Address to the Anthropological Section of the British Association," York, 1906—a pamphlet which is unfortunately not so accessible as could be wished. Thus on reviewing the course of recent speculation concerning rudimentary religion one is led to hope that these views have come to stay. I ought to mention, however, that Mr Lovejoy, in his interesting paper on " The Fundamental Concept of the Primitive Philosophy " in *The Monist*, Vol. XVI., No. 3, objects that in my treatment of such a notion as *mana* I tend " to put the emphasis on the wrong side," namely, on the aspect in which it stands for the supernormal rather than on that in which it stands for the efficacious. His own view is that the perceived energy is mysterious because it is so potent, not potent because it is mysterious in the first instance. Now I do not know that, for the purposes of general theory, I would care to emphasize either aspect at the expense of the other. It seems to me, however, that, in certain instances, at all events, say, in the case of a corpse, the awfulness is what strikes home first, the potency primarily consisting in the very fact that the dead body is able to cause such a shock to the feelings. A less friendly critic is Father Schmidt, whose terrible denunciations are even now in process of descending upon my head in the pages of his excellent periodical, *Anthropos*. On the principle, I suppose, that " he

who is not with me is against me," he chooses to regard me as an enemy of true religion.[1] I wish he would do me the honour to read my paper on " Origin and Validity in Ethics " in *Personal Idealism,* to see how, *mutatis mutandis,* I there in principle contend that the function of a psychological treatment of religion is to determine its history but not its truth. Meanwhile, the chief objection of an anthropological kind brought by him against my views is that I take no account of the presence of what Mr Lang calls " high gods " in primitive religion. Let me assure him that I have complete faith in Mr Lang's " high gods "—or in a great many of them, at all events. On the other hand, I am not at present prepared to admit (as apparently Father Schmidt would do) the postulate of a world-wide degeneration from the belief in such beings, as accounting for pre-animistic phenomena in general. On the contrary, I assume for working purposes that Mr Lang's " high gods " must have had a psychological pre-history of some kind which, if known, would connect them with vaguer and ever vaguer shapes—phantoms teeming in the penumbra of the primitive mind, and dancing about the darkling rim of the tribal fire-circle.[2]

The upshot of these somewhat discursive considerations is that, if I am justified at all in publishing

[1] I am now (1913) convinced that I must have misunderstood Father Schmidt, seeing that his subsequent references to my views have been perfectly fair and friendly.

[2] *See* especially Essay VI.

these essays, it is because they belong to a movement of anthropological thought which has for some time demanded a more permanent vehicle of expression than is afforded by periodical literature. Further, in view of the fact that to me personally there has been attributed in certain quarters a sweeping and even revolutionary dogmatism about religious origins, I gladly embrace the opportunity of showing, by means of this handful of gleanings and suggestions, what a small, humble and tentative affair my theory—so far as I have a theory—is.

A note on a point of fact must be added. The statement about *Ngai*, on p. 12, derived from Joseph Thomson, appears to be incorrect. Mr Hollis, who is thoroughly at home with the Masai language (whereas Thomson, I believe, was not), informs me that *Eng-Aï* is a thoroughly anthropomorphic god, of much the same character as was the sky-god Zeus for the ancient world. Thomson, he thinks, must have misunderstood the Masai. They would never have alluded to his lamp, or to himself, as *Eng-Aï*. It is possible, on the other hand, that they said *e-'ng-Aï*, or *en-dōki e-'ng-Aï*, "it is of God, it is something supernatural." Mr Hollis tells me also that the true form of the name of the volcano which Krapf calls *Donyo Engai*, and which for years figured on the maps as *Donyo Ngai*, is *Ol-doinyo le-'ng-Aï*, the mountain of God. If it were a hill, it would be *En-doinyo e-'ng-Aï*.[1]

[1] *See*, however, note on p. 12.

PREFACE
TO THE SECOND EDITION

THIS edition is enlarged to the following extent: a short Introduction has been written; an outline of the argument has been prefixed to each paper; and three later essays have been added. The essays in question are: "Savage Supreme Beings and the Bull-Roarer," *Hibbert Journal*, January 1910; "The Birth of Humility," an inaugural lecture delivered by me as Reader in Social Anthropology before the University of Oxford, 27th October 1910, and afterwards issued in pamphlet form by the Clarendon Press; and "In a Prehistoric Sanctuary," *Hibbert Journal*, January 1912. I have to thank the Delegates of the Clarendon Press and the Editor of the *Hibbert Journal* for kindly allowing me to reprint them.

Revision has been limited to a few trifling emendations of the form of expression and to a handful of explanatory notes. I have thought it fairer to my readers, and indeed to myself, not to prune away inconsistencies, but to allow the way in which my thought has grown to declare itself. The papers are arranged in the order of their first appear-

ance, with the exception of Essay V., which, being of a slightly different tenour, was placed after, instead of before, Essay IV. in the first edition, and has been allowed to retain its original position.

January 1914.

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INTRODUCTION

A SELF-RESPECTING play requires no prologue, and it would, perhaps, be better policy on my part to ring up the curtain without more ado on these short studies in Comparative Religion. Yet it seems only fair, when old work is about to be given a new lease of life, that the author should state whether he still abides by what he has written.

The papers here brought together bear one and all on the same general topic, namely, the nature of the experience involved in rudimentary religion. Again, all of them alike illustrate the same general thesis, namely, that much of what has hitherto been classed as magic—so far as it has been noticed at all—is really religion of an elementary kind.

In the earliest essay of the series I termed this so-called "magical" element, and the type of religion in which it prevails, "pre-animistic." The epithet has gained some currency; nay, the substantive expression "pre-animism" has been coined and brought into use, though not by me. Now, so long as we are at one about the facts, the words may take their chance. But I am as much concerned

to-day as I was fourteen years ago [1] to urge students of Comparative Religion not to stop short at animism, but to dig deeper into human nature in their search for the roots of religion. Other writers have since independently upheld the same contention, developing it with far greater thoroughness and skill. In fact, I believe that most anthropologists of repute would nowadays subscribe to the negative proposition that animism will not suffice as "a minimum definition of religion." More than that, there would seem to be wide agreement also in regard to a positive doctrine implicated therewith. According to this doctrine, so-called "magical," that is to say, more or less impersonal forces and qualities may and do possess, not secondarily and by derivation, but primarily and in their own right, religious value in the eyes of the man of rudimentary culture; and even tend to possess such value in a predominant degree.

This positive doctrine, which is sometimes known as "the pre-animistic theory," needs, of course, to be developed carefully and critically in the light of evidence which, while it constantly accumulates, must ever remain incomplete. No anthropological theory can afford to stand still, least of all one that seeks to be extremely comprehensive. Hence I cannot be expected to profess myself fully satisfied with any version of the pre-animistic hypothesis which may from time to time be put

[1] The essay on "Pre-animistic Religion" was read for the first time before the British Association in September 1899, and again to the Folk-Lore Society some two months later.

forward whether in my own name or in the name of another. In this sense my earliest essay—and my latest no less—may justly be dubbed "*tatonnante.*" [1] I am supremely conscious that I am merely feeling my way, merely groping in the dark. On the other hand, it is only half true to describe my view of the relation between the ideas peculiar to animism and those of the *mana* type as "*hésitante et très réservée.*" [2] I do not hesitate to regard the general notion exemplified by *mana* as the category that most nearly expresses the essence of rudimentary religion. But this expression of opinion is subject to the perpetual reservation that, in my view, we are not in a position to dogmatize on the subject.

So long, however, as dogmatic assurance is not asked of me, I am prepared as author of these essays to accept present responsibility for method and results alike.

As regards method, while my general attitude is that of an anthropologist, my special interest is psychological. I approach the history of religion as a student of Man in evolution. But my more immediate aim is to translate a type of religious experience remote from our own into such terms of our consciousness as may best enable the nature of that which is so translated to appear for what it is in itself. I would compose a highly-generalized description of a certain state of mind prevailing under conditions of the

[1] As by Father Schmidt in *Anthropos*, 1909, 509.
[2] As by Professor Durkheim in *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse*, 287*n*.

rudest culture. Such a description will necessarily be analytic, in the sense that leading features must be selected for emphasis in accordance with what is found to be their relative predominance in the state of mind in question. Such analysis in the hands of an anthropologist is intended ultimately to subserve a genetic treatment, since his final purpose is no less than to construct a generalized history of the evolution of Man. But science must proceed, as Bacon says, *continenter et gradatim*. On the principle of " one thing at a time," psychological analysis may be undertaken mainly for its own sake. Hence, on grounds of method, I can see no reason why I should not, as an anthropologist, concentrate my attention on the psychological analysis of rudimentary religion.

But, suppose this principle conceded, it may actually be used as a weapon of offence against me. It may be argued that I have sought to generalize too widely—that " one thing at a time " should signify in such a case " one people at a time." I must, indeed, plead guilty to having cast about for clues in many an odd corner of the savage world. For the matter of that, since backward conditions exist within the precincts of civilization, there are, doubtless, similar clues to be discovered even nearer home. But I fully allow that a visit to an island inhabited by pure " pre-animists "—to be followed later on, let us say, by a visit to another island consisting of pure animists—would facilitate research. It remains to inquire whether such islands do, in fact, exist.

INTRODUCTION

The rudest savage can presumably be taught to entertain conceptions and beliefs which everyone would agree to call religious, even if these be, to all appearance, absent from his mind beforehand. Our common human nature, I believe, embraces a permanent possibility of religion. But this is not to say that the religious experience attainable by any two individuals, or by any two peoples, is ever quite the same in quality and range. Two variables enter into the reckoning, namely, the innate mental powers of those concerned, and the circumstances in which their habits of life are formed. The resultant differences cannot be grasped in all their infinite detail. To think them at all is to classify them, and to classify them is to simplify them. I need not go here into the general logic of the matter. Suffice it to say that we must sort out the facts into bundles. These infinitely differing facts must be so grouped together that there is a maximum of difference displayed between the various bundles, and a minimum of difference displayed within any one bundle taken by itself. When, for purposes of analysis, a set of useful contrasts is obtained by means of such bundles, each bundle, each group, of relatively uniform facts is said to have "type-value."

Our problem, then, resolves itself into this: Can the religious beliefs of a single people be assigned type-value for the purposes of psychological analysis as applied to rudimentary religion? I doubt it.

No island of pure " pre-animists " is to be found in my anthropological atlas. Yet Australia, I freely admit, comes nearest to the idea of such an island. Hence, in point of method, Professor Durkheim [1] is doubtless justified in using Australian evidence more or less exclusively to illustrate an elementary type of the religious life. But such a device is dangerous, and, in the hands of any one but a master, may serve but to darken counsel by confusing different lines of research. A monograph on Australian totemism is one thing; the determination of a type of human religion is another thing. As Count Goblet d'Alviella would have us say, the former task belongs to " hierography," the latter to " hierology." The danger—which the genius of Professor Durkheim can afford to despise—is, on the one hand, lest those elements in Australian religion which do not serve to illustrate the type receive but scant justice; and, on the other hand, lest the type itself be overloaded with details that add nothing to its type-value. A monograph coloured by doctrine, or a doctrine distracted by monographic irrelevancies, form the Scylla and Charybdis of such a method. Hence, I prefer the frankly generalizing procedure adopted by another distinguished member of the same school of thought, Professor Lévy-Bruhl.[2] All peoples living under conditions of rudimentary culture are impartially drawn upon to illustrate the type of men-

[1] In *Les Formes Elémentaires de la Vie Religieuse* (Paris, 1912), the sub-title of which is *Le Système Totémique en Australie.*

[2] In *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures* (Paris, 1910).

tality which he seeks to define in contradistinction to our own type of mentality. Critics who object that the type so constituted implies a certain homogeneity of mind, whereas the peoples to whom it refers differ infinitely both in mind and in every other respect, show themselves ignorant of the first principles of typological classification. Science is bound to read relative uniformity into this and that aspect of the flux of things if it is to cope with it at all; it remains for philosophy to make due allowance for the imperfections of the instrument of thought. I claim, then, the right to generalize as widely as the facts permit in regard to the religion of the peoples of the rudest culture. The method, I contend, is sound enough, even if, from lack of sufficient knowledge, I have put it to no very fruitful use.

What, then, of my results? If I seem half-hearted about them it is not because they have ceased to represent my opinions. So many others, however, have by this time said the same things in a better way that I scarcely aspire to rank even among the minor prophets of the gospel of *mana*.

My analysis of rudimentary religion sets forth from the assumption that, as a form of experience, it develops mainly within a sphere of its own. It belongs, as it were, to a wonder-world, from which the workaday world is parted by a sufficiently well-marked frontier. Various reasons, some psychological, some sociological, might be offered to account for this fundamental discontinuity pervading the

activities and affairs of savage life. But I have not sought to explain so much as to describe. We should begin, I think, by trying to realize what sort of an experience it is—how it " feels "—to live in such a wonder-world.

My theory, then, of the nature of this experience is that it is ultimately a binary compound, a duality in unity, consisting in what may be comprehensively termed a *tabu* element and a *mana* element.[1] The former is predominantly negative in its action; what is negatived being the world of the workaday, the world of ordinary happenings. Thus its function is chiefly to provide the experience with its outward limit. The action of the other is predominantly positive; what is posited being something transcending the ordinary world, something wonderful and awful. Thus its main function is to supply the experience with its inward content.

So general a formula, I need hardly say, has hardly more than the value of a *memoria technica*. It is meant to serve primarily as a reminder that psychological analysis as applied to any concrete phase of rudimentary religion must allow for the effective presence of these two elements in the total complex. Now any concrete phase of experience may be viewed either statically or dynamically; that is to say, may be treated either as a state of mind or as

[1] *See* my paper, " The *tabu-mana* Formula as a Minimum Definition of Religion," in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, xii. (1909), 186 f. It is not reprinted here, because it covers much the same ground as the essay on " The Conception of *Mana*" in the present series.

a movement of mind, according as the scientific interest is directed to the intertexture, or else to the interplay, of the elements.[1] Again, in any such concrete phase, processes of thinking, feeling and willing are alike involved; and it may suit the purpose of the analysis to lay stress now on the ideas, now on the emotions, and now on the actions in which the religious experience finds expression. Hence, as the operations of the analytic psychologist are diverse, so the applications of the *tabu-mana* formula will be diverse too. Two expressions borrowed from the savage, and having as their birthright the convenient property of serving as noun, adjective, or verb, of denoting object, quality, or action, have been boldly generalized, so as to establish constants as points of reference within a system constructed out of a welter of variants.

Having duly drawn up my formula, and being ready to offer it to others for whatever it may be worth, I may, perhaps, be permitted to add that I am in favour of a sparing use of all such technicalities in anthropology as savouring at the present stage of its development of pedantry and over-precision. In these essays, therefore, I avoid as far as possible harping on any set phrase. Thus I have used " mysterious," " mystic," " occult," " supernatural," " sacred " and so forth to characterize the sphere of the magico-religious according as my immediate

[1] An illustration of the use of both the static and the dynamic methods of treatment is to be found in the essay on " The Birth of Humility."

purpose might seem to demand. Or, again, if I have referred to *mana* somewhat frequently, I can assure the reader that I have a hundred times turned aside to seek to render the same notion in other and varying ways. Even as regards the use of the term " magic," which a student of rudimentary religion is bound to define somewhat sharply, since it gives him his natural counterfoil, I have tried to allow for the popular use of the word, which is liberal to the point of laxity. Hence in certain contexts I may have failed to give it the meaning I would prefer it to bear, namely, that of, not the impersonal, but the bad, kind of supernaturalism; the impersonal and the bad kinds by no means always coinciding, if my theory of the possibility of a pre-animistic, or, as others would say, " dynamistic," type of religion be correct. In a word, I have " kept it loose," as artists are advised to do when giving its first shape to a picture. To change the metaphor, I feel that all tight wrappings and swaddling-clothes cannot but prove pernicious to an infant science, alive and kicking; though they may be all very suitable for a mummy.

For the rest, the constructive part of my work doubtless suffers somewhat in clearness of outline from being appended and subordinated to the critical portion. The excuse must be that, when I began to write, certain representative theories dominated the entire field of Comparative Religion, and had to be forcibly induced to relax their claims before a " place in the sun " could be found for a new interpretation.

I need not here refer to these theories specifically, but may describe them generally as in my judgment too intellectualistic, too prone to identify religion with this or that doctrine or system of ideas. My own view is that savage religion is something not so much thought out as danced out; that, in other words, it develops under conditions, psychological and sociological, which favour emotional and motor processes, whereas ideation remains relatively in abeyance.

Meantime, a difficulty that has beset me throughout is how to avoid the appearance of setting up as a rival to these too intellectualistic theories of rudimentary religion another theory equally intellectualistic in its way. Pre-animistic religion, according to my meaning and intention, is not definable as the belief in *mana*, in the way that animism is on Tylor's showing definable as the belief in spiritual beings. *Mana* is selected by me for special emphasis merely because it comes nearer than any other available term to the bare designation of that positive emotional value which is the raw material of religion, and needs only to be moralized—to be identified with goodness—to become its essence. Formally, no doubt, *mana* corresponds to an abstract notion. For me, however, the degree of definiteness with which the religious consciousness of the savage manages to express itself by means of this notional form is an almost negligible consideration, so long as an experience of the emotional value thereby signified can otherwise be shown to be present.

Similarly, from such a point of view, it is of secondary importance whether an impersonal or a personal nature be imputed to that which has and, so to speak, is this unique value. The vital concern of religion at any and every stage of its evolution is, I believe, to keep its sense of direction—to maintain an awareness of its unchanging end. How that end is to be attained, whether by recognizing the divine under this partial presentation or under that, is at best a question of means, which as such admits of a progressive solution. Thus there will be found attributed to the sacred and divine now the impersonal nature of a force, as in dynamism; now a living nature in which the body and its indwelling life are not distinguished, as in animatism; now a nature of a dual kind, in which the body is subordinated to an independent animating principle, as in animism; now a nature as of a living man, only crowned with transcendent personality, as in anthropomorphic theism: which attributions will tend to overlap, and, at any rate as they occur in the confused thought of savages, will correspondingly defy precise analysis. Yet religion in its essence and soul will remain relatively unaffected by these attempts to characterize, whether by way of ideas or by means of any other symbols, that abiding value which throughout is felt to be there. Such at least is the theory which, quite unsystematically, I try to set forth in what now follows.

THE THRESHOLD OF RELIGION

I

PRE-ANIMISTIC RELIGION

ARGUMENT

ANTHROPOLOGY needs a wider exterior definition of rudimentary religion. Tylor's animism is too narrow, because too intellectualistic. Psychologically, religion involves more than thought, namely, feeling and will as well; and may manifest itself on its emotional side, even when idea tion is vague. The question, then, is whether, apart from ideas of spirit, ghost, soul and the like, and before such ideas have become dominant factors in the constituent experience, a rudimentary religion can exist. It will suffice to prove that supernaturalism, the attitude of mind dictated by awe of the mysterious, which provides religion with its raw material, may exist apart from animism and, further, may provide a basis on which an animistic doctrine is subsequently constructed. Objects towards which awe is felt may be termed powers. Of such powers spirits constitute but a single class amongst many; though, being

powers in their own right, they furnish a type to which the rest may become assimilated in the long run. Startling manifestations of nature are treated as powers without the agency of spirits being necessarily assumed. Even when they are regarded as living beings, such animatism falls short of animism in Tylor's sense, that is, a view which distinguishes between the spirit and its vehicle, and holds the animating principle to be more or less independent and separable. Out of that awe-inspiring thing, the bull-roarer, certain Australian supreme beings would seem to have developed, who came to be conceived as supernatural headmen, but not as spirits. Curious stones are apt to rank as powers, and even as alive, but it is a long step from a vague belief in their luckiness to the theory that they have "eaten ghost." Animals are often accounted powers, for instance, if associated with mystic rites, as in totemism, or if of uncanny appearance; but animistic interpretations may supervene, as when the wearing of tooth or claw is taken to imply an attendant animal spirit, or when ancestral spirits are thought to be incarnated in animals. Human remains seem to have mystic efficacy in themselves, the dead as such inspiring awe; though here we are near the fountain-head of animism, namely, awe of the human ghost, which hence is especially liable to be called in to explain the efficacy of the "dead hand," and so on. Of diseases, some invite an animistic theory of causation more readily than others, which are simply put down to the powers set in motion by witchcraft. Blood, and notably the blood of women, is a power in its own account, and not because of any associated spirit. These examples are enough to show that something wider than animism is needed as a minimum definition of religion.

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THE object of the present paper is simply to try to give relatively definite shape to the conception of a certain very primitive phase of religion, as religion may for anthropological purposes be understood. The conception in question will strike many, I daresay, as familiar, nay possibly as commonplace to a degree. Even so, however, I venture to think that it is one amongst several of those almost tacitly-accepted commonplaces of Comparative Religion which serve at present but to " crib, cabin and confine " the field of active and critical research. Comparative Religion is still at the classificatory stage. Its genuine votaries are almost exclusively occupied in endeavouring to find " pigeon-holes " wherein to store with some approach to orderly and distinct arrangement the vast and chaotic piles of " slips " which their observation or reading has accumulated. Now in such a case the tendency is always to start with quite a few pigeon-holes, and but gradually, and, as it were, grudgingly, to add to their number. On the other hand considerable division and subdivision of topics is desirable, both in the interest of specialized study, and in order to baffle and neutralize the efforts of popularizers to enlist prejudice on the side of one or another would-be synoptic version of the subject, based on some narrow and fragmentary view of the data as provided by current science. Nay, so essential is it to detach " workable " portions of the evidence for separate and detailed consideration, that it is comparatively unimportant whether the divisions at any moment recognized and adopted be

capable of exact co-ordination in respect to one another, so long as each taken by itself is clearly marked and leads immediately to business. Thus in the present case I have ventured to call attention to a phase of early religion which, I believe, only needs clearly marking off by the aid of a few technical designations to serve as a rallying point for a quantity of facts that have hitherto largely "gone about loose." I have therefore improvised some technical terms. I have likewise roughly surveyed the ground covered by the special topic in question, with a view to showing how the facts may there be disposed and regimented. Choicer technical terms no doubt may easily be found. Moreover, my illustrations are certainly anything but choice, having been culled hastily from the few books nearest to hand. May I hope, however, at least to be credited with the good intention of calling the attention of anthropologists to the possibilities of a more or less disregarded theme in Comparative Religion; and may I, conversely, be acquitted of any design to dogmatize prematurely about religious origins because I have put forward a few experimental formulæ, on the chance of their proving useful to this or that researcher who may be in need of an odd piece of twine wherewith to tie his *scopæ dissolutæ* into a handy, if temporary, besom?

Definitions of words are always troublesome; and religion is the most troublesome of all words to define. Now for the purposes of Anthropology at its present stage it matters less to assign exact limits to the

concept to which the word in question corresponds, than to make sure that these limits are cast on such wide and generous lines as to exclude no feature that has characterized religion at any moment in the long course of its evolution. Suffice it, then, to presuppose that the word stands for a certain composite or concrete state of mind wherein various emotions and ideas are together directly provocative of action. Let it be likewise noted at the start, that these emotions and ideas are by no means always harmoniously related in the religious consciousness, and indeed perhaps can never be strictly commensurate with each other. Now for most persons, probably, the emotional side of religion constitutes its more real, more characteristic feature. Men are, however, obliged to communicate expressly with each other on the subject of their religious experience by the way of ideas solely. Hence, if for no other reason, the ideas composing the religious state tend to overlay and outweigh the emotional element, when it comes to estimating man's religious experience taken at its widest. Thus we catch at an idea that reminds us of one belonging to an advanced creed and say, Here is religion; or, if there be found no clear-cut palpable idea, we are apt to say, There is no religion here; but whether the subtle thrill of what we know in ourselves as religious emotion be present there or no, we rarely have the mindfulness or patience to inquire, simply because this far more delicate criterion is hard to formulate in thought and even harder to apply to fact.

Now the object of this paper is to grope about amongst the roots of those beliefs and practices that at a certain stage of their development have usually been treated as forming a single growth which is labelled animism, or more properly animistic religion. It is a region hard to explore, because the notions that haunt it are vague and impalpable; the religious sense (if such it may be called) manifesting itself in almost unideated feelings that doubtless fall to a large extent outside the savage " field of attention," and at anyrate fall wholly outside our field of direct observation. Now, even where there undeniably do exist precise ideas of the savage mind for Anthropology to grasp and garner, everyone is aware how exceedingly difficult it is to do them justice. How much more difficult, therefore, must it be, in the case of the earliest dim heart-stirrings and fancies of the race, to truthfully preserve the indistinctness of the original, and yet make clear the nature of that germinal source whence our own complex beliefs and aspirations must be supposed to have arisen.

Animism, as a technical term applied to religion, calls attention to the presence of a more or less definite creed or body of ideas. According to Dr Tylor, who presented it to Anthropology, it signifies " the belief in the existence of spiritual beings," [1] that is to say, of " spirits " in the wide sense that includes " souls." A looser use of the word by some writers, whereby it is made to cover the various manifestations of what is commonly but cumbrously

[1] *Prim. Cult.* (3rd edition), i. 424.

styled the " anthropomorphic " [1] tendency of savage thought, will here be ignored, and a fresh expression substituted, seeing that such an extension of its meaning robs the term of its exacter and more convenient connotation, and, further, seeing that it has failed to win general recognition from men of science.

No anthropologist, of course, has ever supposed himself able fully and finally to explain the origin of the belief in souls and spirits. Indeed, with regard to absolute origins of all kinds, we had best say at once with the philosopher that " Nothing is strictly original save in the sense that everything is." Dr Tylor and others, however, have with great plausibility put forward a view as to the specifically formative source of the idea, in what has been nicknamed " the dream-theory." This theory asserts that the prototype of soul and spirit is to be sought especially in the dream-image and trance-image—that vision of the night or day that comes to a man clothed distinctively in what Dr Tylor describes as " vaporous materiality," or, as the Greenland *angekok* puts it, " pale and soft, so that if a man try to grasp it he feels nothing "—*par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.* Perhaps it is only due to Mr Lang's latest researches [2] to say with regard to this theory that its centre of gravity, so to speak, has of late shown signs of shifting from dream to trance, so that " the hallucination-theory " might possibly now prove the more appropriate descriptive title. I shall not,

[1] I was thinking more especially of anthropomorphic theism when I wrote this, but "vitalistic" would more suitably describe the general tendency signified by animism in this wider sense.

[2] *The Making of Religion*, Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

however, pause to inquire whether the " thrill " of ghost-seeing is likely to have given form and character to the religious emotions of the savage more directly or forcibly than the less unfamiliar, yet more kindly and sympathetic, appearance of " dream-faces "; nor, again, whether the practical proofs, as they may be called, of spiritualism (which after all is but another name for animism),[1] I mean clairvoyance and the like, were brought into earlier or greater prominence by normal dreamers or by abnormal " seers." It is enough for my present purpose to assume that animism, the belief in the existence of visionary shapes, whether of the dead or *sui juris*, became with the savage, at a certain stage of his development, the typical, nay almost the universal, means of clothing the facts of his religious experience in ideas and words, and the typical and all but universal theory on which he based his religious practice. And this being assumed, we reach our special problem: Before, or at any rate apart from, animism, was early man subject to any experience, whether in the form of feeling, or of thought, or of both combined, that might be termed specifically " religious "?

Let us begin by asking ourselves what was the precise ground originally covered by animistic belief. The answer, if purely tentative, is soon made. The savage as we know him to-day believes in an infinitely miscellaneous collection of spiritual entities. " To whom are you praying? " asked Hale of a Sakai chief at one of those fruit festivals so characteristic of the Malay peninsula. " To the *hantus* (spirits),"

[1] *Prim. Cult.*, i. 426.

he replied—" the *hantus* of the forest, of the mountains, of the rivers, the *hantus* of the Sakai chiefs who are dead, the *hantus* of headache and stomach-ache, the *hantus* that make people gamble and smoke opium, the *hantus* that send disputes, and the *hantus* that send mosquitoes." [1] Now are all these *hantus*, animistically speaking, on a par, or are some original, others derived? I take it that I am at one with most orthodox upholders of animism in supposing the *hantus* of the dead to be the original *animæ* whence the rest have derived their distinctively animistic, that is to say ghostly, characteristics. For this view it will perhaps be enough to allege a single reason. The *revenant* of dream and hallucination in its actual appearance to the senses presents so exactly and completely the type to which every spirit, however indirect its methods of self-manifestation, is believed and asserted to conform, that I am personally content to regard this conclusion as one amongst the few relative certainties which Anthropology can claim to have established in the way of theory. Suppose this granted, then we find ourselves confronted with the following important train of questions, yielding us a definite nucleus and rallying-point for our present inquiry: " How came an animistic colour to be attached to a number of things not primarily or obviously connected with death and the dead? What inherent general character of their own suggested to man's mind the grouping together of the multifarious classes of so-called 'spiritual' phenomena as capable of common ex-

[1] *J. A. I.*, xv. 300-1.

planation? Was not this common explanation the outcome of a common regard, a common and yet highly specific feeling or emotion? And is not this feeling related to the ideas wherein it finds as it were symbolical expression — as for example to the animistic idea—as something universal and fixed to something particular and transitory? "

Now, by way of answer to these questions, let me repeat, I have no brand-new theory to propound. The doctrine that I now wish to formulate unambiguously, and at the same time, so far as may be possible within the limits of a short article, to supply with a basis of illustrative fact, is one that in a vague and general form constitutes a sort of commonplace with writers on religious origins. These writers for the most part profess, though not always in very plain or positive terms, to discern beneath the fluctuating details of its efforts at self-interpretation a certain religious sense, or, as many would call it, instinct, whereof the component " moments " are fear, admiration, wonder, and the like, whilst its object is, broadly speaking, the supernatural. Now that this is roughly and generally true no one, I think, is likely to deny. Thus, to put the matter as broadly as possible, whether we hold with one extreme school that there exists a specific religious instinct, or whether we prefer to say with the other that man's religious creeds are a by-product of his intellectual development, we must, I think, in any case admit the fact that in response to, or at anyrate in connection with, the emotions of awe, wonder, and the like, wherein feeling would seem for the time being

to have outstripped the power of "natural," that is, reasonable, explanation, there arises in the region of human thought a powerful impulse to objectify and even personify the mysterious or "supernatural" something felt, and in the region of will a corresponding impulse to render it innocuous, or better still propitious, by force of constraint, communion, or conciliation. *Supernaturalism*, then, as this universal feeling taken at its widest and barest may be called, might, as such, be expected to prove not only logically but also in some sense chronologically prior to animism, constituting as the latter does but a particular ideal embodiment of the former.

The appeal to fact that will occupy the rest of this paper, cursory though it must be in view of our space conditions, will suffice, I hope, to settle the matter. First, let us remind ourselves by the help of one or two typical quotations how widely and indiscriminately supernaturalism casts its net. Thus Ellis writes of the Malagasy: "Whatever is great, whatever exceeds the capacity of their understandings, they designate by the one convenient and comprehensive appellation, *andriamanitra*. Whatever is new and useful and extraordinary is called god. Silk is considered as god in the highest degree, the superlative adjective being added to the noun—*andriamanitra-indrinda*. Rice, money, thunder and lightning, and earthquake are all called god. Their ancestors and a deceased sovereign they designate in the same manner. *Tarantasy* or book they call god, from its wonderful capacity of speaking by merely looking at it. Velvet is called by the singular

epithet, 'son of god.'"[1] So, too, of the Masai, though far lower than the Malagasy in the scale of culture, the account given by Joseph Thomson is precisely similar. "Their conception of the deity," he says, "seems marvellously vague. I was *ngai*. My lamp was *ngai*. *Ngai* was in the steaming holes. His house was in the eternal snows of Kilimanjaro. In fact, whatever struck them as strange or incomprehensible, that they at once assumed had some connection with *ngai*."[2] As I have said, such quotations are typical and might be multiplied indefinitely. *Andriamanitra* and *ngai* reappear in the *wakan* of the North American Indian, the *mana* of the Melanesian, the *kalou* of the Fijian, and so on.[3] It is the common element in ghosts and gods, in the magical and the mystical, the supernal and the infernal, the unknown within and the unknown without. It is the supernatural or supernormal, as distinguished from the natural or normal; that in short which, as Mr Jevons phrases it, "defeats reasonable expectation." Or perhaps another and a better way of putting it, seeing that it calls attention to the feeling behind the logic, is to say that it is the awful, and that everything wherein or whereby it

[1] Ellis, *Hist. of Madagascar*, i. 391-2.

[2] Thomson, *Masailand*, 445. But *see* Preface to the first edition *ad fin.* Since the passage in question was written, however, Mr and Mrs Routledge have reported what seems a quite vague use of *ngai* by the Akikuyu, neighbours of the Masai. *See* my note contributed to their recent work, *With a Prehistoric People* (Macmillan, 1910), p. 357.

[3] These examples are rather miscellaneous, and some of them might have been better chosen. In any case they are meant simply to illustrate the vague application of some class-concept to a variety of objects calling forth religious awe. It is not contended that these epithets bear one and all the same sense.

manifests itself is, so to speak, a power of awfulness, or, more shortly, a *power* (though this, like any other of our verbal equivalents, cannot but fail to preserve the vagueness of the original notion).[1] Of all English words awe is, I think, the one that expresses the fundamental religious feeling most nearly. Awe is not the same thing as "pure funk." "*Primus in orbe deos fecit timor*" is only true if we admit wonder, admiration, interest, respect, even love perhaps, to be, no less than fear, essential constituents of this elemental mood.

Now ghosts and spirits are undoubtedly powers, but it does not follow that all powers are ghosts and spirits, even if they tend to become so. In what follows I propose that we examine a few typical cases of powers, which, beneath the animistic colour that in the course of time has more or less completely overlaid them, show traces of having once of their own right possessed pre-animistic validity as objects and occasions of man's religious feeling.

Let us start with some cases that, pertaining as they do to the "unknown without" as it appears in most direct contradistinction to the "unknown within," are thus farthest removed from the proper domain and parent-soil of animism, and may therefore be supposed to have suffered its influences least. What we call "physical nature" may very well be "nature" also to the savage in most of its normal aspects; yet its more startling manifestations,

[1] The Greek word that comes nearest to "power" as used above is *τέρας*. Perhaps "teratism" may be preferred as a designation for that attitude of mind which I have termed "supernaturalism."

thunderstorms, eclipses, eruptions, and the like, are eminently calculated to awake in him an awe that I believe to be specifically religious both in its essence and in its fruits, whether animism have, or have not, succeeded in imposing its distinctive colour upon it. Thus, when a thunderstorm is seen approaching in South Africa, a Kaffir village, led by its medicine-man, will rush to the nearest hill and yell at the hurricane to divert it from its course.[1] Here we have awe finding vent in what on the face of it may be no more than a simple straightforward act of personification. It is animism in the loose sense of some writers, or, as I propose to call it, *animatism :* but it is *not* animism in the strict scientific sense that implies the attribution, not merely of personality and will, but of " soul " or " spirit," to the storm. The next case is but slightly different. The Point Barrow natives, believing the Aurora Borealis to do them harm by striking them at the back of the neck, brandish knives and throw filth at it to drive it away.[2] Now I doubt if we need suppose animism to be latent here any more than in the African example. Nevertheless the association of the Aurora's banefulness with a particular malady would naturally pave the way towards it, whilst the precautionary measures are exactly such as would be used against spirits. The following case is more dubious. When a glacier in Alaska threatened to swallow up a valuable fishing stream, two slaves were killed in order to

[1] Macdonald, *J. A. I.*, xix. 283.
[2] Murdoch, *Point Barrow Expedition*, 432.

bring it to a standstill.[1] Here the advanced character of the propitiatory rite probably presumes acquaintance with some form of the animistic theory. It may very well be, however, that sacrifice is here resorted to as a general religious panacea, without involving any distinct recognition of a particular glacier spirit. And now let us take a couple of instances where the theory behind the religious observance is more explicit. The Fuegians abstain from killing young ducks on the ground that, if they do, " Rain come down, snow come down, hail come down, wind blow, blow, very much blow." The storm is sent by a " big man " who lives in the woods.[2] Now is this animism? I think not. What may be called a " coincidental marvel " is explained by a myth, and mythology need be no more than a sort of animatism grown picturesque. When, however, a Point Barrow Eskimo, in order to persuade the river to yield him fish, throws tobacco, not into the river, but into the air, and cries out " *Tuana, Tuana* " (spirit),[3] then here is a full-fledged animism. Meanwhile, whatever view be taken of the parts respectively played by animatism, mythology, animism, or what not, in investing these observances with meaning and colour, my main point is that the quality of religiousness attaches to them far less in virtue of any one of these ideal constructions than in virtue of that basic feeling of awe, which drives a man, ere he can think or theorize upon it, into personal relations with the supernatural.

[1] Peet, *Am. Antiq.*, ix. 327 ; an instance, however, that might be better authenticated. [2] Fitzroy, ii. 180. [3] Murdoch, *ib.*, 433.

In order to establish the thesis that the attitude of supernaturalism towards what *we* should call inanimate nature may be independent of animistic interpretations, much more is required in the way of evidence than what I have the space to bring forward here. In the case of matters so indirectly ascertainable as the first beginnings of human thought, the cumulative testimony of very numerous and varied data affords the only available substitute for crucial proof. As it is, however, I must content myself with citing but two more sets of instances bearing on this part of my subject.

The first of these may be of interest to those who have lent their attention to Mr Lang's recent discovery of " pure "—that is to say, ethical—religion in the wilds of Australia.[1] I have to confess to the opinion with regard to *Daramulun*, *Mungan-ngaua*, *Tundun* and *Baiamai*, those divinities whom the Kurnai, Murrings, Kamilaroi and other Australian groups address severally as " Our Father," recognizing in them the supernatural headmen and lawgivers of their respective tribes, that their prototype is nothing more or less than that well-known material and inanimate object, the bull-roarer.[2] Its thunderous booming must have been eminently awe-inspiring to the first inventors, or rather discoverers, of the instrument, and would not unnaturally provoke the

[1] It is Mr Lang who would limit the epithets of pure and ethical to this type of primitive religion. In my own view, all genuine religion, whether distinguished by the cult of personal deities or not, is ethical; inasmuch as it is of its essence to make the worshipper feel a stronger and better man; *cf.* Essay VII. p. 190.

[2] *See* Essay VI.

" animatistic " attribution of life and power to it. Then mythology seems to have stepped in to explain why and how the bull-roarer enforces those tribal ceremonies with which its use is associated, and, after the manner of myth, to have invented schemes and genealogies of bull-roarers whose wonderful history and dreadful powers it proceeded to chronicle. Thus, for example, *Baiamai* kills *Daramulun* for devouring some of the youths undergoing initiation, but puts his voice into the wood of the bull-roarer.[1] Or *Mungan-ngaua* begets *Tundun*, who first makes the bull-roarers in actual use amongst the Kurnai, and then becomes a porpoise.[2] Further, mythology is reinforced by symbolistic ritual. Figures made of logs are set up on the initiation ground to represent *Baiamai* and his wife; or the men throw blazing sticks at the women and children as if it were *Daramulun* coming to burn them.[3] As for animism, however, we never get anywhere near to it, save perhaps when *Daramulun's* voice is said to inhabit the bull-roarer, or when he is spoken of as living in the sky and ruling the ghosts of the dead Kurnai.[4] Nevertheless, despite its want of animistic colouring, a genuine religion (if reverence shown towards supernatural powers and obedience to their mandates be a sufficient test of genuineness) has sprung up out of the awe inspired by the bull-roarer; and Mr Lang's assertion may safely be endorsed that animism, with the opportunities it affords for spiritualistic hocus-pocus, could serve to introduce therein a principle of degeneration only.

[1] Matthews, *J. A. I.*, xxv. 298.
[2] Howitt, *J. A. I.*, xiv. 312.
[3] Matthews, *J. A. I.*, xxiv. 416; xxv. 298.
[4] Howitt, *J. A. I.*, xiv. 321.

My other set of instances pertains to the fascinating subject of stone-worship—a subject, alas! from which I would fain illustrate my point at far greater length. Stones that are at all curious in shape, position, size or colour—not to speak of properties derived from remarkable coincidences of all sorts—would seem specially designed by nature to appeal to primitive man's "supernaturalistic" tendency. A solitary pillar of rock, a crumpled volcanic boulder, a meteorite, a pebble resembling a pig, a yam, or an arrowhead, a piece of shining quartz, these and such as these are almost certain to be invested by his imagination with the vague but dreadful attributes of powers. Nor, although to us nothing appears so utterly inanimate as a stone, is savage animatism in the least afraid to regard it as alive. Thus the Kanakas differentiate their sacred stones into males and females, and firmly believe that from time to time little stones appear at the side of the parent blocks.[1] On the other hand, when a Banks' Islander sees a big stone with little stones around it, he says that there is a *vui* (spirit) inside it, ready if properly conciliated to make the women bear many children and the sows large litters.[2] Now, this is no longer animatism, but animism proper. A piece of sympathetic magic is explained in terms of spirit-causation. The following case from the Baram district of Borneo is transitional. A man protects his fruit trees by placing near them certain round stones in cleft sticks. He then utters a curse, calling upon the

[1] Ellis, *Tour Round Hawaii*, 113. [2] Codrington, *J. A. I.*, x. 276.

stones to witness it: "May he who steals this fruit suffer from stones in the stomach as large as these." Further, suppose a friend of the proprietor wish to eat of the fruit, he will light a fire, and ask the fire to explain to the stone that nothing wrong is being done.[1] Here we seem to have simple animatism, but it may be said to tremble on the verge of animism, inasmuch as by itself—that is, by the mere attribution of life and will—it is unable to account for the magical powers of the stone. How this may be done with the help of animism is shown us by the Banks' Islanders, already referred to, who, employing stones of a peculiar long shape in much the same way to protect their houses, do so on the explicit ground that the stones have "eaten ghost"—the ghost of a dead man being not unnaturally taken as the type and *ne plus ultra* of awful power.[2] Not to multiply instances, let me roundly state that, amid the vast array of facts relating to the worship of stones, there will be found the most divergent ideal representations of their supernatural nature and powers, ranging from the vaguest semi-conscious belief in their luckiness[3] onwards, through animatism, to the distinct animistic conception of them as the home of spirits of the dead or the unborn, or as the image and visible presence of a god; but that underlying all these fluctuating interpretations of thought there

[1] Hose, *J. A. I.*, xxiii. 161. [2] Codrington, *l.c.*

[3] I am afraid it may be said that I have not given sufficient prominence to that "moment" in religious feeling which corresponds to the belief in luck. I do not, however, regard it as a specific emotion in itself, but rather as a compound of the wonder produced by a coincidence and of sufficient awe of the *power* therewith seemingly connected, to make it appear worth while to try to conciliate it.

may be discerned a single universal feeling, namely, the sense of an awfulness in them intimately affecting man and demanding of him the fruits of awe, namely, respect, veneration, propitiation, service.

Passing now from the region of what we regard as the inanimate to that of the sub-animate and the animate, we come first in order of upward progress to that tantalizing theme, the worship of plants and animals. Now to a large extent this coincides with the subject of totemism, about which I shall say little, if only because it teems with controversial matter. This much, however, I take to be now relatively certain with regard to it, that in their origin totemistic observances had a magical rather than a strictly religious import. That is to say, their object was not so much to conciliate powers in plant or animal form, as to establish sympathetic control over classes of serviceable plants and animals regarded simply as such, namely, as clans or tribes very much on a par with the human ones. Now I am ready to suppose that sympathetic magic in the eyes of the savage is, primarily, no exclusive instrument of religion, but a means of causation on a level with his other methods of exerting force—just as with him talking is not confined exclusively to praying. On the other hand, I believe that the abnormal and mysterious element in magical causation is bound to strike him sooner or later, and to call for explanation in the terms most familiar and most satisfying to primitive mysticism. Thus, in the case of totemism, the conception of an affinity between the spirits of the plants and animals and

their human clients, as effected by transmigration or some other animistic contrivance, is sure to arise, with the result that the plants and animals by reason of their "spiritualization" forthwith assume the plenary rank and attributes of powers. Meanwhile, in order to show how this may come about, I shall bring forward one or two illustrations that have no direct connection with totemism, as they will then at the same time serve to call attention to the qualities that constitute an intrinsic as opposed to a merely derivatory right to be revered as supernatural and awful. There are many animals that are propitiated by primitive man neither because they are merely useful nor merely dangerous, but because they are, in a word, uncanny. White animals (for example, white elephants or white buffaloes), birds of night (notably the owl), monkeys, mice, frogs, crabs, snakes, and lizards, in fact a host of strange and gruesome beasts, are to the savage, of their own right and on the face of them, instinct with dreadful divinity. To take a single instance, a fishing party of Crees catch a new and terrible-looking kind of fish. It is promptly returned to the water as a *manitu*, and five days are wasted whilst it is being appeased.[1] Now in the case of powers such as these, sympathetic magic will naturally suggest the wearing of tooth or claw, bone or skin as a means of sharing in the divine potency. Here is the chance for animism to step in. Thus a Kennaiah chief, who wishes to wear the skin of the Borneo tiger-cat for luck in war, will wrap himself in it, and before lying

[1] Hind, *Red River Exped.*, ii. 135.

down to sleep will explain to the skin exactly what he wants, and beg the spirit to send him a propitious dream.[1] Or in other cases mere association and coincidence will pave the way towards an animistic version of the facts. Thus I have no doubt that it is the uncanny appearance of the snake, combined with its habit of frequenting graves and of entering dwellings, which has led more than one savage people to treat it as the chosen incarnation of their ancestral ghosts.[2] And here let me leave this part of the subject, having thus barely touched upon it in order to confirm the single point that religious awe is towards powers, and that these are not necessarily spirits or ghosts, though they tend to become so.

At length we reach what I have roughly described as the proper domain and parent-soil of animism, namely, the phenomena that have to do with dream and trance, disease and death. Here the question for us must be, Do supernaturalism and animism originally coincide in respect to these phenomena? Or, in other words, Is the awful, in each and all of them alike, primarily soul or spirit? My own belief is that the two spheres do not originally coincide, that the awful in dream and trance is at first distinct from the awful in death and disease, though the former readily comes to overlay and colour the latter. Thus I conceive that the trance-image, alike on account of its singularity, its accompaniments in the way of physical no less than mental derange-

[1] Hose, *J. A. I.*, xxiii. 159.

[2] *E.g.*, Zulus, *cf.* Macdonald, *J. A. I.*, xx. 122; Malagasy, *cf.* Sibree, *J. A. I.*, xxi. 227.

ment, and its coincidental possibilities, must have been originally and of its own right awful; and that so, though perhaps to a lesser extent, must have been the dream-image, if only on the ground last mentioned. Nor would I deny that, in regard to death, these two kinds of vision taken together would be bound to suggest to the savage mind that there is a something which survives the body. But have we here a complete account of the influences whereby there is produced that mingled fear and love of the dead which culminate in manes-worship? I think not. For one thing, it is almost an axiom with writers on this subject, that a sort of solipsism, or Berkleianism (as Professor Sully terms it as he finds it in the child), operates in the savage to make him refuse to recognize death as a fact, there being at anyrate plenty of proof that he is extremely unwilling to recognize the fact of natural death. The influence, however, which I consider most fundamental of all is something else, namely, the awfulness felt to attach to the dead human body in itself.[1] Here, I think, we probably have the cause of the definite assignment to a passing appearance such as the trance-image of real and permanent existence in relation to a dead owner; and certainly the main source of the ascription of potency to the soul thus rendered substantive. The thrill of ghost-seeing may be real enough, but I fancy it is nothing to the horror of a human corpse instilled into man's heart

[1] Several critics have objected to this theory of mine as unproved—which I admit—but themselves offer no proof to the contrary unless it be that the living dog is unmoved by the sight of a dead dog. But a dog is not a man.

by his instinct of self-preservation. In confirmation of this view I would refer to the mass of evidence dealing with the use of human remains for purposes of protective or offensive magic. A skull, a human hand, a scalp-lock, a portion of dried and pounded flesh are potent medicine in themselves, so long as sympathetic magic is at the stage at which it takes itself for granted. Magical processes, however, as we have seen, specially invite explanation. What more natural, then, given an acquaintance with the images of trance and dream, than to attribute the mysterious potency of a dead man's body to that uncanny thing his wraith? Let me quote just one instance to show how easy is the transition from the one idea to the other. A young native of Leper's Island, out of affection for his dead brother, made his bones into arrow-tips. Thereafter he no longer spoke of himself as "I," but as "we two," and was much feared.[1] The Melanesian explanation was that he had thus acquired the *mana*, or supernatural power, of the dead man. Clearly it is but a hair's-breadth that divides the *mana* thus personified from the notion of the attendant ghost which elsewhere so often meets us.

There remains the difficult question whether animism is primarily, or only derivatively, connected with the religious awe felt in the presence of most kinds of disease. I am disposed to say, "*distinguo*." As regards delirium, epilepsy, and kindred forms of seizure, the patient's experience of hallucinatory images, combined with the bystanders' impression

[1] Codrington, *J. A. I.*, xix. 216-17.

that the former is, as we say, " no longer himself," would, I think, well nigh immediately and directly stamp it as a case of possession by a spirit. Then all convulsive movements, sneezing, yawning, a ringing in the ear, a twitching of the eyelid, and so on, would be explained analogously. On the other hand there is a large and miscellaneous number of diseases that primitive man attributes to witchcraft, without at the same time necessarily ascribing them to the visitation of bad spirits. Thus a savage will imagine that he has a crab or a frog, some red ants or a piece of crystal in his stomach, introduced by magical means, as for instance by burying the crab (perhaps with an invocation to the crab-fetish) [1] in his path. To remedy such supposed evils the native doctor betakes himself to the sucking cure and the like, while he meets spirits with a more or less distinct set of contrivances, for instance the drum or rattle to frighten them, and the hollow bone to imprison them. Meanwhile animism undoubtedly tends to provide a general explanation for all disease, since disease to the savage mind especially connotes what may be described as " infection " in the widest sense, and infection is eminently suggestive of the workings of a mobile aggressive agency such as spirit appears intrinsically to be. Let me briefly refer, however, to one form of malady which all the world over excites the liveliest religious awe, and yet is, so far as I know, but rarely and loosely connected with animism by savage theorists. The horror of blood I take to be strictly parallel to the horror of a corpse

[1] Conolly, *J. A. I.*, xxvi. 151.

already alluded to; and I believe that in what Westermarck has termed the " mystic detestation " of woman, or in the unreasoning dread which causes a North American brave with a running sore to be banned from the camp,[1] we have a crucial case of a pure and virtually uncoloured religious feeling. The issue of blood " pertains to *wakanda*," as the Omahas said.[2] That is the primary vague utterance of supernaturalism; and strictly secondary, I conceive, and by way of *ex post facto* justification is the belief in the magical properties of the blood, the theory that the blood is the life, or the Maori notion that it is full of germs ready to turn into malicious spirits.[3]

At this point my list of illustrations must come to a close; and it therefore only remains for me to utter a last word in my own defence for having called attention to a subject that many will be ready to pronounce both trite and at the same time incapable of exact or final treatment.

As regards the charge of triteness, I would only say that a disregarded commonplace is no commonplace at all, and that disregard is, anthropologically speaking, to be measured by the actual use to which a conception is put, when there is available evidence in the shape of raw facts waiting to be marshalled and pigeon-holed by its aid. I do not find that the leading theorists have by the organization of their material shown themselves to be sufficiently aware

[1] Adair, *Hist. of Am. Ind.*, 124.
[2] Dorsey, *Omaha Sociology*, 267.
[3] *Cf.* Tregear, *J A. I.*, xix. 101.

that the animistic idea represents but one amongst a number of ideas, for the most part far more vague than it is, and hence more liable to escape notice; all of which ideas, however, are active in savage religion as we have it, struggling one with the other for supremacy in accordance with the normal tendency of religious thought towards uniformity of doctrinal expression. On the contrary, the impression left on my mind by a study of the leading theorists is that animistic interpretations have by them been decidedly overdone; that, whereas they are prone in the case of the religions of civilization to detect survivals and fading rudimentary forms, they are less inclined to repeat the process when their clues have at length led them back to that stage of primitive thought which perforce must be " original " for them by reason of the lack of earlier evidence, but is not in the least " original " in an absolute sense and from the standpoint of the racial history.

As for the charge of inconclusiveness, this might be in point were it a question of assigning exact limits to the concept to which the word religion, as employed by Anthropology, ought to correspond. As I have said, however, the only real danger at present can come from framing what is bound to be a purely experimental and preliminary definition in too hard-and-fast a manner. Thus Dr Frazer, though he is doubtless well aware of all the facts I have cited, prefers to treat of magic and religion as occupying mutually exclusive spheres, while I regard these spheres, not indeed as coincident by

any means, but still as overlapping. I, on the other hand, would hold out for the widest possible rendering of the idea of religion on practical and theoretical grounds alike. As regards the former, I should fear to cut myself off prematurely from any group of facts that might possibly bear upon the history of man's religions evolution. As regards theory, I would rest my case on the psychological argument that, if there be reason, as I think there is, to hold that man's religious sense is a constant and universal feature of his mental life, its essence and true nature must then be sought, not so much in the shifting variety of its ideal constructions, as in that steadfast groundwork of specific emotion whereby man is able to feel the supernatural precisely at the point at which his thought breaks down. Thus, from the vague utterance of the Omaha, " the blood pertains to *wakanda*," onwards, through animism, to the dictum of the greatest living idealist philosopher, " the universe is a spiritual whole," a single impulse may be discerned as active—the impulse, never satisfied in finite consciousness yet never abandoned, to bring together and grasp as one the *That* and the *What* of God.

II

FROM SPELL TO PRAYER

ARGUMENT

HAS religion enough in common with magic for spell in certain cases to develop into prayer? Frazer's account of magic is too intellectualistic, and this is why he makes magic and religion utterly distinct in their psychological nature, so that, like oil and water, though juxtaposed, they will not intermix; and so that religion has to be credited by him with an independent and later origin. He regards magic as simply due to a misapplication of the laws of the association of ideas. Magic, however, is not merely an affair of misapplied ideas, but must be studied likewise on its emotional side. Violent passion, such as anger or love, is especially liable to misdirection, the pent-up desire to act discharging itself on the mere shadow of an object if the substance be not ready to hand. Such blind acquiescence in a substituted object amounts, psychologically, to a rudimentary magic. In developed magic, however, the operator is more or less aware that he is dealing with a symbol, yet, in his need for emotional relief, makes himself believe that the desired effect, though enacted on the symbol, is projectively transmitted to the real object; while, apart from this psychological cause of self-justification consisting in the need of relief, the sociological fact

that the belief is shared by others brings about its own verification, since the credulous victim is apt to succumb to his suggested fate. Now the spell on analysis is found to express the spirit of the magical act, and, in particular, to express that exertion of the will to believe which is the psychological counterpart of the mana, *or mysterious power, which the magician and his magic embody. A typical spell distinguishes between symbol and ulterior reality, but carries over the desired effect from the one to the other by means of a projective act of which an uttered "must" is the mainspring.* Mana, *which on its inner side is just this seemingly mysterious power of putting the magical act through, of willing semblance into reality, furnishes a notion that may be used to explain supernatural agency of any kind; so that in this way magic readily passes into religion, since supernaturalism provides a raw material common to them both. Or again, the* mana *may be transferred from its true vehicle, the uttered "must," to the symbol or instrument of the magician's purpose, inasmuch as he is wont to bid it to fulfil his will, and so, having once attributed to it a power and will of its own, readily passes from bluff to blandishment. Or, once more, the ulterior reality, which is ordered to accommodate itself to the prefigured desire, to take on the symbolized effect, may be besought with prayer instead, the will involved in the projection of desire conjuring up an answering will in its object. At once, then, because it equally belongs to the sphere of the occult and supernatural, and because it tends to be conceived as an affair between wills, magic, though distinct, has something in common with religion, so that interpenetration and transfusion are possible between them.*

FROM SPELL TO PRAYER

THIS paper represents the fruit of some rather perfunctory, if only because interrupted, meditation on the broader and, so to speak, more philosophic features of the contrast drawn between magic and religion by Dr Frazer in the second edition of his *Golden Bough*. Meanwhile, it is more immediately written round the subject of the relation of incantation to invocation, the spell to the prayer. I confess to having reached my conclusions by ways that are largely *à priori*. By this I do not mean, of course, that I have excogitated them out of my inner consciousness, as the Teutonic professor in the story is said to have excogitated the camel. I simply mean that the preliminary induction on which my hypothesis is based consists partly in considerations pertaining to the universal psychology of man, and partly in general impressions derived from a limited amount of discursive reading about savages. The verification of my theory, on the other hand, by means of a detailed comparison of its results with the relevant evidence is a task beyond my present means. As for my illustrations, these have been hastily gathered from a few standard books and papers, and most of all, I think, from that house of heaped-up treasure, the *Golden Bough* itself. In these circumstances my sole excuse for challenging the views of an authority whose knowledge and command of anthropological fact is truly vast must be that in the present inchoate state of the science there can be no closed questions, nor even any reserved ones—no mysteries over which expert may claim the

right to take counsel with expert, secure from the incursions of the irresponsible amateur. I would add that what I have to say is not intended in any way to abrogate Dr Frazer's contrast between magic and religion. On the contrary, I consider it to embody a working distinction of first-rate importance. I merely wish to mitigate this contrast by proposing what, in effect, amounts to a separation in lieu of a divorce. A working principle, if it is to work, must not be pushed too hard.

The question, then, that I propose to discuss is the following: Does the spell help to generate the prayer, and, if so, how? Now the spell belongs to magic, and the prayer to religion. Hence we are attacking, in specific shape, no less a problem than this: Does magic help to generate religion?

Perhaps it will make for clearness of exposition if I outline the reply I would offer in what follows to this latter question. First, I suppose certain beliefs, of a kind natural to the infancy of thought, to be accepted at face value in a spirit of naïve faith, whilst being in fact illusory. The practice corresponding to such naïve belief I call "rudimentary magic." Afterwards I conceive a certain sense of their *prima facie* illusiveness to come to attach to these beliefs, without, however, managing to invalidate them. This I call the stage of "developed magic." Such magic, as embodying a reality that to some extent transcends appearance, becomes to a corresponding extent a mystery.

As such, on my view, it tends to fall within the sphere of religion. For I define the object of religion to be whatever is perceived as a mystery and treated accordingly. (Dr Frazer, however, defines religion differently, and this must be borne in mind in estimating the pertinence of such criticisms as I may pass on his interpretations of the facts.)

Let us now turn to the *Golden Bough* to see what light it throws on this same problem, viz., whether magic is a factor in the genesis of religion. If I understand Dr Frazer aright—and of this I am by no means sure—his position comes to this. Magic is a negative, but not a positive, condition of the genesis of religion. The failure of magic is the opportunity of religion. Hence it may be said to help to generate religion in the sense in which the idle apprentice may be said to help to set up his more industrious rival by allowing him to step into his shoes. But it makes no positive contribution to religion either in the way of form or of content.

More explicitly stated, Dr Frazer's theory runs somewhat thus. (It is only fair to note that it is a theory which he puts forward "tentatively" and "with diffidence."[1]) Originally, and so long as the highest human culture was at what may be described as an Australian level, magic reigned supreme, and religion was not. But time and trial proved magic to be a broken reed. "Man saw that he had taken for causes what were no causes, and that all his efforts

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 73 *n.*, 75.

to work by means of these imaginary causes had been vain. His painful toil had been wasted, his curious ingenuity had been squandered to no purpose. He had been pulling at strings to which nothing was attached." Whereupon " our primitive philosopher " (and truly, we may say, did that savage of " deeper mind " and " shrewder intelligence " deserve this title of " philosopher," if he could thus reason, as Dr Frazer makes him do, about " causes " and the like) advanced, " very slowly," indeed, and " step by step," to the following " solution of his harassing doubts." " If the great world went on its way without the help of him or his fellows, it must surely be because there were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed its course and brought about all the varied series of events which he had hitherto believed to be dependent on his own magic."

Now the impression I get from these passages, and from the whole of those twenty pages or so which Dr Frazer devotes to the subject of the relation of magic to religion as such, is that the epic vein decidedly predominates therein. The glowing periods in which the history of " the great transition " is recounted are not easily translated into the cold prose of science. Construed literally they appear liable to not a few serious strictures. For example, pure ratiocination seems to be credited with an effectiveness without a parallel in early culture. Almost as well say that, when man found he could not make big enough bags with the throwing-stick, he sat down and excogitated the bow-and-arrow.

Or again " unseen beings " seem to be introduced as " mysterious powers " sprung fully-armed from the brain of man, and otherwise without assigned prehistory.[1] Finally, magic and religion appear to be treated as in their inmost psychologic nature disparate and unsympathetic forces, oil and water, which even when brought into juxtaposition are so far from mixing that the observer has no difficulty in distinguishing what is due to the presence of each.[2] One's first impression is that a purely analytic method has escaped its own notice in putting on a pseudo-genetic guise, that mere heads of classification have first been invested with an impermeable essence, and then identified with the phases of a historical development which is thereby robbed of all intrinsic continuity. But on second thoughts one sees, I think, that to construe literally here is to construe illiberally. Dr Frazer, in order to dispose summarily of an interminable question, may be supposed to have resorted to a kind of Platonic myth. A certain priority and a certain absoluteness within its own province had to be vindicated for magic as against religion, if the special problem of the *Golden Bough* was to be kept free of irrelevancies. This vindication the myth contrives, and the rest is, so to speak, literature. If Dr Frazer contemplates a specific work on the early history of religion, he doubtless intends to fill in what are manifest gaps in the present argument. Meanwhile, as regards the inquiry we are now embarked on, we may say that, so far as he goes, Dr Frazer is against the view that

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 78. [2] Cf. *ib.*, 33, 45, etc.

magic is capable of merging in religion so as to become part and parcel of it, but that he does not go very far into the question, and leaves it more or less open to further discussion. Wherefore to its further discussion let us proceed.

Now in the first place it would clearly simplify our task if we could find sufficient reason for assuming that, whatever it may afterwards have become, magic was originally something wholly unrelated to religion—that, in short, it was originally *sui generis*. I may point out that this is by no means the same thing as to postulate, with Dr Frazer, an "age of magic," when religion simply was not.[1] Our assumption would not exclude the possibility of some sort of religion having been coeval with magic. Which, let me add, might have been the case, even were it shown that magic can generate religion of a kind. For religion has all the appearance of being a highly complex and multifarious growth—a forest rather than a tree.

That magic was originally *sui generis* might seem a doctrine that hardly calls for establishment, so universally is it accepted by anthropologists. Its peculiar *provenance* is held to be completely known. Thus Dr Frazer tells us that magic may be "deduced immediately from elementary processes of reasoning," meaning the laws of association, or, specifically, the laws of association by similarity and by contiguity in space or time.[2]

Now it seems to me that, once more, these statements need to be construed liberally. The psycho-

[1] See *G. B.*,[2] i. 73. [2] *Ib.*, 70. *Cf.* 62.

logical purist might justly doubt whether Dr Frazer is literally able to deduce magic immediately from the laws of association. He would, at anyrate, deny Dr Frazer's right to describe the laws of association as " processes of reasoning " or " laws of thought " in any strict sense of these terms.[1] A generation ago, no doubt, when the self-styled school of " experience " dominated British psychology, these expressions would have passed muster. In which context it is perhaps relevant to remark that Dr Frazer's theory of the associationalist origin of magic would seem to have been influenced by that of Dr Jevons, and that of Dr Jevons in its turn by that of Dr Tylor, which was framed more than thirty years ago, and naturally reflects the current state of psychological opinion. To-day, however, no psychologist worth seriously considering holds that association taken strictly for just what it is suffices to explain anything that deserves the name of reasoning or thought, much less any form of practical contrivance based on reasoning or thought. First of all, association is no self-acting " mental chemistry," but depends on continuity of interest. Secondly, thought, that is, thought-construction, instead of merely reproducing the old, transforms it into something new. The psychological purist, then, might justly find fault with Dr Frazer's remarks as lacking in technical accuracy, were technical accuracy to be looked for in a passage that, to judge from its style, is semi-popular in its purport. Even so, however, this loose language is to be regretted. Seeing that

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 70 and 62.

an all-sufficient associationalism has for sound reason been banished from psychology, the retention of its peculiar phraseology is to be deprecated as liable to suggest that anthropology is harbouring an impostor on the strength of obsolete credentials.

A word more touching the want of precision in Dr Frazer's language. As in his account of the interior history of the genesis of religion, so in his characterization of the inner nature of magic he seems to exaggerate the work of pure ratiocination. Thus he speaks of magic as a "philosophy" consisting in "principles" from which the savage "infers" and "concludes" this and that;[1] magic "proceeds upon" such and such "assumptions"; and so on.[2] Now on the face of them these appear to be glaring instances of what is known as "the psychologist's fallacy." The standpoint of the observer seems to be confused with the standpoint of the mind under observation. But there are indications that Dr Frazer expects us to make the necessary allowance for his metaphorical diction. Thus one of the "assumptions" of magic is said to consist in a "faith" that whilst "real and firm" is nevertheless "implicit."[3] Meanwhile, from the point of view of the psychological purist, implicit, that is, unconscious, inferences, assumptions, and so on, are little better than hybrids. Now doubtless a considerable amount of real inference may be operative at certain stages in the development of magic. Nay, various forms of magic may even be found to have originated in a theorizing about causes that did not arise out of

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 9. [2] *Ib.*, 49. [3] *Ib.* *Cf.* 62 with 61.

practice save indirectly, and was the immediate fruit of reflection. I refer more especially to divination, if divination is to be classed under magic, as Dr Tylor thinks that it should.[1] But, speaking generally, the working principle we had better adopt as inquirers into the origin of magic is, I suggest, the following: to expect the theory to grow out of the practice, rather than the other way about; to try to start from a savage Monsieur Jourdain who talks prose whilst yet unaware that he is doing so.

In what follows I shall seek to observe this working principle. Meanwhile, I cannot pretend to a systematic and all-inclusive treatment of a subject which, for me, I confess, has at present no well-marked limits. Dr Frazer's division of magic into two kinds, imitative and sympathetic,[2] is highly convenient for analysis, but I am not so sure that it directly subserves genesis. Not to speak of the question already touched on whether divination falls under magic, there are other practices quasi-magical in form, for instance the familiar sucking-cure, which cannot be easily reduced to cases either of imitative or sympathetic magic, and which nevertheless, I believe, are of connate psychological origin with practices of one or other of the last-mentioned types. In these circumstances my attempt at a derivation of magic must be taken in the spirit in which it is offered —namely, as illustrative merely. I shall keep as closely as I can to undisputed forms of magical practice, for instance the casting of spells by means

[1] *See* his article, "Magic," in *Encycl. Brit.* (ninth edit.).
[2] *G. B.*,[2] i. 9.

of an image, in the hope that their development moves along the central line of historical advance.

To start, then, as Dr Frazer seems to suggest that we might,[1] from the brutes. When a bull is in a rage —and let us note that the rage as determining the direction of interest has a good deal to do with the matter [2]—it will gore my discarded coat instead of me, provided that the coat is sufficiently near, and I am sufficiently remote, for the proximate stimulus to dominate its attention. Of course it is very hard to say what really goes on in the bull's mind. Possibly there is little or no meaning in speaking of association as contributory to its act, as would be the case supposing it be simply the sight of something immediately gorable that lets loose the discharge of wrath. On the other hand, suppose it to perceive in the coat the slightest hint or flavour of the intruding presence of a moment before, suppose it to be moved by the least aftertaste of the sensations provoked by my red tie or rapidly retreating form, and we might justly credit association with a hand in the matter. And now to pass from the case of the animal to that of man, in regard to whom a certain measure of sympathetic insight becomes possible. With a fury that well-nigh matches the bull's in its narrowing effect on the consciousness, the lover, who yesterday perhaps was kissing the treasured glove of his mistress, to-day, being jilted, casts her portrait on the fire. Here let us note two things. Firstly,

[1] Cf. *G. B.*,[2] i. 70.

[2] *Cf.* Stout, *Groundwork of Psychology*, Section on "Emotion as determining ideal revival," p. 120.

the mental digression, the fact that he is for the nonce so " blind," as we say, with love or rancour, that the glove or the portrait has by association become substituted for the original object of his sentiments, namely, his mistress. Secondly, the completeness of the digression. This dear glove fit only to be kissed, this hateful portrait fit only to be burnt, occupies his whole attention, and is therefore equivalent to an irresistible belief that realizes itself as inevitably as a suggestion does in the case of the hypnotic patient. Such at least is the current psychological explanation of the phenomenon known as " primitive credulity."

Now can the man who throws the faithless maiden's portrait into the fire, simply because the sight of it irresistibly provokes him to do so, be said to be practising magic? I think, hardly. Since, however, it is better that the class-concepts of anthropology should be framed too wide rather than too narrow, let us speak of a " rudimentary magic," of which the act of primitive credulity is the psychological *terminus a quo*.[1] I contrast such " rudimentary magic " with the " developed magic " whereof the spirit is expressed in the formula: As I do this symbolically, so may something else like it be done in reality. In the former naïve belief prevails, in the latter a make-believe. In what immediately follows we shall be concerned with the psychological history of the transition from the rudimentary to the developed form.

[1] It will be noted that I am dealing with magic almost exclusively on its psychological side. The " rudimentary magic " of this passage is not to be identified with any social institution.

The feature which it is most important for our purpose to note in the act of primitive credulity is that, to coin a phrase, it is not projective. This is well illustrated by the case of the bull. The bull does not gore my coat with any ulterior motive prejudicial to me. On the contrary, it contentedly gores the coat, and, unless I am unfortunate enough to recall the bull's attention to myself, I escape. Thus there is none of that projectiveness to be ascribed to the bull's motive which so characteristically enters into the motive of the act of developed magic. We may be sure that the bull does not conceive (*a*) that he is acting symbolically, that, in child-language, he is " only pretending "; (*b*) that at the same time his pretending somehow causes an ulterior effect, similar as regards its ideal character, but different in that it constitutes that real thing which is the ultimate object of the whole proceeding.

And now let us go on to consider how such primitive credulity is sundered from the beginnings of enlightenment—if to practise projective magic is to be enlightened—only by the veriest hair's-breadth. The moment the bull's rage has died out of him, the coat he was goring becomes that uninteresting thing a coat must be to the normal animal whose interest is solely in the edible. Now the bull, being a bull, probably passes from the one perceptual context to the other, from coat gorable to coat inedible, without any feeling of the relation between them; they are simply not one coat for him at all, but two. But now put in the bull's place a more or less brute-like man, with just that extra dash of continuity in his

mental life which is needed in order that the two coats—the two successive phases of consciousness—may be compared. How will they be compared? We may be sure that the comparison will be, so to speak, in favour of the more normal and abiding experience of the two. If it be more normal to ignore the coat than to gore it, there will arise a certain sense—you may make it as dim as you will to begin with, but once it is there at all it marks a step in advance of primitive credulity—of the gorable aspect of the coat as relatively delusive and unreal, of the act of passion as relatively misdirected and idle.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding this new-found capacity to recognize later on that he has been deluded, rage will continue to delude the subject so long as its grip upon him lasts. Nay more, directly there is a nascent self-consciousness, a sort of detached personality to act as passive spectator, the deluding passion may be actually accompanied by an awareness of being given over to unreal imaginings and vain doings. Doubtless your relatively low savage might say with Kipling's philosopher of the barrack-room:

> "[I've] stood beside an' watched myself
> Be'avin' like a blooming fool."

Make-believe, however, such as we meet with in developed magic, involves something more than mere concurrent awareness that one is being fooled by one's passion. It involves positive acquiescence in such a condition of mind. The subject is not completely mastered by the suggestion, as in the act of primitive credulity. On the contrary, he more or less clearly

perceives it to be fanciful, and yet dallies with it and lets it work upon him. Now why should he do this? Well, originally, I suspect, because he feels that it does him good. Presumably, to work off one's wrath on any apology for an enemy is expletive, that is, cathartic. He knows that he is not doing the real thing, but he finds it does him good to believe he is doing it, and so he makes himself believe it. Symbol and ulterior reality have fallen apart in his thought, but his " will to believe " builds a bridge from the one to the other. Symbolic act and ulterior act symbolized are, we must remember, connected by an ideal bond, in that they are more or less alike, have a character partially identical which so far as it is identical is provocative of one and the same type of reaction. All that is required for the symbolic act to acquire projectiveness is that this ideal bond be conceived as a real bond. Since, however, the appearance of mere ideality can *ex hypothesi* be no longer ignored, it must instead be explained away. Primitive credulity no longer suffices. In the place of a naïve and effortless faith there is needed the kind of faith that, to whatever extent it is assailed by doubt, can recover itself by self-justification.

The methods of self-justification as practised by the primitive mind, become aware that it is pretending, yet loth to abandon a practice rooted in impulse and capable of affording relief to surcharged emotion, are well worth the attention of the anthropologist. The subject tends to be ignored in proportion as association pure and simple is regarded as be-all and end-all of the " art magic." Now we need not sup-

pose that because the primitive mind is able to explain away its doubts, there is therefore necessarily any solid and objective truth at the back of its explanations. Given sufficient bias in favour of a theory, the human mind, primitive or even civilized, by unconsciously picking its facts and by the various other familiar ways of fallacy, can bring itself to believe almost any kind of nonsense. At the same time there does happen to be an objectively true and real projectiveness in the kind of symbolic magic we have been especially considering—the discharge of wrath on the image or what not. We know that as a fact to be symbolically tortured and destroyed by his enemy " gets on the nerves " of the savage, so that he is apt really to feel torturing pains and die.[1] The psychology of the matter is up to a certain point simple enough, the principles involved being indeed more or less identical with those we have already had occasion to consider. Just as the savage is a good actor, throwing himself like a child into his mime, so he is a good spectator, entering into the spirit of another's acting, herein again resembling the child, who can be frightened into fits by the roar of what he knows to be but a " pretended " lion. Even if the make-believe is more or less make-believe to the victim, it is hardly the less efficacious; for, dominating as it tends to do the field of attention, it racks the emotional system, and, taking advantage of the relative abeyance of intelligent thought and will, sets stirring all manner of deep-lying impulses and auto-

[1] See, *e.g.*, *G. B.*,[2] i. 13.

matisms.[1] Well, this being objectively the fact, are we to allow that the savage magician and his victim may become aware of the fact? I think we must. Of course the true reasons of the fact, namely, that suggestion is at work, and so on, are beyond the ken of primitive man. But I submit that the projectiveness of the magical act is grounded, not merely on a subjective bias that " fakes " its facts, but on one that is met half-way, so to speak, by the real facts themselves. I would even suppose that the kind of magic practised by man on man, since it lent itself especially to objective verification, may very well have been the earliest kind of developed magic—the earliest kind to pass beyond the stage of impulse to that of more or less conscious and self-justifying policy. Were this the case, one would have to assume that the savage extended his sphere of operations by some dim sort of analogous reasoning. If, despite appearances to the contrary, magic really answered in the case of man, it would really answer in the case of the weather and so on; to vent one's spleen on the weather being, meanwhile, as a naïve impulsive act, hardly, if at all, less natural than to do so in the case of one's human foe.[2] Thus I surmise that the proved effectiveness of the social department of developed magic gave the greater share of such logical support as was required to the meteorological and other branches of the business.

[1] At this point I might have gone into the confirmatory effect of the credulity being shared by society at large. For psychological purposes, however, it was sufficient to treat the magical experiment as confined to the operator and his victim.

[2] Cf. *G. B.*,[2] i. 108-9.

FROM SPELL TO PRAYER

It is high time that we address ourselves to the more immediate subject of our interest, the spell, the nature of which, however, could not fail to be misunderstood so long as the magical act was vaguely conceived on its psychological side, that is, the side of its true inwardness, the side to which it is the supreme business even of an anthropology that prides itself on its " objective methods " to attend. To begin, then, at the beginning, why should there be an accompanying spell at all? Is it, in fact, an indispensable part of the true magical ceremony? Now it is true that not infrequently the absence of any incantation from a piece of magical ritual as at any-rate performed to-day is expressly noted. To give but one example. Among the Khonds of Orissa a branch cut by a priest in the enemy's country is dressed up and armed so as to personate one of the foe. Thereupon it is thrown down at the shrine of the war god, but this " appeal " to him for co-operation is, we are expressly told, " silent," [1] and that notwithstanding the semi-religious character which the magical rite has put on. On the other hand, the use of the spell as an accompaniment or rather integral portion of the magical performance is so prevalent, that I am inclined, merely on the strength of the historical evidence, to regard its presence as normal in the perfect and uncontaminated ceremony. This supposition would, however, be immensely strengthened if we could discover good psychological reason why the spell ought to be there.

I preferred a moment ago to speak of the spell as an

[1] *J. A. I.*, ix. 362.

integral portion, rather than as the mere accompaniment, of the magical rite, since it is rather with developed than with rudimentary magic that we shall be concerned when in the sequel we consider actual specimens of the kind of spell in use. Corresponding to the act of primitive credulity there may be, I conceive, a kind of spell, if spell it can be called, which is no more than a mere accompaniment. Such a verbal accompaniment will either be purely expletive, or it may be what I shall call " descriptive," as when a child making a picture of a man says aloud to himself, " I am making a man "; that is, supposing him to be merely playing spectator to himself, and not to be assisting himself to imagine that what he draws is a man. Such descriptive accompaniments would of course tend to pass, unaltered in form, into instruments of make-believe as soon as the make-believe stage of magic begins. Nevertheless, the whole psychological character of the spell is from that moment changed. It henceforth forms an integral part of the rite, since it helps the action out.

What do I mean by " helping the action out "? Let us recur to the notion of developed magic as a more or less clearly-recognized pretending, which at the same time is believed to project itself into an ulterior effect. Now I cannot but suppose that such projectiveness is bound to strike the savage as mysterious. " But no," says Dr Frazer; " magic is the savage equivalent of our natural science." This I cannot but profoundly doubt. If it is advisable to use the word " science " at all in such a context, I should say that magic was *occult* science to the

savage, " occult " standing here for the very antithesis of " natural." Dr Frazer proceeds to work out his parallel by formulating the assumption he holds to be common to magic and natural science. Both alike imply " that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency "; or again, " that the course of nature is determined, not by the passions or caprice of personal beings, but by the operation of immutable laws acting mechanically." [1] But the " necessity," the " law," implicit in developed magic as revealed by the corresponding type of spell, namely, the type of spell which helps the action out, is surely something utterly distinct in kind from what natural science postulates under these same notoriously ambiguous names. It is not the " is and cannot but be " of a satisfied induction. On the contrary, it is something that has but the remotest psychological affinity therewith, namely, such a " must " as is involved in " May so and so happen," or " I do this in order that so and so may happen." Such a " must " belongs to magic in virtue of the premonitory projectiveness that reveals itself in the operator's act of imperative willing. Meanwhile, so far as the process fails to explain itself in this way—and it must always, I contend, be felt as something other than a normal and ordinary act of imperative willing—it will inevitably be felt to be occult, supernormal, supernatural, and will participate

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 61, 63. In iii. 459, however, the view that magic and science have any real presupposition in common seems virtually to be given up.

in, while *pro tanto* colouring, whatever happens to be the general mode of accounting for supernaturalistic events. But this, I take it, will always tend to be some theory of quasi-personal agency.

Dr Frazer, however, is so far from allowing this that he makes the implicit presupposition to be the very opposite of the notion of personal agency, namely, the idea of mechanical causation. He does not, however, attempt to go into the psychology of the matter, and the psychological probabilities, I submit, will be found to tell dead against this view of his. Mechanical causation is indeed by no means unknown to the savage. From the moment he employs such mechanical aids as tools he may be supposed to perceive that the work he does with them proceeds as it were directly and immediately from them. He throws a spear at his enemy; it hits him; and the man drops. That the spear makes the man drop he can see. But when a wizard brandishes a magic spear simply in the direction of a distant, perhaps absent and invisible, person, who thereafter dies, the wizard—not to speak of the bystanders—is almost bound to notice something in the action of the symbolic weapon that is indirect, and as such calls aloud for explanation on non-mechanical lines. The spear did not do it of itself, but some occult power, whether in, or behind, the spear. Further, his own consciousness cannot fail to give him an intuitive inkling of what this power is, namely, his projection of will, a psychic force, a manifestation of personal agency, *mana*. It is a secondary consideration whether he locate the personal agency,

the " devil," in the spear, in himself, or in some *tertium quid* that possesses it or him. In any case the power is represented quasi-personally. I am quite prepared to believe with Mr Lang that gods tend at first to be conceived as exercising their power precisely as a magician does.[1] But it does not therefore follow, as it must if Dr Frazer's theory of magical as mechanical causation be accepted, that in some sense the early gods came down to men " from out of a machine."

We have been hitherto considering the magical act from the point of view of the operator. Let us now inquire what sort of character is imposed by it on the other party to the transaction, namely, the victim. If our previous hypothesis be correct, that to the operator the magical act is generically a projection of imperative will, and specifically one that moves on a supernormal plane, it follows that the position of the victim will be, in a word, a position compatible with *rapport*. As the operator is master of a supernormal " must," so the victim is the slave of that same " must." Now surely there is nothing in such a position on the part of the victim that is incompatible with the possession of what we know as will. On the contrary, might we not expect that the operator, as soon as he comes to reflect on the matter at all, would think of his power as somehow making itself felt by his victim, as somehow coming home to him, as somehow reaching the unwilling will of the man and bending it to an enforced assent? On this theory a magical transaction ought, hardly if at all

[1] *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, i. 120.

less naturally than a religious transaction, to assume the garb of an affair between persons. We shall see presently whether there is evidence that it actually does. On Dr Frazer's view, however, magic and religion are systems based on assumptions that are as distinct and wide apart as matter and mind, their ultimate implications. Hence, if magic and religion join forces, it is for Dr Frazer a mere contamination of unrelated originals incapable of presenting the inward unity of a single self-developing plot. He is driven to allege a " confusion of ideas," a " mixture," a " fusion," an " amalgamation," such as can take place only under the pressure of some extrinsic influence.[1] For a satisfactory clue, however, to the nature of the collocating cause we search his writings in vain.

Meanwhile, Dr Frazer seems to admit the thin end of the wedge into his case for a mechanically-causative magic by allowing that the material on which it works is composed not merely of " things which are regarded as inanimate," but likewise of " persons whose behaviour in the particular circumstances is known to be determined with absolute certainty." [2] Now of course magic may be conceived as taking effect on a person through his body, as when that which is projected takes the form of an *atnongara* stone, viz. a piece of crystal, or of something half-material, half-personal, like the *arungquiltha* of the Arunta, or the *badi* of the Malays.[3] After all, magic in one of

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 67, 69.

[2] See *G. B.*,[2] i. 63, where this is clearly implied.

[3] *Cf.* Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 531 and 537 ; Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 427.

its most prominent aspects is a disease-making. But Dr Frazer's interest is not in these secondary notions. He is seeking to elucidate the ultimate implication of magic when he explains " determined with absolute certainty " to mean—determined, as is " the course of nature," " by the operation of immutable laws acting mechanically." [1] But a person conceived as simply equivalent to an inanimate thing—for that is precisely what it comes to—is a fundamentally different matter, I contend, from the notion I take to be, not implicit, but nascently explicit [2] here, namely, that of a will constrained. No doubt the modern doctrine of a psychological automatism virtually forbids us to speak any longer of " will " in such a connection. To naïve thought, however, as witness the more popular explanations of the phenomena of suggestion current in our own time, the natural correlative to exercise of will on the part of the operator will surely be submission, *i.e.* of will, as we should say, on the part of the patient. For the rest, it would seem that Dr Frazer bases his case for it being a kind of physical necessity that is ascribed by the savage to the workings of his magic on the explanation which the medicine-man gives of his failures, when he alleges that nothing but the interference of another more potent sorcerer could have robbed his spell of its efficacy.[3] But the excuse

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 63.

[2] Compare the effect on the woman ascribed to the *lonka-lonka*, below, p. 65.

[3] *G. B.*,[2] i. 61. *See*, however, Sp. and G., 532, from which it appears that the medicine-man by no means sticks to a single form of excuse.

appears to imply, if anything, a conditionality and relativity of will-power, of *mana*, the analogy of the scientific law being manifestly far-fetched. And surely it is in any case somewhat rash to deduce the implicit assumptions of an art from such a mere piece of professional " bluff."

If, then, the occult projectiveness of the magical act is naturally and almost inevitably interpreted as an exertion of will that somehow finds its way to another will and dominates it, the spell or uttered " must " will tend, I conceive, to embody the very life and soul of the affair. Nothing initiates an imperative more cleanly, cutting it away from the formative matrix of thought and launching it on its free career, than the spoken word. Nothing, again, finds its way home to another's mind more sharply. It is the very type of a spiritual projectile. I do not, indeed, believe that what may be called the silent operations of imitative magic are ultimately sign-language and nothing more. I prefer to think, as I have already explained, that they are originally like the fire drawn from an excitable soldier by the tree-stump he mistakes for an enemy, or, more precisely, miscarriages of passion-clouded purpose prematurely caused by a chance association; and that what might be called their prefigurative function is an outgrowth. But I certainly do incline to think that, when the stage of developed magic is reached and the projectiveness of the mimic act is established as a fact, a fact, however, that as mysterious, occult, calls aloud for interpretation, the projective character of the silent part of the magical ritual will come to under-

lie its whole meaning; and further, that the spell, as being the crispest embodiment of the "must," as spring and soul of the projection, will naturally provide the general explanatory notion under which the rest will be brought, namely, that of an imperative utterance.

Let us now consider typical specimens of the various kinds of spell in common use, partly in order to test and substantiate the foregoing contentions, but more especially so that haply we may observe the spell pass by easy gradations into the prayer, the imperative into the optative. To begin with, I would suggest that at the stage of developed magic the most perfect spell is one of the following form—a form so widely distributed and easily recognized that a single example will suffice to characterize it. In ancient Peru, when a war expedition was contemplated, they were wont to starve certain black sheep for some days and then slay them, uttering the incantation:[1] "As the hearts of these beasts are weakened, so let our enemies be weakened." Precisely the same type is found all over the world, from Central Australia to Scotland.[2] I call this form perfect, because it takes equal notice of present symbolization and ulterior realization, instrument and end. Here the instrument is the weakening of the beasts, the end the weakening of the enemy. Let us not, however, overlook the explicitly stated link between the two, the unifying soul of the process, namely, the imperative "let them be weakened." It is apt to escape one's attention because the

[1] *Acosta*, ii. 342. [2] *Cf.* Sp. and G., 536, and *G. B.*,[2] i. 17.

operator, instead of obtruding his personality upon us, concentrates like a good workman on his instrument, which might therefore at the first glance be credited with the origination of the force it but transmits. Not unfrequently, however, the personal agency of the operator appears on the surface of the spell, as when sunshine is made in New Caledonia by kindling a fire and saying: "Sun! I do this that you may be burning hot." [1] Here the sun is treated as a "you," so that the operator is perhaps not unnaturally led to refer to himself as the other party to this transaction between persons. Meanwhile, though our second instance is interesting as indicating the true source of the *mana* immanent in the spell, namely, the operator's exertion of will-power, it is better not to insist too strongly on the difference between the instrument and the force that wields and as it were fills it. Both alike belong to what may be called the protasis of the spell. The important logical cleavage occurs between protasis and apodosis—the firing of the projectile and the hitting of the target—the setting-in-motion of the instrument and the realization of the end. Every true spell, I submit, distinguishes implicitly or explicitly between the two. I say implicitly or explicitly, for we find curtailed spells of the kind "We carry Death into the water," no mention being made of the symbol.[2] It would be quite wrong, however, to argue that here is no make-believe, no disjoining of instrument and end requiring an exertion of credulity that simply takes the one act for the other. This is shown by the occurrence of the

[1] Cf. *G. B.*,[3] i. 116. [2] *Ib.*, ii. 83.

same sort of spell in fuller form, *e.g.*, " Ha, Koré, we fling you into the river, like these torches, that you may return no more." [1] The participants in the rite know, in short, that they are " only pretending." They have the thought which it is left to Mr Skeat's Malays to express with perfect clearness: " It is not wax that I am scorching, it is the liver, heart and spleen of So-and-so that I scorch." [2]

This relative disjunction, then, of instrument and end, protasis and apodosis, being taken as characteristic of the spell of developed magic, let us proceed to inquire how each in turn is in general character fitted to promote the development of the prayer out of the spell (assuming this to be possible at all). First, then, let us consider whether magic contributes anything of its own to religion when we approach the subject from the side of what has been called the instrument. Under this head we have agreed to take account both of the projective act and of the projectile—in other words, both of the putting forth of the " must " and of the symbol in which the " must " is embodied.

Now the projective act, I have tried to show, while felt by the operator as essentially a kind of imperative willing, is yet concurrently perceived by him to be no ordinary and normal kind of imperative willing. Inasmuch as the merely symbolized and pretended reproduces itself in an ulterior and separate shape as solid fact, the process is manifestly occult or supernormal. Now I have elsewhere tried to show probable reason why the prime condition of

[1] Cf. *G. B.*,[2] ii. 108. [2] *M. M.*, 570.

the historical genesis of religion should be sought in the awe caused in man's mind by the perception of the supernatural, that is, supernormal, as it occurs within him and about him. For the purposes of the anthropologist I would have the limits of primitive religion coincide with those of primitive "supernaturalism." To adopt a happy phrase coined by Mr Hartland when noticing my view, the supernatural is the original "theoplasm, god-stuff." [1] Is, then, the occult or supernatural as revealed in magic at first the one and only form of supernatural manifestation known to man? Emphatically I say, No. To take but one, and that perhaps the most obvious, example of an object of supernaturalistic awe that anthropology must be content to treat as primary and *sui generis*, the mystery of human death may be set over against the miracle of the magical projection as at least as original and unique a rallying-point of superstition. On the other hand, I am quite prepared to believe that magical occultism was able of its own right to colour primitive supernaturalism to a marked and noteworthy extent. I suggest that the peculiar contribution of magic—at all events of the kind of magic we have been considering—to religion was the idea of *mana*.[2] No doubt, the actual *mana* of the Melanesians will on analysis be found to yield a very mixed and self-contradictory set of meanings, and to stand for any kind of power that rests in whatever way upon the divine. I suppose it, however, to have the central

[1] *Folk-Lore*, xii. 27.

[2] On the subject of "magomorphism," *cf.* p. 88.

and nuclear sense of magical power; and, apart from the question of historical fact, let me, for expository purposes at anyrate, be allowed to give the term this connotation. The inwardness of such *mana* or magical power we have seen reason to regard as derived by the magician from a more or less intuitive perception of his projective act of will as the force which occultly transmutes his pretence into ulterior reality. But if the essence of his supernormal power lie in precisely this, then wherever else there be discoverable supernormal power under control of a person, will not its essence tend to be conceived as consisting in the same? Meanwhile, all manifestations of the supernatural are likely to appear as in some sense manifestations of power, and as in some sense personally controlled. That they should be noticed at all by man they must come within the range of his practical interests, that is, be as agents or patients in regard to him; and, if he is in awe of them, it will assuredly be as agents, actual or potential, that is, as powers, that he will represent them to himself. And again, whatever is able to stand up against him as an independent and self-supporting radiator of active powers will be inevitably invested by him with more or less selfhood or personality like in kind to what he is conscious of in himself. Thus there is no difficulty in explaining psychologically why *mana* should be attributed to those quasi-personal powers of awful nature by which the savage, immersed in half-lights and starting like a child at his own shadow, feels himself on every hand to be surrounded.

Why, then, does Dr Frazer, whilst admitting that for the magician to seek for *mana* at the hands of ghosts of the dead, stones, snakes, and so on, is characteristic of that " earlier stage " in the history of religion when the antagonism between sorcerer and priest as yet was not, nevertheless treat this as a " confusion of magic and religion," and go on to lay it down that " this fusion is not primitive "? [1] Is it not simply that he ignores the possibility of the origin of the idea of *mana* itself in the inward experience that goes with the exercise of developed magic? For Dr Frazer this seeking for supernatural aid on the part of the sorcerer is a " passing into another kind." The sorcerer's exertion of power and the *mana* he craves of his gods have no direct psychological affinity. If, however, our argument has not been all along proceeding on a false track, there is a specific identity of nature common to the force which animates the magical act as such, and that additional force which in certain cases is sought from an external supernatural source. Psychologically speaking, there seems every reason why, granting that the magical act is regarded as occult, and as such falls into line with whatever else is occult and supernatural, its peculiar inwardness as revealed to the operator should be read into whatever else has the *prima facie* appearance of a quasi-personal exertion of supernatural power. After all, we know that, in point of fact, the savage is ready enough to put down whatever effects he cannot rationally account for (*e.g.*, disease) to what may be termed

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 65-6, 69.

sorcery in the abstract. But, once it is established that to feel like and inwardly be a supernatural agent is to feel oneself exerting the will-power of a human magician, then what more natural than that a human magician when in difficulties should seek, by any one of the many modes of entering into relations with the divine, to reinforce his own *mana* from the boundless store of self-same *mana* belonging to those magicians of a higher order whom, so to speak, he has created after his own image?

All this, however, I confess, it is easier to deduce than to verify. When we try to study the matter in the concrete, we soon lose our way amongst plural causes and intermixed effects. For instance, it is clear that the savage has inward experience of the supernormal, not only in his feats of projective magic, but likewise in his dreams, his fits of ecstasy, and so on (though these latter seem to have no place within the sphere of magic proper). Or again we have been dealing with the act of magic from the point of view of the operator. But there is also the point of view of the victim, whose suggestibility will, we may suppose, be largely conditioned by the amount of " asthénic " emotion—fear and fascination—induced in him. Hence any sort of association with the supernatural and awful which the sorcerer can establish will be all to the good. An all-round obscurántism and mystery-mongering is his policy, quite apart from the considerations that make his own acts mysterious to himself. However, the quotations cited by Dr Frazer from Dr Codrington seem fairly crucial as regards the hypothesis I am

defending.[1] *Mana* is at all events the power which is believed to do the work in Melanesian magic, and to obtain *mana* on the other hand is the object of the rites and practices that make up what anthropologists will be ready to call Melanesian "religion." Or once more we seem to find exactly what we want in the following prayer of the Malay *pawang* at the grave of a murdered man: "Hearken, So-and-so, and assist me . . . I desire to ask for a little magic."[2] I submit, then, that *mana*, as I have interpreted it, yields the chief clue to the original use of names of power in connection with the spell, from "in the devil's name"[3] to "Im Namen Jesu."[4] Mr Skeat has compared the exorcising of disease-demons by invoking a spirit of some powerful wild beast, the elephant or the tiger, to the casting out of devils through Beelzebub their prince.[5] Admitting the comparison to be just and apt, is there not at the back of this the notion of the magic-working power —the "control"—inherent in the supernatural being as such?[6] Secondary ideas will of course tend to superimpose themselves, as when, as Mr Skeat has abundantly shown, the magician invokes the higher power no longer as an ally, but rather as a shield. "It is not I who am burying him (in the form of a waxen image), it is Gabriel who is burying him."[7] Still Gabriel, I suggest, was primarily conceived as a

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 65-6. *Cf.* the same authority in *J. A. I.*, xi. 309.
[2] *M. M.*, 60-1 [3] Cf. *G. B.*,[2] i. 121.
[4] *Cf.* W. Heitmüller, *Im Namen Jesu*, Göttingen, 1903.
[5] *Folk-Lore*, xiii. 159.
[6] The Malay charm-book quoted by Mr Skeat puts the matter typically, "God was the Eldest Magician." *M. M.*, 2.
[7] *M. M.*, 571. Cf. *G. B.*,[2] i. 11.

magic-working power, and indeed as such is able to bear all responsibility on his broad shoulders. Compare the huntsman's charm addressed to the (more or less divine) deer: "It is not I who am huntsman, it is Pawang Sidi (wizard Sidi) that is huntsman; It is not I whose dogs these are, it is Pawang Sakti (the 'magic wizard') whose dogs these are." [1]

But I must move forward to another aspect of the inherent tendency of the magical instrument to generate religion. Instead of taking the form of a divine fellow-operator who backs the magician, the *mana* may instead associate itself so closely with the magician's symbol as to seem a god whose connection is with it rather than with him. The ultimate psychological reason for this must be sought, as I have already hinted, in the good workman's tendency to throw himself literally, as far as his consciousness goes, into the work before him. He is so much one in idea with his instrument that the *mana* in him is as easily represented as resident in it. Meanwhile the capacity of naïve thought to personify whatever has independent existence must help out the transference, as may be illustrated abundantly from such a magnificent collection of spells as we get in the *Golden Bough*. Contrast the following pair of cases. In West Africa, when a war party is on foot, the women dance with brushes in their hands, singing, "Our husbands have gone to Ashantee land; may they sweep their enemies off the face of the earth." [2] In much the same way in the Kei Islands, when a battle is in progress, the

[1] *M. M.*, 175.

[2] *G. B.*,[2] i. 34.

women wave fans in the direction of the enemy. What they say, however, is, " O golden fans! let our bullets hit and those of the enemy miss." [1] We must not make too much of such a change from impersonal mention to personal address. It implies no more than a slight increase in vividness of idea. Still, as far as it goes, I take it, it is all in the direction of that more emphatic kind of personification which gives the thing addressed enough soul of its own to enable it to possess *mana*. In the following Russian example we seem to see the instrument first created, then invested with personality, and lastly filled with *mana* more or less from without: " I attach five knots to each hostile infidel shooter. . . . Do ye, O knots, bar the shooter from every road and way. . . . In my knots lies hid the mighty strength of snakes—from the twelve-headed snake." [2] Here the *mana* is added more or less from without, for, though a knot is enough like a snake to generate the comparison, yet the twelve-headed snake sounds like an intensification definitely borrowed from mythology. The example, however, is not sufficiently primitive to bear close scrutiny as regards the thought it contains. On the other hand, the Australians are, in Dr. Frazer's eyes at least, as primitive as you please, and it is precisely amongst them that he finds a magic free of religion. Yet Australia presents us with a crucial case of the deification of the magical instrument.

To punish their enemies the Arunta prepare a

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 33.
[2] *G. B.*,[2] i. 399. *Cf.* iii. 360, which introduces us to a ten-headed serpent (Greek).

magic spear. It is named the *arungquiltha*, this name, let us note, being equally applicable to the supernatural evil power that possesses anybody or anything, and to the person or object wherein it is permanently or for the time being resident. They then address it, "Go straight, go straight and kill him," and wait till the *arungquiltha* is heard to reply, "Where is he?"—being, we are told, "regarded in this instance as an evil spirit resident in the magic implement."[1] Thereafter a crash of thunder is heard, and a fiery appearance is seen streaking across the sky—a beautifully concrete image, by the way, of the projectiveness ascribed by the savage to his magic. It is but a step from this to the identification of the *arungquiltha* with comets and shooting-stars.[2] By a converse movement of mythologizing thought, when a man wishes to charm a certain shell ornament, the *lonka-lonka*, so that it may gain him the affections of a woman, he sings over it certain words which convey an invitation to the lightning to come and dwell in the *lonka-lonka*. The supposed effect of this on the woman is precisely that we nowadays attribute to suggestion. She, though absent in her own camp, sees, with the inward eye as it were, since she alone sees it, the lightning flashing on the *lonka-lonka*, "and all at once her internal organs shake with emotion."[3] Now why these easy transitions of thought from the magical instrument to a celestial portent, and *vice versa*, not to speak of the identification of *arungquiltha* with other manifestations of the supernatural embodied in stones,

[1] Sp. and G., 548-9. [2] *Ib.*, 550. [3] *Ib.*, 545.

alcheringa animals, and what not?[1] Simply, I answer, because magic proper is all along an occult process, and as such part and parcel of the "god-stuff" out of which religion fashions itself. And more than this, by importing its peculiar projectiveness into the vague associations of the occult it provides one, though I do not say the only, centre round which those associations may crystallize into relatively clear, if even so highly fluid and unstable, forms. We may see why the medicine-man is so ready to press into his service that miscellaneous mass of "plant," dead men's bones, skins of strange animals, and what not; and why these objects in their turn come to be able to work miracles for themselves, and in fact develop into non-human medicine-men. But all these things were psychologically next door to impossible, if magic were in origin a mechanical "natural science" utterly alien in its inward essential nature to all religion, and as such capable only of yielding to it as a substitute, and never of joining forces with it as ally and blood-relation. Surely, if we look at the matter simply from this side alone, the side of the instrument, there is enough evidence to upset the oil-and-water theory of Dr Frazer.

Before we leave the subject of the instrument let us finally note that concurrently with the personification and progressive deification of the instrument, as it may be called, the spell evolves into the prayer. Thus, on the one hand, the name of power associated with the spell, instead of being merely quoted so as

[1] Sp. and G., 550-1.

by simple juxtaposition to add *mana* to *mana*, may be invoked as a personal agency by whose good grace the charm as a whole is caused to work. Dr Frazer provides us with an instance of this from the Kei Islands. When their lords are away fighting, the women, having anointed certain stones and fruits and exposed them on a board, sing: "O lord sun and moon let the bullets rebound from our husbands . . . just as raindrops rebound from these objects which are smeared with oil." [1] Dr Frazer speaks of "the prayer to the sun that he will be pleased to give effect to the charm" as "a religious and perhaps later addition." No doubt in a sense it is. We have seen reason to believe, however, that such a development is natural to the spell; and this particular development would be especially natural if we regard the sun and moon as invoked not merely as magic-working powers in general, but as powers of the sky which send the rain and are thus decidedly suggested by the spell itself. At anyrate it seems quite certain that reflection on the occult working of a spell will generate the notion of external divine agency, and this notion in its turn give rise to prayer. Thus the New Caledonia rain-makers poured water over a skeleton so that it might run on to some taro leaves. "They believed that the soul of the deceased took up the water, converted it into rain, and showered it down again." From this belief it is but a step to prayer. And so we find that in Russia, where a very similar rite is practised, whilst some pour water on the corpse

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 33.

through a sieve, others beat it about the head, exclaiming, "Give us rain."[1] In these cases the power invoked is more or less external to the symbol. On the other hand, it may be identical with the symbol. Thus the Fanti wizard puts a crab into a hole in the ground over which the victim is about to pass, and sprinkles rum over it with the invocation: "O Crab-Fetish, when So-and-so walks over you, may you take life from him."[2] Here the crab, I suggest, was originally a magical symbol on a par with the stones which in Borneo serve to protect fruit trees, the idea of which is that the thief may suffer from stones in the stomach like to these. These Borneo stones are similarly treated as personal agencies. They are called on to witness the anathema. Or again, if a friend of the proprietor wishes to pluck the fruit, he first lights a fire and asks it to explain to the stones that he is no thief.[3] In short, there is fairly crucial evidence to show how naturally and insensibly the charm-symbol may pass into the idol.[4] All that is needed is that there should be sufficient personification for prayer to be said.

It remains to speak very briefly of the corresponding personification and gradual deification of what in contrast to the "instrument" I have called the "end." Now clearly the curtailed form of spell with suppressed protasis is to all outward appearance a prayer and nothing else. Take a single very simple

[1] *G. B.*,[2] i. 100.

[2] *J. A. I.*, xxvi. 151. Cf. *G. B.*,[2] ii. 69-70, where the divine cuttle-fish is propitiated, lest it make a cuttle-fish grow in the man's inside.

[3] *Ib.*, xxiii. 161.

[4] *Cf.* Dr Haddon in *J. A. I.*, xix. 324.

example—the "Fruit, Fruit, Fruit, Fruit," which we find at the end of various Malay charms connected with the practice of "productive" magic.[1] According to our previous conclusions, however, this is no prayer so long as the force which sets the spell in motion is felt by the operator as an exertion of imperative will and an attempt to establish control. But, given a form of words which need suffer no change though the thought at the back of it alter, what more natural than that the mind of the charmer should fluctuate between "bluff" and blandishment, conjuration and cajolery?

Mr Skeat provides us with examples of how easily this transition effects itself in the course of one and the same ceremony. Thus "Listen, O listen, to my injunctions"—which is surely prayer—is immediately followed by threat backed by the name of power: "And if you hearken not to my instructions you shall be rebels in the sight of Allah."[2] And that we need not suppose this transition to involve a change of mind from overweening pride of soul to humility and reverence,[3] the same authority makes it clear that prayer may be resorted to as a trick, may be a civil request that but masks a decoy,[4] a complication which in itself shows how artificial must ever be the distinction we draw, purely for our own classificatory purposes, between magic and religion. So far we have considered the transition

[1] *Cf.* Mr Skeat in *Folk-Lore*, xiii. 161.

[2] *Folk-Lore*, xiii. 142.

[3] Contrast what Dr Frazer says about man's new-found sense of his own littleness, etc., *G. B.*,[2] i. 78.

[4] *M. M.*, 140, 308.

from the side of the operator. And now look at it from the side of the patient or victim whose will he seeks to constrain. That it is a question of a will constrained, and not of a person conceived as equivalent to an inanimate thing, we have already argued. An example of the way the savage figures to himself the effects of the control he exerts was provided by the Arunta description of the woman who with the inward eye sees the lightning flashing on the *lonka-lonka*, and all at once her inward parts are shaken with the projected passion. Now savage thought finds no difficulty in postulating will constrained where we deny will and personality altogether. And, once personify, you are on the way to worship. Thus in China they sweep out the house and say, "Let the devil of poverty depart."[1] In Timorlaut and Ceram they launch the disease boat, at the same time crying, "O sickness, go from here."[2] Already here we seem to find the spell-form changed over into the prayer-form. Meanwhile in Buro the same rite is accompanied by the invocation: "Grandfather Small-pox, go away."[3] Here the "Grandfather" is clearly indicative of the true spirit of prayer, as might be illustrated extensively. Or so again the magical ploughing of the Indian women is accompanied by what can only be described as a prayer to "Mother Earth."[4] Clearly the cults of the rice-mother, the maize-mother, the corn-mother, and so on, wherein magic is finally swallowed up in unmistakable religion, are the natural outcome of

[1] *G. B.*,[2] iii. 83.
[2] *Ib.*, 97-8.
[3] *Ib.*, 98.
[4] *Ib.*, i. 99.

such a gradually-intensifying personification. But this personification in its turn would follow naturally upon that view of the magical act which we have all along assumed to have been its ground-idea, namely, the view that it is an inter-personal, inter-subjective transaction, an affair between wills — something, therefore, generically akin to, if specifically distinct from, the relation which brings together the suppliant and his god.

One word only in conclusion. I have been dealing, let it be remembered in justice to my hypothesis, with this question of the relation of magic to religion, the spell to the prayer, *abstractly*. It is certain that religion cannot be identified merely with the worship directly generated by magic. Religion is a far wider and more complex thing. Again, there may be other elements in magic than the one I have selected for more or less exclusive consideration. It is to some extent a matter of definition. For instance, divination may, or may not, be treated as a branch of magic. If it be so treated, we might, as has already been said, have to admit that, whereas one kind of magic develops directly out of quasi-instinctive practice, namely, the act of primitive credulity, another kind of magic, divination, is originally due to some sort of dim theorising about causes, the theory engendering the practice rather than the practice the theory. Meanwhile, if out of the immense confusion of beliefs and rites which the student of savage superstition is called upon to face, we shall haply have contrived to isolate, and more or less consistently keep in view, a single abstract development of some intrinsic

interest and importance, we shall have done very well. Every abstraction that is " won from the void and formless infinite " is of value in the present vague and shifting condition of Anthropology. Dr Frazer's abstract contrast of magic and religion is a case in point. But abstraction needs to be qualified by abstraction that the ideal whole may at length be envisaged as a unity of many phases. My object throughout has been to show that, if from one point of view magic and religion must be held apart in thought, from another point of view they may legitimately be brought together.

III

IS TABOO A NEGATIVE MAGIC?

ARGUMENT

FRAZER'S intellectualistic explanation of magic as a misapplication of the association of ideas by similarity and contiguity is extended by him to cover likewise the whole doctrine of taboo, which on this view is just a negative magic, a system of abstinences based on the avoidance of certain calculated, and, as it turns out, miscalculated evil consequences. But taboo can be shown to implicate a feeling of the supernatural or mysterious, which as such abounds in indefinite and incalculable effects. What is tabooed is always a power whose modes of action transcend the ordinary. Sympathy, that is, association by similarity and contiguity, doubtless helps sometimes to prefigure the type of danger to be feared; but in any case it fails to account for the full force of the sanction involved, which indeed is, in one aspect, a sociological fact, namely, a prohibition maintained by the strong arm of the law, the taboo breaker being accounted a public danger. Even from the psychological point of view, however, taboo is more than the outcome of a false scheme of thought, since it is felt to be essentially a mystic affair, relating to wonder-working powers. Whether we term such wonder-working in general magic, or, preferably, use the word magic to mean only a

bad or anti-social kind of wonder-working, we are in any case carried beyond magic in the sense of the sympathetic principle into that wider sphere of the supernatural or mysterious, to which many savage expressions have reference, as, for instance, the Pygmy oudah, *and, notably, the* mana *of the Pacific. To break a taboo is to set in motion against oneself* mana, *or supernatural wonder-working power; but the particular form likely to be taken by the visitation remains for the most part uncertain. Thus the communal taboos of the Manipur region are organized as a precaution against mystic perils all and sundry, the chief motive at work being an indefinite anxiety. Mystic evils, even if prefigured according to the sympathetic principle, are always pregnant evils; their end is not in sight. Certain taboos may be considered in detail. The taboo on contact with women is due to the fact that woman is regarded more or less as a witch; the reason is not merely lest she transmit her effeminacy to the male. The stranger is taboo because of his inherent strangeness, and not merely because he may import various sympathetic contagions from without. The chief is taboo, not lest he pass on his kingliness, but because he has* mana, *the immeasurable power of a superman. Thus, instead of terming taboo a negative magic, it would be truer to describe it as a negative* mana.

IT is always easier to criticize than to construct. Many affirmative instances usually go to the founding of an induction, whereas a single contradictory case suffices to upset it. Meanwhile, in anthropology, it will not do to press a generalization overmuch, for at least two reasons. The first

of these reasons is the fundamental one that human history cannot be shown, or at anyrate has not hitherto been shown, to be subject to hard-and-fast laws.[1] Hence we must cut our coat according to our cloth, and be fully content if our analysis of the ways and doings of man discloses tendencies of a well-marked kind. The second reason is that, in the present state of the science, field-work, rightly enough, predominates over study work. Whilst the weather lasts and the crop is still left standing, garnering rather than threshing must remain the order of the day. Working hypotheses, therefore, the invention of theorists who are masters of their subject, are not so plentiful that we can afford to discard them at the first hint of an exception. If, then, some one comes forward to attack a leading view, it is not enough to arm himself with a few negative instances. It is likewise incumbent on the critic to provide another view that can serve as a substitute. In the present case I have sought to do this after a fashion, though I am painfully aware that, in defining taboo by means of *mana*, I am laying myself open to a charge of explaining *obscurum per obscurius*. I can only reply prophetically that the last word about *mana* has not yet been said; that it represents a genuine idea of the primitive mind, an idea no less genuine and no less widely

[1] *Cf.* p. 132. A distinguished anthropologist writes to me that, if anthropology be not subject to hard-and-fast laws, the subject would not seem to him "worth touching with a barge-pole." But my own opinion is that the less the man of science (who usually is no philosopher) has to do with a metaphysical postulate such as that of determinism, the better.

distributed than the idea of taboo, as several writers have recently suggested, and as further investigation will, I believe, abundantly confirm. I would also rejoin that if the accusation of *obscurum per obscurius* hardly applies directly to the theory I am criticizing —since to identify " magic " with the sympathetic principle yields a perfectly definite sense—yet the natural associations of the word are so much at variance with this abstract use of the name of a social institution that the expression " negative magic " is more likely to cause confusion than to clear it up.

So far back as when Dr Tylor published his epoch-making *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* we find the suggestion put forward of a certain community of principle between taboo and that " confusion of objective with subjective connection " which " may be applied to explain one branch after another of the arts of the sorcerer and diviner, till it almost seems as though we were coming near the end of his list, and might set down practices not based on this mental process as exceptions to a general rule." [1] " Many of the food prejudices of savage races," continues Dr Tylor, " depend on the belief which belongs to this class of superstitions, that the qualities of the eaten pass into the eater. Thus, among the Dayaks, young men sometimes abstain from the flesh of deer, lest it should make them timid, and before a pig-hunt they avoid oil, lest the game should slip through their fingers, and in the same way the flesh of slow-going and cowardly animals is not

[1] *Op. cit.*, 3rd edit., 129.

to be eaten by the warriors of South America; but they love the meat of tigers, stags and boars, for courage and speed." [1]

Recently [2] Dr Frazer has universalized Dr Tylor's partial correlation, and has pronounced " the whole doctrine of taboo " to be a negative magic, understanding by magic a misapplication of the association of ideas by similarity and contiguity. A very similar definition had already been proposed by MM. Hubert and Mauss.[3] They limit the identification, however, to what they name " sympathetic taboo," implying that taboo includes other varieties as well. Again, although here they seem to make the sympathetic principle the differentia of magic, the final gist of their admirable essay is rather to find this in the anti-social character ascribed to the magician's art.

Now, according to the foregoing view, taboo is a ceremonial abstinence based on the fear of definite consequences. Just as sympathetic magic says, " As I do this, so may that which this symbolises follow," taboo says, " I must not do this, lest there follow that which is the counterpart of this."

In violent contrast we have the view of Dr Jevons, which, at first sight at anyrate, seems to declare all consideration of consequences to be foreign to the taboo attitude. He bases his theory of taboo on an alleged " fact that among savages universally there

[1] *Op. cit.*, 3rd edit., 131.

[2] *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, 52.

[3] *L'Année Sociologique*, vii. 56. It is to be noted that Dr Frazer arrived at his conclusion by independent means; cf. *Man*, 1906, 37. *See* also Hubert and Mauss, *Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions*, Preface xxii.

are some things which categorically and unconditionally must not be done," insisting, " that this feeling is a ' primitive ' sentiment." [1] Now it is not easy to discover what is here meant, so great is the departure from the recognized terminology of philosophy. " Categorically " and " unconditionally " are expressions that smack of Kantian " rigorism "; but Kant's famous analysis of duty as a categorical and unconditional imperative makes obligation directly antagonistic to sentiment of all kinds. A sentiment as such has a history and assignable development. The Kantian law of duty, *à priori*, objective, absolute, has none whatever. Is Dr Jevons, then, speaking here strictly according to philosophic tradition? Or would he recognize a growth of moral principle, say, on some such lines as those which Dr Westermarck or Mr Hobhouse has recently laid down? If he were of the former persuasion, then he would be irrelevantly interpolating a non-genetic view of morality that for purposes of psychological and sociological explanation could have no value or significance at all. But if he is of the other and less uncompromising faith—which appears more probable, seeing that his book is professedly dealing with religion from the historical standpoint — then " categorical " and " unconditional," in their application to a mere sentiment, are to be given an elastic sense. No more is meant, we must in that case suppose, than that the taboo feeling of " Do not meddle " involves no very explicit condition, no very clear or specific idea of un-

[1] *An Introduction to the History of Religion*, 85.

pleasant consequences to be avoided, but as it were threatens by aposiopesis—"Do not meddle, or, if you do, . . .!" If this is as much as Dr Jevons intends—and it seems at anyrate to be all that is meant by MM. Hubert and Mauss when they speak in very similar terms of the absolute, necessary, and *à priori* character of the "magical judgment"[1]—then I think this view has very much to be said for it.

My own contention is that, while there is always a sanction at the back of taboo in the shape of some suggestion of mystic punishment following on a breach of the customary rule, yet the nature of the visitation in store for the offender is never a measurable quantity. Even when the penalty is apparently determinate and specific—which, however, is by no means always the case, as I shall endeavour to show later—an infinite *plus* of awfulness will, I believe, be found, on closer examination, to attach to it. Taboo, on my view, belongs, and belongs wholly, to the sphere of the magico-religious. Within that sphere, I venture to assert, man always feels himself to be in contact with powers whose modes of action transcend the ordinary and calculable. Though he does not on that account desist from attempting to exploit these powers, yet it is with no assurance of limited liability that he enters on the undertaking. In short, dealings with whatever has mystic power are conducted at an indefinite risk; and taboo but embodies the resolution to take no unnecessary risks of this indefinite kind. This contention I shall now try to make good.

[1] *Op. cit.*, vii. 125.

First, to attack the theory that taboo is negative magic (in Dr Frazer's sense of the term " magic ") on the side on which that theory is strongest, namely, where sympathy is most in evidence. I do not for one moment deny that in some taboos a sympathetic element is present and even prominent. Indeed, I see no harm in speaking, with MM. Hubert and Mauss, of sympathetic taboo, where " sympathetic " stands for the differentia or leading character of a variety, and the genus " taboo " is taken as already explained in independent terms. The presence of the sympathetic principle is, to my mind, amply and crucially proved in the case of those food restrictions mentioned in the passage quoted from Dr Tylor, the prohibition to eat deer lest one become timid, and so on. Another telling set of examples is provided by those remarkable taboos on the use of knots which, as Dr Frazer has abundantly shown, are wont to be observed at critical seasons such as those of childbirth, marriage and death.[1] But even here, I suggest, the consequences tend to remain indefinite and vague, and that for more than one kind of reason.

We can distinguish a sociological reason and a hierological or religious reason, though for the purposes of the historical study of religion, from the standpoint of which taboo is usually considered, the first may be treated as subordinate to the second.

To begin with, these, no less than any other taboos, are customary observances, a portion of the unwritten law of society. To this fact, then, must be ascribed part at least of the force that renders them

[1] *The Golden Bough*,[2] i. 392 *sqq.*

effective. There are always penalties of a distinctively social kind to be feared by the taboo-breaker. In extreme cases death will be inflicted; in all cases there will be more or less of what the Australian natives call "growling," [1] and to bear up against public opinion is notoriously the last thing of which the savage is capable. Moreover, this social sanction is at the same time a religious sanction. To speak the language of a more advanced culture, State and Church being indivisibly one, to be outlaw is *ipso facto* to be excommunicate. Given the notion of mystic danger—of which more anon—social disapproval of all kinds will tend to borrow the tone and colour of religious aversion, the feeling that the offender is a source of spiritual peril to the community; whilst the sanctioning power remains social in the sense that society takes forcible means to remove the curse from its midst.

It may be argued that these social consequences of taboo-breaking are secondary, and thus scarcely bear on the question of the intrinsic nature of taboo. Such an objection, however, will not be admitted by anyone who has reflected at all deeply on the psychology of religion. On the broadest of theoretical grounds religion must be pronounced a product of the corporate life—a phenomenon of intercourse. Confirmation *à posteriori* is obtained by the examination of any particular taboos of which we have detailed information. Take, for example, the elaborate list of food-restrictions imposed amongst the

[1] *Cf.* B. Spencer and F. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 196.

Arunta on the *ulpmerka* or boy who has not yet been circumcised.[1] The sympathetic principle is probably not absent, though its action happens here not to be easily recognizible. When we learn, however, that eating parrots or cockatoos will produce a hollow on the top of the head and a hole in the chin, we may suspect that the penalty consists in becoming like a parrot or cockatoo. On the other hand, the same penalty, for instance premature old age, follows on so many different kinds of transgression that it looks here as if a tendency to dispense with particular connections and generalize the effects of mystic wrong-doing were at work. Meanwhile, in regard to all these taboos alike our authorities assure us that the underlying idea throughout is that of reserving the best kinds of food for the use of the elder men, and of thereby disciplining the novice and teaching him to " know his place." Here is a social reason with a vengeance. Even if some suspect that our authorities over-estimate the influence of conscious design upon tribal custom, they will hardly go the length of asserting that sympathy pure and simple has automatically generated a code so favourable to the elderly *gourmet*. A number of succulent meats to be reserved on the one hand, a number of diseases and malformations held in dread by the tribe on the other, and possibly a few sympathetic connections established by tradition between certain foods and certain diseases to serve them as a pattern—with this as their pre-existing material the Australian

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *op. cit.*, 470 *sqq.* Here, by the way, in the systematic assignment of penalties to offences we seem to have a crucial disproof of the pure " unconditionality " of taboo.

greybeards, from all we know about them, would be quite capable of constructing a taboo-system, the efficient cause of which is not so much mystic fear as statecraft. Even if the principle of sympathy lurk in the background, we may be sure that the elders are not applying it very consciously or very strictly; and again we may be sure that society in imposing its law on the *ulpmerka* is at much greater pains to make it clear that he must not eat such and such than why he must not—if only because there are so many excellent reasons of a social kind why the young should not ask questions, but simply do as they are bidden.

But there is, I believe, another and a deeper reason why sympathy pure and simple cannot account for taboo. Taboo, I take it, is always something of a mystic affair. But I cannot see why there should be anything mystic about sympathy understood, as Dr Frazer understands it, simply as a misapplication of the laws of the association of ideas. After all, the association of ideas is at the back of all our thinking (though by itself it will not account for any of our thinking); and thinking as such does not fall within the sphere of the mystic. Or does the mystery follow from the fact that it is a " misapplication " of the laws aforesaid? [1] Then the savage must

[1] Dr Frazer writes, *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, 53, " It is not a taboo to say, 'Do not put your hand in the fire'; it is a rule of common sense, because the forbidden action entails a real, not an imaginary, evil." It is not a taboo, but a rule of common prudence, for the savage. But not for the reason alleged. In his eyes there is nothing imaginary, but something terribly real, about the death or other disaster he observes to overtake the taboo-breaker. How, then, does he come to bring this kind of evil under a category of its own? Surely it ought to be the prime concern of Anthropology to tell us that.

be aware that he is misapplying these laws; for taboo is for him a mystic affair. But if he knows he is indulging in error, why does he not mend his ways? Clearly Dr Frazer cannot mean his explanation of magic or of taboo to be an explanation of what it is for the savage. Now, perhaps he is entitled to say that magic, in his sense, is not a savage concept or institution at all, but merely a counter for the use of the psychology that seeks to explain the primitive mind not from within but from without. He is, however, certainly not entitled to say that taboo is not a savage concept or institution. In Polynesia *tabu* is a well-recognized term that serves as perhaps the chief nucleus of embryonic reflection with regard to mystic matters of all kinds; in some of the islands the name stands for the whole system of religion.[1] Moreover, from every quarter of the primitive world we get expressions that bear the closest analogy to this word. How then are we to be content with an explanation of taboo that does not pretend to render its sense as it has sense for those who both practise it and make it a rallying-point for their thought on mystic matters? As well say that taboo is " superstition " as that it is " magic " in Dr Frazer's sense of the word. We ask to understand it, and we are merely bidden to despise it.

If, on the other hand, we cast about amongst genuine primitive notions for such as may with relative appropriateness be deemed equivalent to the idea of magic, as that idea is to be understood and

[1] *Cf.* E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, s.v. *tapu*.

employed by a psychology that tries to establish community between savage and civilized thought, we have the choice between two alternative types.

My own preference is for those primitive expressions that are definitely dyslogistic or condemnatory, as when we speak of the "black art." The clearest cases that I know are Australian. Thus the *arungquiltha* of the Arunta is "associated at bottom with the possession of supernatural evil power."[1] Perhaps we may say broadly that, as contrasted with *churinga*, the term stands for magic as opposed to religion—for magic, that is, as the witch-haunted England of the seventeenth century understood it, namely, as something anti-social and wholly bad. The Kaitish *ittha* seems to be the exact analogue of *arungquiltha*;[2] and so do the *muparn* of the Yerklamining,[3] the *mung* of the Wurunjerri,[4] and the *gubburra* of the Yuin.[5] In all these cases the notion seems to be that of a wonder-working of a completely noxious kind. Amongst the Arunta a man caught practising such magic is severely punished, and probably killed.[6]

Some, however, might choose rather to assign the meaning of "magic" to the wonder-working in general, and not simply to its bad variety. Thus amongst the last-mentioned Yuin "evil magic" may be practised by the *gommera* or medicine-man; but

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *op. cit.*, 548 *n.*
[2] Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 464 *n.*
[3] A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, 450.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 365. [5] *Ib.*, 372
[6] Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes*, 536.

in this tribe he is the leader of society, and a wielder of good supernatural power no less than of evil. The wonder-working power he possesses goes by the comprehensive name of *joia*, translated "magic" by Howitt, and described as an "immaterial force" set in motion not only by the *gommera* but also by certain sacred animals.[1] Here we seem to have a case of that very widespread notion of which the most famous representatives are the *mana* of the Pacific and the *orenda* of the Iroquois. A good deal of attention has lately been paid by anthropologists to these latter expressions, and I may perhaps be permitted to take certain of their findings for granted. It would appear that the root-idea is that of power—a power manifested in sheer luck, no doubt, as well as in cunning, yet, on the whole, tending to be conceived as a psychic energy, almost, in fact, as what we would call "will-power."[2] Further, though it may be that every being possesses its modicum of *mana*, the tendency is for the word to express extraordinary power, in short a wonder-working.

Now between the ordinary and the extraordinary, the work-a-day and the wonderful is a difference, if you will, of degree rather than of kind. The sphere of the miraculous is, subjectively, just the sphere of

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes*, 533, 560-1.

[2] It is very interesting to note, as Tregear's excellent dictionary, s.v. *mana*, enables one to do at a glance, how the root *mana* underlies an immense number of the terms by which psychical faculties and states are rendered. Thus in Samoan we find *mana'o* to desire, wish, *manatu* to think, *manamea* to love, *atuamanatu* to have a good memory; in Tahitian *manao* to think, *manavaru* eager desire; in Hawaiian *manao* to think, *mananao* thought, *manaoio* to believe, *manaiva* feelings, affections; and so on.

a startled experience, and clearly there are endless degrees in the intensity of felt surprise; though society tends to fix hard-and-fast limits within which surprise is, so to speak, expected of one. How the savage proceeds to differentiate the normal from the abnormal was brought home to me in the course of an interview I was accorded by the Pygmy "chief" Bokane.[1] I was trying to verify Col. Harrison's statement [2] that if a Pygmy dies suddenly the body is cut in two to see whether or not the death is caused by *oudah*—the "devil," as Col. Harrison renders it, though, for my part, I could not discover the slightest trace of personality attaching to this evil principle.[3] I asked Bokane how his people told whether the death was due to *oudah* or not. He replied that, if an arrow-head or a large thorn were found inside the body, it was an arrow or a thorn that had killed the man; but, if nothing could be found, then *oudah* must have done it. If a dangerous animal killed a man, I learnt on further inquiry, it was not *oudah*, but it was *oudah* if you cut your finger accidentally. When strange sounds were heard in the forest at night and the dogs howled, that was *oudah*. On some such lines as these, then, we may suppose other savages also to have succeeded in placing the strange and unaccountable under a category of its own. In the case of *mana* and *orenda* I am inclined to think that the core

[1] I spent about five hours in all in private talk with the Pygmies, assisted, I need hardly say, by an interpreter, at Olympia in London, Jan. 8 and 9, 1907.

[2] *Life among the Pygmies*, Lond., 1906, 20.

[3] Nothing, apparently, is done to avert or propitiate *oudah*. Bokane denied that the pots of honey placed at the foot of trees were for *oudah*.

of the notion is provided by the wonderful feats—wonderful to himself, no doubt, as well as to his audience—of the human magician; which notion is then extended to cover wonder-working animals, nature-powers, and the like by an anthropomorphism which is specifically a "magomorphism," so to say. Of course other elements beside that of sheer surprise at the unusual enter into the composition of a predominant notion such as that of *mana*, which in virtue of its very predominance is sure to attract and attach to itself all manner of meanings floating in its neighbourhood. For example, as the history of the word "mystic" reminds us, the wonderful and the secret or esoteric tend to form one idea. The Australian wonder-worker owes no little of his influence over the minds of his fellows to the fact that in most tribes an exhibition of his power forms part and parcel of the impressive mystery of initiation. Let it suffice, however, for our present purpose to identify *mana* with a wonder-working power such as that of the magician—a power that may manifest itself in actions of the sympathetic type, but is not limited to this type, being all that for the primitive mind is, or promises to be, extraordinarily effective in the way of the exertion of personal, or seemingly personal, will-force.

Now, if "magic" is to mean *mana* (which, however, is not Dr Frazer's sense of "magic," nor, indeed, mine, since I prefer to give it the uniformly bad meaning of *arungquiltha*, that is, of the anti-social variety of *mana*), then in describing taboo as negative magic we shall not, I believe, be far wide of the mark. Taboo I take to be a mystic affair. To

break a taboo is to set in motion against oneself mystic wonder-working power in one form or another. It may be of the wholly bad variety. Thus it is taboo for the headman of the water-totem in the Kaitish tribe to touch a pointing-stick lest the " evil magic " in it turn all the water bad.[1] On the other hand, many tabooed things, woman's blood or the king's touch, have power to cure no less than to kill; while an almost wholly beneficent power such as the clan-totem or the personal *manitu* is nevertheless taboo.[2] Indeed, it is inevitable that, whenever society prescribes a taboo in regard to some object in particular, that object should tend to assume a certain measure of respectability as an institution, a part of the social creed; and, as the law upholds it, so it will surely seem in the end to uphold the law by punishing its infraction. It is to be remarked, however, that many taboos prescribed by the primitive society have regard to no object in particular, but are of the nature of general precautions against mystic perils all and sundry, the vaporous shapes conjured by unreasoning panic. It is instructive in this context to consult the admirable account given by Mr Hodson of the communal taboos or *gennas* observed throughout the Manipur region.[3] On all sorts of occasions the *gennabura* or religious head of the village ordains that the community shall keep a *genna*. The village

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, 463.

[2] Is Dr Frazer henceforth prepared to explain totemism on purely sympathetic principles? It would, on the other hand, be easy to show that the ideas of *mana* and of *manitu* and the like go very closely together.

[3] T. C. Hodson, "The 'Genna amongst the Tribes of Assam," *J. A. I.*, xxxvi. 92 *sqq.*

gates are closed, and the friend outside must stay there, whilst the stranger who is within remains. The men cook and eat apart from the women during this time. The food taboos are strictly enforced.[1] All trade, all fishing, all hunting, all cutting of grass and felling of trees are forbidden. And why these precautions? Sometimes a definite visitation will have occurred. "Phenomena such as earthquakes and eclipses, or the destruction of a village by fire, occasion general *gennas*. . . . We also find general *gennas* occasioned by the death of a man from wounds inflicted by an enemy or by a wild animal, by the death of a man from snake-bite or from cholera or small-pox, or by the death of a woman in child-birth."[2] At other times nothing untoward has happened, but something important and "ticklish" has to be done—the crops sown, the ghosts laid of those who have died during the year. It is a moment of crisis, and the tribal nerves are on the stretch. Mr Hodson, indeed, expressly notes that "the effect of *gennas* is certainly to produce in those engaged in them a tension which is of great psychological interest."[3] Is not what he takes for the effect rather the cause of *gennas?* Anxiety says, "Let us abstain from all

[1] Some of these food taboos have a sympathetic character. Thus "young unmarried girls are not allowed to taste the flesh of the male of any animal or of female animals which have been killed while with young" (*ib.*, 98). Even here, however, an element of miracle enters, unless the Manipuris find parthenogenesis no more odd than the Arunta are by some supposed to do. Another taboo is on dog's flesh, the mystic penalty being an eruption of boils. Here there is no obvious sympathetic connection. Boils are uncanny, and have to be accounted for on mystic lines—if not sympathetically, yet by some reference to evil magic; for disease is always evil magic for the savage; *cf.* Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes*, 548.

[2] *Ib.*, 96. [3] *Ib.*, 101.

acts that may bring upon us the ill-will of the powers." Anxiety sees every outlet of activity blocked by a dim shape, endowed with no definite attributes such as the sympathetic theory is obliged to postulate, but stationed there as simply a nameless representative of the environing Unknown with its quite unlimited power of bringing the tribal *mana* —its luck and cunning—to nought by an output of superior *mana*, to be manifested who knows how?

It may be objected that, whereas we have made it of the very essence of *mana* that it should be indefinite and mysterious in its effects, there can be nothing indefinite or mysterious on the Dyak view—to recur to the example from which we started—about the effect of deer-meat, since it produces timidity exactly as it might be thought to produce indigestion. Perhaps it is enough to reply that to the savage a fit of indigestion would likewise be a phenomenon explicable only in mystic terms. The common sense of the primitive man may—to take Dr Frazer's instance—recognize that normally and as a matter of course the fire burns whoever thrusts his fingers into it; but the moment that the fire burns someone " accidentally," as we say, the savage mind scents a mystery. Just so for the Pygmy. His knife acts normally so long as it serves him to trim his arrow-shaft. As soon, however, as it slips and cuts his hand, there is *oudah* in, or at the back of, the " cussed " thing. Given, then, anything that behaves " cussedly " with regularity, that is normally abnormal in its effects, so to speak, and a taboo or customary avoidance will be instituted. It becomes

the duty of society to its members to keep before their eyes the nature of the direful consequences attending violation of the rule. Society shakes its head solemnly at careless youth, and mutters μορμώ. Careless youth does not believe all it is told, yet is nevertheless impressed and, on the whole, abstains. Kafir children must not eat certain small birds.[1] If they catch them on the veld, they must take them to their grand-parents, who alone may eat the body, though the children are given back the head. "If the parents catch children eating birds on the veld, they tell them they will turn out witches or wizards when they grow up." Here we have the mystic sanction. And there is a social sanction in reserve. "The boys naturally get sound thrashings from their fathers, who feel it their duty to prevent their sons from turning out abandoned wretches in after life." Nevertheless, youth is sceptical, or at anyrate intractable. "Children do not see the logic of this rule, and consequently try to eat the bird on the veld, when they think they will not be found out. . . . There is no time when boys and girls are so free from observation as when watching the fields; consequently, at such times they have glorious feasts off the birds they catch." Now the sympathetic principle may underlie this food taboo, or it may not, but clearly by itself it is not enough to account for the customary observance in the concrete. Society has to keep the taboo going, so to say; and to keep it going it relies partly on the *vis a tergo* of brute force, but still more on the suggestion of mystic evil

[1] Dudley Kidd, *Savage Childhood, a Study of Kafir Children*, 193.

in store for the offender, not an imaginary evil, *pace* Dr Frazer, but what is quite another thing, an evil that appeals to the imagination, an indefinite, unmeasured, pregnant evil, a visitation, a doom, a judgment.

Hitherto we have had in view mainly such cases of taboo as seemed most closely bound up with the sympathetic principle, minor matters of routine for the most part, outlying and relatively isolated portions of the social system, which for that reason might be expected to contain their own *raison d'être* unaffected by the transforming influence of any higher synthesis. If, however, we turn to the major taboos of primitive society, the classical well-nigh universal cases of the woman shunned, the stranger banned, the divine chief isolated, and so on, how infinitely more difficult does it become to conceive sympathy, and sympathy only, as the continuously, or even the originally, efficient cause of the avoidance. Unfortunately, considerations of space utterly prohibit a detailed treatment of matters covering so wide an area both of fact and of hypothesis. It must suffice here to assert that the principles already laid down will be found to apply to these major taboos with even greater cogency. Here, too, there are at work both a social and a mystic sanction (so far as these can be kept apart in thought, the mystic sanction being but the voice of society uttering bodings instead of threats). As for the mystic sanction, we shall be probably not far wrong if we say that the woman has *mana*, the stranger has *mana*, the divine chief has *mana*, and for that reason pre-eminently are one and all taboo for those who have

the best right to determine the meaning of taboo, namely, those who practise and observe it.

If there were room left in which to consider these taboos in some detail—the three notable cases mentioned do not, of course, by any means complete the list of taboos of the first rank [1]—it might turn out that in our running fight with the upholders of the sympathetic theory serious opposition must be encountered at certain points, yet never so serious, let us hope, that it might not be eventually overcome.

Thus the first case on our list—that of the taboo on woman—provides our opponents with a really excellent chance of defending their position. There can be no doubt that a sympathetic interpretation is often put upon this taboo by savages themselves. Mr Crawley, who has made the subject of what he terms the sexual taboo peculiarly his own, brings forward evidence that, to my mind at least, is conclusive on this point.[2] Among the Barea man and wife seldom share the same bed, the reason they give being that " the breath of the wife weakens her husband." Amongst the Omahas if a boy plays with girls he is dubbed " hermaphrodite." In the Wiraijuri tribe boys are reproved for playing with girls, and the culprit is taken aside by an old man, who solemnly extracts from his legs some " strands of the woman's apron " which have got in. And so

[1] Thus one of the most notable and widespread of taboos is that on the dead. Sympathetic interpretations of this taboo are by no means unknown amongst savages, but it would not be hard to show that they do not exhaust the mystery of death, of all human concepts the most thickly enwrapped in imaginative atmosphere.

[2] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 93, *cf.* 207 *sqq.*

on in case after case. Here clearly what is primarily feared is the transmission of womanly characteristics, in a word, of effeminacy. Mr Crawley even goes so far as to speak of the belief in such transmission as " the chief factor in sexual taboo." [1] Whether this be so or not,[2] he likewise shows, with singular clearness and force, that it is not the only factor. Owing, he thinks, to a natural nervousness that one sex feels towards the other, as well as to the unaccountable nature of various phenomena in the life-history of woman such as menstruation and child-birth, the notion of her as simply the weaker vessel " is merged in another conception of woman as a ' mysterious ' person. . . . She is more or less of a potential witch." [3] With this I cordially agree, and shall not labour the point more except to the extent of asking the question, How, on the hypothesis that what is dreaded is simply the transmission of womanliness, are we to account for the fact—to quote but the best-known story of the kind—that when an Australian black-fellow discovered his wife to have lain on his blanket he wholly succumbed to terror and was dead within a fortnight? [4] Only a twilight fear, a measureless horror, could thus kill. And to

[1] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 207.

[2] Mr Crawley does not tell us on what principle he would proceed to estimate predominance as between such factors. I should have thought that the moral of his excellent study, abounding as it does in psychological insight, was to lay stress on the subconscious grounds of action rather than on the reasons whereby more or less *ex post facto* the dawning reflection of the savage seeks to interpret and justify that action. I myself believe the sympathetic explanation to be little more than such an *ex post facto* justification of a mystic avoidance already in full swing.

[3] *J. A. I.*, ix. 458.

[4] *Ib.*, 206.

show how mixed a mode of thought prevails as to the workings of the sanction set in motion, in a very similar case from Assam it is not the man but the woman who dies of fright.[1]

The case of the taboo on strangers seems at first sight to afford a clear proof of the effect of mere strangeness in exciting dread, especially when we compare the results of contact with novelties of all kinds. Dr Jevons, however, argues that " strangers are not inherently taboo, but, as belonging to strange gods, bring with them strange supernatural influences." [2] In support of this view he instances the fact that newcomers are frequently fumigated to drive away the evil influences they bear in their train. But, after all, there are no taboos that religion has not learnt to neutralize by means of one or another ceremonial device. Woman, for example, is inherently taboo, yet with proper precautions she may be married.[3] So too, then, strangers may be entertained after a purifying ceremony. It by no means follows, however, that they have lost all their mystic virtue, any more than it follows that woman has ceased to be mysterious after the marriage ceremony. Witness the power to bless or to curse retained by the stranger within the gate—a matter for the first time brought clearly to light by Dr Westermarck's striking investigation of the religious basis of primitive hospitality.[4] Meanwhile, even if Dr Jevons's

[1] Hodson, *op. cit.*, 100.

[2] *An Introduction to the History of Religion*, 71.

[3] I accept Mr Crawley's hypothesis that "marriage ceremonies neutralize the dangers attaching to union between the sexes." *The Mystic Rose*, 322.

[4] E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*,

contention were to be granted that the taboo on strangers is really a taboo on the tabooed things he may have been in contact with, it is hard to see how the sympathetic explanation of taboo is going to be stretched to cover the indefinite possibility of definite sympathetic contagions of all sorts. We are left asking why mere uncertainty in itself can rouse imaginative fears—a line of inquiry that must presently lead to the conclusion that mere strangeness in itself can do the same.

The third of our cases—that of the tabooed chief—need not detain us long. At all events in Polynesia, the eponymous home of taboo, they have no doubt about the explanation. The chief has *mana*, and therefore he is feared. Men do not dread contact with the king lest they become kingly, but lest they be blasted by the superman's supermanliness. Such, at least, is the native theory of the kingly taboo on its religious side. On its highly-developed social side it is a fear of the strong arm of the State mingled with a respect for established authority—just as religious taboo is for the most part not all cringing terror, but rather an awe as towards mystic powers recognized by society and as such tending to be reputable.

We have cast but a rapid glance over an immense subject. We have but dipped here and there almost at random amongst the endless facts bearing on our theme to see if the sympathetic principle—a per-

i. 583 *sqq*. Dr Westermarck's view, by the way, is that "the unknown stranger, like everything unknown and everything strange, arouses a feeling of mysterious awe in superstitious minds."

fectly genuine thing in its way—would take us to the bottom of the taboo feeling and idea. We conclude provisionally that it will not. Indefinite rather than definite consequences appear to be associated with the violation of a taboo, and that because what is dreaded is essentially a mysterious power, something arbitrary and unaccountable in its modes of action. Is, then, taboo a negative *mana?* Yes—if *mana* be somewhat liberally interpreted. Is it a negative magic, understanding by magic sympathetic action? With all my respect and admiration for the great authority who has propounded the hypothesis, I must venture to answer—No.

IV

THE CONCEPTION OF MANA

ARGUMENT

WHEN the science of Comparative Religion employs a native expression such as mana, *or* tabu, *as a general category, it is obliged to disregard to some extent its original or local meaning; but this disadvantage is outbalanced by the advantage of thus enabling savage mentality to express itself as far as possible in its own language. Moreover, the local meaning of* mana *justifies its use as a term of wide application, covering all manifestations of mysterious, or supernatural, power in magic and religion alike. Science, then, may adopt* mana *as a general category to designate the positive aspect of the supernatural, or sacred, or whatever we are to call that order of miraculous happenings which, for the concrete experience, if not usually for the abstract thought of the savage, is marked off perceptibly from the order of ordinary happenings.* Tabu, *on the other hand, may serve to designate its negative aspect. That is to say, negatively, the supernatural is* tabu, *not to be lightly approached, because, positively, it is* mana, *instinct with a power above the ordinary. This* tabu-mana *formula will suffice to characterize the supernatural in its purely existential dimension, that is, as it is in itself, apart from its value to man. In*

its moral dimension the supernatural manifests itself variously as good or bad, and is accordingly subject to further characterization of an explanatory kind on the part of the savage, who, for instance, has special words to signify evil supernatural power. Our stock antithesis between magic and religion should, preferably, be employed to denote a similar distinction between the bad and good kinds of supernaturalism; whereas the "magico-religious" is equivalent to the supernatural in its good and bad aspects taken together. If, then, the tabu-mana *formula be substituted for animism as a minimum definition of religion, does the latter category become obsolete? By no means. To go no further for a proof,* mana, *in its local meaning, proves to be capable of existing in combination with a doctrine of spirits, souls and ghosts. Such a doctrine, in fact, constitutes a rudimentary philosophy, the sphere of which does not stand in determinate relation with that of supernaturalism, inasmuch as, if spirits and ghosts tend to be accounted supernatural, souls are by no means necessarily so.* Mana, *on the other hand, which occasionally comes near to meaning soul, since it may express indwelling psychic power, though hardly personality, is always coextensive with the supernatural. For the rest, the line drawn between the impersonal and the personal in rudimentary religious thought is fluctuating and vague; while even in advanced religion, as notably in Buddhism, the impersonal aspect of the supernatural, which notions of the type of* mana *tend to emphasize, may predominate. On the other hand, if the personal aspect be prominent, such prominence may be due not to animism so much as to anthropomorphic theism, which is, psychologically, a more or less independent development.*

THE CONCEPTION OF MANA

IT is no part of my present design to determine, by an exhaustive analysis of the existing evidence, how the conception of *mana* is understood and applied within its special area of distribution, namely, the Pacific region. Such a task pertains to Descriptive Ethnology; and it is rather to a problem of Comparative Ethnology that I would venture to call attention. I propose to discuss the value—that is to say, the appropriateness and the fruitfulness—of either this conception of *mana* or some nearly equivalent notion, such as the Huron *orenda*, when selected by the science of Comparative Religion to serve as one of its categories, or classificatory terms of the widest extension.

Now any historical science that adopts the comparative method stands committed to the postulate that human nature is sufficiently homogeneous and uniform to warrant us in classifying its tendencies under formulæ coextensive with the whole broad field of anthropological research. Though the conditions of their occurrence cause our data to appear highly disconnected, we claim, even if we cannot yet wholly make good, the right to bind them together into a single system of reference by means of certain general principles. By duly constructing such theoretical bridges, as Dr Frazer is fond of calling them, we hope eventually to transform, as it were, a medley of insecure, insignificant sandbanks into one stable and glorious Venice.

So much, then, for our scientific ideal. But some sceptical champion of the actual may be inclined to ask: "Are examples as a matter of fact forth-

coming, at anyrate from within the particular department of Comparative Religion, of categories or general principles that, when tested by use, prove reasonably steadfast?" To this challenge it may be replied that, even when we limit ourselves to the case of what may be described as "rudimentary" religion—in regard to which our terminology finds itself in the paradoxical position of having to grapple with states of mind themselves hardly subject to fixed terms at all—there are at all events distinguishable degrees of value to be recognised amongst the categories in current employment. Thus most of us will be agreed that, considered as a head of general classification, "*tabu*" works well enough, but "totem" scarcely so well, whilst "fetish" is perhaps altogether unsatisfactory. Besides, there is at least one supreme principle that has for many years stood firm in the midst of these psychological quicksands. Dr Tylor's conception of "animism" is the crucial instance of a category that successfully applies to rudimentary religion taken at its widest. If our science is to be compared to a Venice held together by bridges, then "animism" must be likened to its Rialto.

At the same time, "lest one good custom should corrupt the world," we need plenty of customs; and the like holds true of categories. In what follows I may seem to be attacking "animism," in so far as I shall attempt to endow "*mana*" with classificatory authority to some extent at the expense of the older notion. Let me, therefore, declare at the outset that I should be the last to wish our time-

honoured Rialto to be treated as an obsolete or obsolescent structure. If I seek to divert from it some of the traffic it is not naturally suited to bear, I am surely offering it no injury, but a service.

One word more by way of preface. There are those who dislike the introduction of native terms into our scientific nomenclature. The local and general usages, they object, tend to become confused. This may, indeed, be a real danger. On the other hand, are we not more likely to keep in touch with the obscure forces at work in rudimentary religion if we make what use we can of the clues lying ready to hand in the recorded efforts of rudimentary reflection upon religion? The *mana* of the Pacific may be said, I think, without exaggeration to embody rudimentary reflection—to form a piece of subconscious philosophy. To begin with, the religious eye perceives the presence of *mana* here, there, and everywhere. In the next place, *mana* has worked its way into the very heart of the native languages, where it figures as more than one part of speech, and abounds in secondary meanings of all kinds. Lastly, whatever the word may originally have signified (as far as I know, an unsettled question), it stands in its actual use for something lying more or less beyond the reach of the senses—something verging on what we are wont to describe as the immaterial or unseen. All this, however, hardly amounts to a proof that *mana* has acquired in the aboriginal mind the full status of an abstract idea. For instance, whereas a Codrington might decide in comprehensive fashion that all Melanesian

religion consists in getting *mana* for oneself,[1] it is at least open to doubt whether a Melanesian sage could have arrived, unassisted, at a generalisation so abstract—a " bird's-eye view " so detached from confusing detail. Nevertheless, we may well suspect some such truth as this to have long been more or less inarticulately felt by the Melanesian mind. In fact, I take it, there would have been small difficulty on Bishop Codrington's part in making an intelligent native realize the force of his universal proposition. What is the moral of this? Surely, that the science of Comparative Religion should strive to explicate the meaning inherent in any given phase of the world's religious experience in just those terms that would naturally suggest themselves, suppose the phase in question to be somehow quickened into self-consciousness and self-expression. Such terms I would denominate " sympathetic "; and would, further, hazard the judgment that, in the case of all science of the kind, its use of sympathetic terms is the measure of its sympathetic insight. *Mana*, then, I contend, has, despite its exotic appearance, a perfect right to figure as a scientific category by the side of *tabu*—a term hailing from the same geographical area—so long as a classificatory function of like importance can be found for it. That function let us now proceed, if so may be, to discover.

Codrington defines *mana*, in its Melanesian use, as follows: " a force altogether distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good and evil, and which it is of the greatest advantage to

[1] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians* (Oxford, 1891), 119 *n.*

possess or control"; or again he says: "It is a power or influence, not physical, and in a way supernatural; but it shows itself in physical force, or in any kind of power or excellence which a man possesses." It is supernatural just in this way, namely, that it is "what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary power of men, outside the common processes of nature." He illustrates his point by examples: "If a man has been successful in fighting, it has not been his natural strength of arm, quickness of eye, or readiness of resource that has won success; he has certainly got the *mana* of a spirit or of some deceased warrior to empower him, conveyed in an amulet of a stone round his neck or a tuft of leaves in his belt, in a tooth hung upon a finger of his bow hand, or in the form of words with which he brings supernatural assistance to his side. If a man's pigs multiply, and his gardens are productive, it is not because he is industrious and looks after his property, but because of the stones full of *mana* for pigs and yams that he possesses. Of course a yam naturally grows when planted, that is well known, but it will not be very large unless *mana* comes into play; a canoe will not be swift unless *mana* be brought to bear upon it, a net will not catch many fish, nor an arrow inflict a mortal wound." [1]

From Polynesia comes much the same story. Tregear in his admirable comparative dictionary of the Polynesian dialects [2] renders the word, which

[1] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 118-20.

[2] E. Tregear, *The Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary* (Wellington, N.Z., 1891), s.v. *mana*.

may be either noun or adjective, thus: "supernatural power; divine authority; having qualities which ordinary persons or things do not possess." He seems to distinguish, however, what might be called a "secular" sense, in which the term stands generally for "authority," or, as an adjective, for "effectual, effective." He cites copious instances from the various dialects to exemplify the supernatural mode of *mana*. Thus the word is applied, in Maori, to a wooden sword that has done deeds so wonderful as to possess a sanctity and power of its own; in Samoan, to a parent who brings a curse on a disobedient child; in Hawaiian, to the gods, or to a man who by his death gives efficacy to an idol; in Tongan, to whoever performs miracles, or bewitches; in Mangarevan, to a magic staff given to a man by his grandfather, or, again, to divination in general; and so forth. In short, its range is as wide as those of divinity and witchcraft taken together. If, on the other hand, we turn to what I have called the secular sense attributed to *mana*, as, for example, when it is used of a chief, a healer of maladies, a successful pleader, or the winner of a race, we perceive at once that the distinction of meaning holds good for the civilized lexicographer rather than for the unsophisticated native. The chief who can impose *tabu*, the caster-out of disease-devils, and, in hardly less a degree, the man who can exercise the magic of persuasion, or who can command the luck which the most skilled athlete does not despise, is for the Polynesian mind not metaphorically "gifted" or "inspired," but literally. Of course, as in Europe,

so in Polynesia, the coin of current usage may have become clipped with lapse of time. Thus Plato tells us that both the Spartans and the Athenian ladies of his day used to exclaim of any male person they happened to admire, *θεῖος ἀνήρ*, "what a divine man!"[1] It need not surprise us, therefore, that in Mangarevan you may say of any number over forty *manamanana* —an "awful" lot, in fact. Such an exception, however, can scarcely be allowed to count against the generalization that, throughout the Pacific region, *mana* in its essential meaning connotes what both Codrington and Tregear describe as the supernatural.

Now mark the importance of this in view of the possible use of *mana* as a category of Comparative Religion. Comparative Religion, I would maintain, at all events so long as it is seeking to grapple with rudimentary or protoplasmic types of religious experience, must cast its net somewhat widely. Its interest must embrace the whole of one, and, perhaps, for savagery the more considerable, of the two fundamental aspects under which his experience or his universe (we may express it either way) reveals itself to the rudimentary intelligence of man. What to call this aspect, so as to preserve the flavour of the aboriginal notion, is a difficulty, but a difficulty of detail. The all-important matter is to establish by induction that such an aspect is actually perceived at the level of experience I have called "rudimentary." This, I believe, can be done. I have, for instance, shown elsewhere that even the Pygmy, a person

[1] Plato, *Meno*, 99 D.

perhaps not overburdened with ideas, possesses in his notion of *oudah* an inkling of the difference that marks off the one province of experience from the other. Of course he cannot deal with *oudah* abstractly; provinces of experience and the like are not for him. But I found that, when confronted with particular cases, or rather types of case, my Pygmy friend could determine with great precision whether *oudah* was there or not. What practical results, if any, would be likely to flow from this effort of discernment my knowledge of Pygmy customs, unfortunately, does not enable me to say; but I take it that the conception is not there for nothing. I shall assume, then, that an inductive study of the ideas and customs of savagery will show, firstly, that an awareness of a fundamental aspect of life and of the world, which aspect I shall provisionally term "supernatural," is so general as to be typical, and, secondly, that such an awareness is no less generally bound up with a specific group of vital reactions.

As to the question of a name for this aspect different views may be held. The term our science needs ought to express the bare minimum of generic being required to constitute matter for the experience which, taken at its highest, though by no means at its widest, we call "religious." "Raw material for good religion and bad religion, as well as for magic white or black"—how are we going to designate that in a phrase? It will not help us here, I am afraid, to cast about amongst native words. Putting aside *oudah* as too insignificant and too little under-

stood to be pressed into this high service, I can find nothing more nearly adapted to the purpose than the Siouan *wakan* or *wakanda;* of which M'Gee writes: "the term may be translated into 'mystery' perhaps more satisfactorily than in [*sic*] any other single English word, yet this rendering is at the same time too limited, as *wakanda* vaguely denotes also power, sacred, ancient, grandeur, animate, immortal." [1] But when vagueness reaches this pitch, it is time, I think, to resort to one of our own more clear-cut notions. Amongst such notions that of "the supernatural" stands out, in my opinion, as the least objectionable. Of course it is our term; that must be clearly understood. The savage has no word for "nature." He does not abstractly distinguish between an order of uniform happenings and a higher order of miraculous happenings. He is merely concerned to mark and exploit the difference when presented in the concrete. As Codrington says: "A man comes by chance upon a stone which takes his fancy; its shape is singular, it is like something, it is certainly not a common stone, there must be *mana* in it. So he argues with himself, and he puts it to the proof; he lays it at the root of a tree to the fruit of which it has a certain resemblance, or he buries it in the ground when he plants his garden; an abundant crop on the tree or in the garden shows that he is right, the stone is *mana*, has that power in it." [2] Here, however, we have at all events the

[1] W. J. M'Gee, *Fifteenth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology* (Washington, 1898), 182.

[2] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 119.

germs of our formal antithesis between the natural and the supernatural; which, by the way, is perhaps not so nicely suited to the taste of the advanced theology of our day that it would have much scruple about dedicating the expression to the service of rudimentary religion. I should like to add that in any case the English word "supernatural" seems to suit this context better than the word "sacred." *L'idée du sacré* may be apposite enough in French, since *sacré* can stand either for "holy" or for "damned"; but it is an abuse of the English language to speak of the "sacredness" of some accursed wizard. Hence, if our science were to take over the phrase, it must turn its back on usage in favour of etymology; and then, I think, it would be found that the Latin *sacer* merely amounts to *tabu*, the negative mode of the supernatural—a point to which I now proceed.

Tabu, as I have tried to prove elsewhere, is the negative mode of the supernatural, to which *mana* corresponds as the positive mode. I am not confining my attention to the use of these terms in the Pacific region,[1] but am considering them as transformed, on the strength of their local use, into categories of world-wide application. Given the super-

[1] Indeed, in Melanesia at all events, *rongo* answers more nearly to the purpose than does *tambu* (=*tabu*), since the latter always implies human sanction and prohibition. A place may, in fact, be *tambu* without being *rongo*, as when a secret society taboos the approaches to its lodge by means of certain marks, which are quite effectual as representing the physical force commanded by the association. So Codrington, *op. cit.*, 77. Surely, however, every secret society possesses, or originally possessed, a quasi-religious character, and as such would have *mana* at its disposal.

natural in any form there are always two things to note about it: firstly, that you are to be heedful in regard to it; secondly, that it has power. The first may be called its negative character, the second its positive. Perhaps stronger expressions might seem to be required. *Tabu*, it might be argued, is not so much negative as prohibitive, or even minatory; whilst *mana* is not merely positive but operative and thaumaturgic. The more colourless terms, however, are safer when it is a question of characterising universal modes of the supernatural. Given this wide sense *tabu* simply implies that you must be heedful in regard to the supernatural, not that you must be on your guard against it. The prohibition to have dealings with it is not absolute; otherwise practical religion would be impossible. The warning is against casual, incautious, profane dealings. "Not to be lightly approached" is Codrington's translation for the corresponding term used in the New Hebrides.[1] Under certain conditions man may draw nigh, but it is well for him to respect those conditions. Thus "prohibitive" and "minatory" are too strong. *Tabu*, as popularly used, may in a given context connote something like absolute prohibition, but in the universal application I have given to it can only represent the supernatural in its negative character—the supernatural, so to speak, on the defensive.

We come now to *mana*. Here, again, we must shun descriptions that are too specific. *Mana* is often operative and thaumaturgic, but not always.

[1] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 188; *cf.* 181.

Like energy, *mana* may be dormant or potential. *Mana*, let us remember, is an adjective as well as a noun, expressing a possession which is likewise a permanent quality. The stone that looks like a banana is and has *mana*, whether you set it working by planting it at the foot of your tree or not. Hence it seems enough to say that *mana* exhibits the supernatural in its positive capacity—ready, but not necessarily in act, to strike.

At this point an important consideration calls for notice. *Tabu* and *mana* apply to the supernatural solely as viewed in what I should like to call its first, or existential, dimension. With its second, or moral, dimension they have nothing to do whatever. They register judgments of fact, as philosophers would say, not judgments of value; they are constitutive categories, not normative. Thus, whatever is supernatural is indifferently *tabu*—perilous to the unwary; but as such it may equally well be holy or unclean, set apart for God or abandoned to devil, sainted or sinful, cloistered or quarantined. There is plenty of linguistic evidence to show that such distinctions of value are familiar to the savage mind. Nor is it hard to see how they arise naturally out of the *tabu* idea. Thus in Melanesia everything supernatural is at once *tambu* and *rongo*, words implying that it is fenced round by sanctions human and divine; but there is a stronger term *buto* meaning that the sanctions are specially dreadful and thereupon becoming equivalent to "abominable," [1] where we seem to pass without a break from degree of intensity to degree

[1] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 31.

of worth. Passing on to *mana*, we find exactly the same absence of moral significance. The mystic potentiality is alike for good and evil. Take, for example, two Samoan phrases found side by side in Tregear's dictionary:[1] *fa'a-mana*, to show extraordinary power or energy, as in healing; *fa'a-mana-mana*, to attribute an accident or misfortune to supernatural powers. Or again, in Melanesia European medicine is called *pei mana*, but on the other hand there is likewise *mana* in the poisoned arrow.[2] Similarly, *orenda* is power to bless or to curse; and the same holds good of a host of similar native expressions, for instance, *wakan*, *qube*, *manitu*, *oki*, not to go outside North America. Meanwhile, in this direction also moral valuations soon make themselves felt. Thus in the Pacific region we have plenty of special words for witchcraft; and in Maori mythology we even hear of a personified witchcraft *Makutu* dwelling with the wicked goddess *Miru*, of whom Tregear writes: " the unclean *tapu* was her power (*mana*)." [3] Or again, in Huron there is a word *otgon* denoting specifically the malign and destructive exercise of *orenda ;* and Hewitt notes the curious fact that the former term is gradually displacing the latter—as if, he observes, the bad rather than the good manifestations of supernatural power produced a lasting impression on the native mind.[4] Elsewhere I have given Australian examples of a similar distinction drawn between wonder-working power in general, and

[1] Tregear, s.v. *mana*. [2] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 198, 308.
[3] Tregear, s.vv. *Makutu*, *Miru*.
[4] J. N. B. Hewitt, *The American Anthropologist* (1902), N.S., iv. 37 *n*.

a specifically noxious variety of the same, such as, for instance, the well-known *arungquiltha* of the Arunta.

I have said enough, I trust, to show that there exists, deep-engrained in the rudimentary thought of the world, a conception of a specific aspect common to all sorts of things and living beings, under which they appear at once as needing insulation and as endowed with an energy of high, since extraordinary, potential—all this without any reference to the bearing of these facts on human welfare. In this connection I would merely add that our stock antithesis between magic and religion becomes applicable only when we pass from this to the second or moral dimension of the supernatural. Presented in its double character of *tabu* and *mana* the supernatural is not moral or immoral, but simply unmoral. It is convenient to describe its sphere as that of the magico-religious; but strictly speaking it is that which is neither magical nor religious, since these terms of valuation have yet to be superinduced. I am aware that the normative function of these expressions is not always manifest, that it is permissible to speak of false religion, white magic, and so on. But, for scientific purposes at anyrate, an evaluatory use ought, I think, to be assigned to this historic disjunction, not merely in view of the usage of civilized society, but as a consequence of that tendency to mark off by discriminative epithets the good and the bad supernaturalisms, the kingdoms of God and of the Devil, which runs right through the hierological language of the world.

The rest of this paper will be concerned with a more

perplexing, and hence, probably, more controversial, side of the subject. Put in a nutshell the problem is the following: How does "animism" fit into the scheme? Is the supernatural identical with the spiritual, and is *mana* nothing more or less than spiritual power? Or, on the contrary, are *mana* and "soul" or "spirit" categories that belong to relatively distinct systems of ideas—do the two refuse to combine?

As regards this latter question, our minds may quickly be set at rest. Somehow these categories do manage to combine freely, and notably in that very Pacific region where *mana* is at home. The Melanesian evidence collected by Codrington is decisive. Wherever *mana* is found—and that is to say wherever the supernatural reveals itself—this *mana* is referred to one of three originating sources, namely, a living man, a dead man's ghost, or a "spirit"; spirits displaying one of two forms, that of a ghostlike appearance—as a native put it, "something indistinct, with no definite outline, grey like dust, vanishing as soon as looked at" [1]—or that of the ordinary corporeal figure of a man. Other manifestations of the supernatural are explained in terms of these three, or rather the last two, agencies. A sacred animal, or again, a sacred stone, is one which belongs to a ghost or spirit, or in which a ghost or spirit resides.[2] Can we say, then, that "animism" is in complete possession of the field? With a little stretching of the term, I think, we can. Ghosts and spirits of ghostlike form are obviously animistic to the core. Supernatural beings of human and cor-

[1] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 151. [2] *Ib.*, 178 *sqq.*

poreal form may perhaps be reckoned by courtesy as spirits; though really we have here the rudiments of a distinct and alternative development, namely, anthropomorphic theism, a mode of conception that especially appeals to the mythological fancy. Finally, animism can be made without much trouble to cover the case of the living man with *mana*. If a man has *mana*, it resides in his "spiritual part"[1] or "soul," which after his death becomes a ghost. Besides, it appears, no man has this power of himself; you can say that he has *mana* with the use of the substantive, not that he is *mana*, as you can say of a ghost or spirit. This latter "puts the *mana* into the man" (*manag*—a causative verb) or "inspires" him; and an inspired man will even in speaking of himself say not "I" but "we two."[2] There seems, however, to be a certain flaw in the native logic, involving what comes perilously near to argument in a circle. Not every man has *mana*, nor every ghost;[3] but the soul of a man of power becomes as such a ghost of power, though in his capacity of ghost he has it in greater force than when alive.[4] On the ground of this capacity for earning, if not enjoying, during life the right to be *mana*, I have ventured provisionally to class the living man with the ghost and with the spirit as an independent owner of *mana*; but it is clear that, in defiance of logic, animism has contrived to "jump the claim."

Having thus shown in the briefest way that *mana*

[1] Codrington. *op. cit.*, 191. [2] *Ib.*, 191, 210, 153.

[3] *Ib.*, 119, 125, 258; but 176 shows that even the burying-places of common people are so far sacred that no one will go there without due cause. [4] *Ib.*, 258.

and " animism " can occur in combination, I proceed to the awkward task of determining how, if treated as categories applicable to rudimentary religion in general, they are to be provided each with a classificatory function of its own. Perhaps the simplest way of meeting, or rather avoiding, the difficulty is to deny that " animism " is a category that belongs intrinsically to our science at all. Certainly it might be said to pertain more properly to some interest wider than the magico-religious, call it rudimentary philosophy or what we will. It makes no difference whether we take animism in the vaguer Spencerian sense of the attribution of life and animation—an attitude of mind to which I prefer to give the distinguishing name of " animatism "—or in the more exact Tylorian sense of the attribution of soul, ghost, or ghost-like spirit. In either case we are carried far beyond the bounds of rudimentary religion, even when magic is made co-partner in the system. There is obviously nothing in the least supernatural in being merely alive. On the other hand, to have soul is, as we have seen, not necessarily to have *mana* here or hereafter. The rudimentary philosophy of Melanesia abounds in nice distinctions of an animistic kind as follows. A yam lives without intelligence, and therefore has no *tarunga* or " soul." A pig has a *tarunga* and so likewise has a man, but with this difference that when a pig dies he has no *tindalo* or " ghost," but a man's *tarunga* at his death becomes a *tindalo*. Even so, however, only a great man's *tarunga* becomes a *tindalo* with *mana*, a " ghost of worship," as Codrington renders it. Meanwhile, as

regards a *vui* or "spirit," its nature is apparently the same as that of a soul, or at anyrate a human soul, but it is never without *mana*.[1] Thus only the higher grades of this animistic hierarchy rank as supernatural beings; and you know them for what they are not by their soul-like nature, but by the *mana* that is in them.

It remains to add that *mana* can come very near to meaning "soul" or "spirit," though without the connotation of wraith-like appearance. Tregear supplies abundant evidence from Polynesia.[2] *Mana* from meaning indwelling power naturally passes into the sense of "intelligence," "energy of character," "spirit"; and the kindred term *manawa* (*manava*) expresses "heart," "the interior man," "conscience," "soul"; whilst various other compounds of *mana* between them yield a most complete psychological vocabulary—words for thought, memory, belief, approval, affection, desire and so forth. Meanwhile, *mana* always, I think, falls short of expressing "individuality." Though immaterial it is perfectly transmissible. Thus only last week[3] a correspondent wrote to me from Simbo in the Solomon Islands to say that a native has no objection to imparting to you the words of a *mana* song. The mere knowledge will not enable you to perform miracles. You must pay him money, and then *ipso facto* he will transmit

[1] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 249; *cf.* 123-6. In thus comparing *tindalo* and *vui* in respect to their place in "the animistic hierarchy," I do not overlook the fact that they belong to different regions with distinct cultures; *cf.* p. 121.

[2] Tregear, *op. cit.*, s.vv. *mana*, *manawa*

[3] September 1909; the correspondent was Mr A. M. Hocart.

the *mana* to you—as we should say, the " good-will " of the concern. On the other hand, animism lends itself naturally to this purpose. It is true that there is often very little individuality attaching to the nameless spirit (*vui*) that may enter into a man. But the ghost (*tindalo*) that inspires you is apt to retain its full selfhood, so that the possessed one speaks of " we two—So-and-so and I."

I conclude, then, that *mana*, or rather the *tabu-mana* formula, has solid advantages over animism, when the avowed object is to found what Dr Tylor calls " a minimum definition of religion." *Mana* is coextensive with the supernatural; animism is far too wide. *Mana* is always *mana*, supernatural power, differing in intensity—in voltage, so to speak—but never in essence; animism splits up into more or less irreducible kinds, notably " soul," " spirit," and " ghost." Finally, *mana*, whilst fully adapted to express the immaterial—the unseen force at work behind the seen—yet, conformably with the incoherent state of rudimentary reflection, leaves in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal, and in particular does not allow any notion of a high individuality to be precipitated. Animism, on the other hand, tends to lose touch with the supernatural in its more impersonal forms, and is not well suited to express its transmissibility nor indeed its immateriality; but, by way of compensation, it can in a specialized form become a means of representing supernatural agents of high individuality, whenever the social condition of mankind is advanced enough to foster such a conception.

The last consideration paves the way for a concluding observation. Throughout I have been in search of classificatory categories applicable to rudimentary religion as a whole. In other words, I have assumed that the subject is to be treated as if it represented a single level of experience, and, moreover, that the treatment is to limit itself to the work of classifying—that is, arranging the facts under synoptic headings. Now such, I think, must be the prime object of our science at its present stage of development. We must not try to move too fast. Some day, however, when our knowledge is fuller and better organized, we may hope to be able to deal with the history of religion genetically—to exhibit the successive stages of a continuous process of orthogenic or central evolution, whilst making at the same time full allowance for the thousand and one side-shoots of the wide-spreading family tree of human culture. Now when it comes to exhibiting genesis, it may well be, I think, that, along certain lines of growth, and perhaps along the central line itself, *mana* will at a certain point have to give way to one or another type of animistic conception. Where marked individualities tend to be lacking in society, as in Australia, there it will be found that the supernatural tends normally to be apprehended under more or less impersonal forms. This holds true even within the strict *habitat* of the *mana* doctrine. Thus in the New Hebrides, where the culture is relatively backward, the prevailing animistic conception is that of the *vui* or " spirit," a being often nameless, and, at the best, of vague personality. On the other

hand, in the Solomon Islands, where the culture is more advanced, the religious interest centres in the *tindalo mana* or ghost of power—the departed soul of some well-known individual.[1] In effect, hero-worship has, with the evolution of the hero, super-induced itself upon some sort of polydaemonism redolent of democracy. But I refrain from further speculations about religious evolution. They are tempting, but, in the present state of our knowledge, hardly edifying. I would merely add, glancing forwards for a moment from rudimentary religion to what we call "advanced," that to the end animism never manages to drive the more impersonal conceptions of the supernatural clean out of the field. The "ghost," clearly, does not hold its own for long. Anthropomorphic theism, on the other hand, a view that is bred from animatism rather than from animism proper, dominates many of the higher creeds, but not all. Buddhism is a standing example of an advanced type of religion that exalts the impersonal aspect of the divine. It is, again, especially noticeable how a thinker such as Plato, with all his interest in soul, human personality, and the subjective in general, hesitates between a personal and an impersonal rendering of the idea of God. Thus the ambiguity that lies sleeping in *mana* would seem to persist to some extent even when religious experience is at its most self-conscious. In the meantime all religions, low and high, rudimentary and advanced, can join in saying with the Psalmist that "power belongeth unto God."

[1] Codrington, *op. cit.*, 122.

V

A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

ARGUMENT

BRITISH anthropologists, exception made of Spencer, have always applied a psychological method to the comparative study of religion, that is, have treated psychological elements as fundamental in religious history. Other schools have been more inclined to try to reduce the psychological to presumed non-psychological, or objective, conditions. Thus, of such objectivist theories, one regards man as primarily determined by his instincts, another as by his race, another as by his economic necessities, another as by geographical conditions; all these views being liable to the charge of apriorism and downright materialism. The sociological school of Durkheim, on the other hand, combines a genuine psychological interest with the gratuitous postulate of determinism, a position which leads them, in their quest for objectivity, to abstract away, and hence in effect to ignore and undervalue, that free moment in human history of which individuality is the expression; whereas, as concretely presented, and hence for the purposes of science as distinct from metaphysics, human experience exhibits the contradictory appearances of determination and freedom in conjunction. Hitherto, however, British anthropologists have been content to adopt the

method of Individual Psychology, and hence are themselves guilty of an abstract treatment of religion, seeing that religion is in a leading aspect a social product, a phenomenon of intercourse. To remedy this shortcoming, then, the method of a Social Psychology is needed, and, for the study of rudimentary religion, should even be made paramount. The religious society, rather than the religious individual, must be treated as primarily responsible for the feelings, thoughts and actions that make up historical religion; though, strictly, to speak of the religious society as owning the soul thus manifested is no more than a methodological fiction—just as the abstract soul of Individual Psychology is, in another way, a fiction too. Exclusive reliance on a Social Psychology being thus ruled out by the abstractness of its point of view, room must be found for the co-operation of the subsidiary disciplines. The first is Individual Psychology, which as applied to history will attach no small measure of explanatory value to the higher manifestations of individuality, individual initiation being, however, less in evidence under the sway of primitive custom. The second is Social Morphology, a line of inquiry most fruitfully prosecuted by the French sociologists aforesaid, which, however, as such stops short at the external condition, the social envelope; the informing spirit of religion being the concern of Social, assisted by Individual, Psychology.

I. *Comparative Religion as a Branch of Psychology*

ALTHOUGH anthropologists of the British school have on the whole troubled little to make explicit to their readers, or even to themselves, the precise method of their researches in Com-

parative Religion, there is no doubt that one and all, if challenged, would declare that method to be, broadly speaking, psychological. In other words, they would profess to be trying to understand the religious consciousness, or religious experience, of mankind "from the inside," as the phrase is. Treating ritual, language, organisation, and so on, as but the "outward signs" of an "inward and spiritual" condition, they seek to penetrate, they would say, beyond and beneath these phenomena, by the only available, if indirect, means, namely, the exercise of sympathetic insight, to those subjective factors of which the objective manifestations form the more or less loose-fitting garment. Further—though here might be found a greater divergence of opinion—religious experience would be characterized by most thinkers of this school as pre-eminently of the practical rather than of the speculative or mystic type, a mode of the life of purpose and action rather than of the life of thought or faith. After all, considering the national tendency to emphasize the ethical side of Christianity, it is not surprising that the scientific conception of religion should echo this pragmatic tone.

Does the rest of the world agree with the British school in regarding psychological and subjective elements as fundamental in religious history? Of course no one in their senses—not even a theorist defending a thesis—would deny that subjective elements are there to be taken stock of, or that, when taken stock of, they have a certain value in revealing ultimate conditions. But a profound distrust of the subjective as providing altogether too

shifting a base for the philosophy of the human sciences exists both here and abroad. Indeed, if British anthropologists (from amongst whom Spencer may for our present purpose be excluded as founder of a distinct school of his own) have acquiesced in purely psychological results, might not the reason be that, busy with their beloved facts, they have not troubled to look beyond the ends of their noses? Hence, both here amongst admirers of the Synthetic Philosophy, and abroad where system is more of a cult, determined efforts of all sorts have been made to reduce the psychological to its presumed non-psychological and objective conditions. Sociological or historical method in general rather than the method of Comparative Religion in particular has naturally furnished the immediate topic of most pronouncements. Yet it would be easy to show that Comparative Religion no less than any other of the special departments of Social Science has been seriously affected by this and that attempt to refer the will and fancy of man to causes that transcend the arbitrary.

To enumerate and classify the multitude of these objectivist theories is too formidable a task to be attempted here, but some representative views may be cited by way of illustrating, and at the same time criticising, their general tendency. First we have the evolutionism of the biological school with its organicist or even mechanist analogies, which applied wholesale and unconditionally to Sociology have notoriously begotten a mythology. When all has been said in favour of the suggestiveness of the

ideas of such writers as Novicow or Espinas, it remains certain that sociological phenomena belong primarily to a plane distinct from that of instinct, and admit of specific explanation in terms not heterogeneous but appropriate. No doubt there are remoter conditions of a biological order that have a certain relevancy. To exalt these, however, at the expense of proximate conditions, as this school is led by its *a priori* bias to do, is gratuitously to hamper observation and description with a radically false perspective. Closely associated with the line of thought is the view of such thinkers as Lapouge and Ammon, who make race the dominant factor in human development—a notion which seems likewise to underlie the somewhat different work of Gumplowicz. But, strictly taken, race is the vaguest and most elusive of conceptions, as any physical anthropologist is perfectly ready to admit.[1] The races of mankind, it is plain, are a thoroughly mixed lot. If on the other hand race be taken loosely in the sense of nationality, it is clear that analysis has not yet said its last word. In another category are the economic interpretations of Loria and others, this type of theory deriving itself from the " historical materialism " of Marx. Distinct, but of very similar tendency, is the anthropogeography of Ratzel and his school, a method that is rapidly gaining ground in this country. Now, regarded in themselves, such studies, whether of food-supply, or of soil or climate, in relation to distribution of population and other

[1] Compare, for instance, P. Topinard, *Eléments d'anthropologie générale* (1885), p. 202.

objective matters, are highly important, nay indispensable. National character and policy are certainly not to be understood apart from the consideration of environing conditions of this kind. It is only when, or so far as, they are taken to explain the national history to all intents and purposes finally, *milieu* or some prominent aspect thereof being regarded as the determining cause of genius itself, that no soundly empirical and tentative philosophy of man can bear with them any longer. The trouble with all these theories we have reviewed is their apriorism. It is assumed offhand firstly, that for all the manifestations of mind, individual and collective, there must be an explanation in terms of necessary causation of a physical and external type; secondly, that some one cause must be more fundamental than the rest, and must therefore be capable of accepting responsibility, as it were, for the whole affair. But these are but prejudices, begotten it may be by a passion for the objective, but nevertheless deserving the denomination of subjectivist at its most abusive. As empiricists we must work, not from metaphysical fancies, but from facts—from that which, as Aristotle puts it, is " better known to us."

A defender of these views will retort: " But granting you that instinct and race are somewhat intangible, here in food-supply or soil are the very facts you profess to be after. Surely they are ' better known to us,' because directly presented to the senses, than the accompanying subjective states that sympathetic insight must indirectly divine." To this the reply is that undoubtedly they are directly presented to us

as facts; but not as causes. Description may well begin from them; it does not follow that explanation will end with them. We begin, let us say, by describing in objective terms the proportion borne by the agricultural to the manufacturing portion of the population in this country, or its position as a group of islands set over against a continent. Is it possible for explanation to deduce therefrom without further ado the amount of corn we import or the size of our battle fleet? If this seem possible to some, it is only because the middle term, a fact of another order, a psychical fact, namely, the national desire for self-preservation, is tacitly assumed as a constant factor in the situation. But nations make mistakes. They are capable of ignoring, or at least misconceiving, the dictates of self-preservation. The " free fooders " and the " blue-water school " do not have it all their own way. But what becomes then of the " laws " supposed objectively and necessarily to connect preponderance of manufacturing population with the importation of grain, or insular position with the command of the sea? They turn out to be but laws of the moral type, laws which ought to be kept if certain ends are to be realized, but which actually are broken as often as these ends are not affirmed by the general will. In short, if we are not composing in the slap-dash style of evolutionary biology some *a priori* science of national health in general, but are seeking empirically to describe in their detailed relations to each other the actual conditions under which the historical life of peoples is carried on, psychical factors must not only be considered but

specially emphasized. For the peoples concerned, and therefore for the observer, the psychical factors—this sentiment, that policy, and so on—underlie and condition the material factors. If more remotely the psychical factors be themselves conditioned, it is certainly not by the material factors as directly presented either to the observer or to those he is observing, but by certain transcendent causes somehow discerned by the metaphysician at the back of these factors. We may add that we have represented the case for objective determinants of an economic and geographical kind at its strongest, namely, where, as when food or defence from foes is in question, the psychical accompaniments are relatively simple and constant. Where art or religion have to be accounted for, material explanations at once become palpably incomplete and arbitrary. It is true that we have gone for our illustration to a civilized nation where sentiments and policies are clearly in evidence. But the primitive tribe has its sentiments and even its policies likewise. That they are harder to discover does not confer the right to treat them as directly deducible from *milieu*.

There remains to be considered another group of sociologists, the school of Durkheim and his brilliant colleagues of *L'Année Sociologique*. These thinkers are, or tend to be, objectivist, but theirs is a psychological not a materialistic objectivism. Their explanations are framed in terms of idea, sentiment, and purpose, which is the all-important matter. So long as they do not force the psychology to suit their metaphysical postulate of determinism—and they

show no strong inclination to do that, a test-case being their handling of the association of ideas on sound apperceptionist principles—there can be no harm in believing, with at least half the psychological world, that ultimately the subjective and objective orders are at one in a cause-bound necessary series or system of correlated realities. If they admit the phenomenal existence of the contingent in the shape of human purpose, they are welcome to disbelieve in its real existence, whatever that may mean. Their merit is that they go straight to the facts, objective and subjective, of human life as directly or indirectly observed, philosophizing as to principles of explanation as they go, that is, as the principles are demanded by the actual work of specific and detailed research. With these, therefore, the British school of anthropology, with its radical empiricism that puts facts before laws and is happy if it can see a stride-length ahead in the dark, has no quarrel; nay from them it has much to learn. What this school names *Morphologie Sociale*, the study of the exterior conditions and forms of social agglomeration, of all in short that a statistical demography should describe, is a branch of investigation to which more attention might well be paid on this side of the Channel, as witness sundry gaps in the *questionnaires* our anthropologists are wont to circulate among workers in the field.[1] But you may have too much of a good thing, if the other good things of life are for its sake neglected. There are certain signs that Psychology may in the long run suffer from one-

[1] Cf. *L'Année Sociologique*, ix. 138.

sided explanations of morphological derivation. Thus that most able and thoroughgoing of anthropological researchers, M. Mauss, in his *Essai sur les variations saisonnières des Sociétés Eskimos* [1] goes so far as to claim that he has here verified crucially [2] the hypothesis that all the forms, including the religious form, of the social life of the Eskimo are a function of its material substrate, namely, the mass, density, organization and composition of their modes of agglomeration. All he shows, however, is that, if the mode of agglomeration changes, the religious custom and so on does as a fact alter. Just so in the case of the individual, as the brain-matter is modified, the ideas appear to change; but surely it does not follow necessarily that thought is a function of the brain, if this is to mean that thought is the effect, or even the unconditional correlate, of cerebration. Yet if it mean less than this, and unknown conditions may possibly vitiate the correspondence, explanation is not reached, since we are left with the merely analogical. A similar tendency would seem to be the stress laid by the school of Durkheim on the objectivity of their method—on the fact that throughout they are dealing with "things." They appear to regard social phenomena, whether morphological or psychological, as objective simply in the sense of independent of individual control. Now no doubt the individual often finds himself powerless in face of the mass, though the mass is probably in every case moved by its ringleaders. No doubt, again, the subconscious nature of most popular contagions favours a treat-

[1] Cf. *L'Année Sociologique*, 39 *sqq.* [2] *Ib.*, p. 129.

ment which verges on a mechanist dynamic. But do these writers mean more than that in a certain abstract aspect of society mechanism, or something psychologically equivalent, prevails? Probably not. But they at least show no wish or power (happily for those who have profited largely from their researches) to limit their science to the study of this abstract element and its conditions—a bare fragment at most, suppose it *per impossibile* isolated, of the vast mass of sociological material calling for analysis. The truth would seem to be that these thinkers, in reacting against the ideological constructions of the fancy-free anthropologist—a pretender who is fast being hustled from the field even in this land of distinguished amateurs—have bent the stick over to the other side. By all means let us avoid what Bacon calls *anticipatio* as contrasted with *interpretatio naturæ*—the flying to the widest axioms without progressively graduated research. But at least let Psychology as Psychology preserve its integrity as a kind of bridge-work between the objective and the subjective elements of our experience. Let no premature abstraction cut up the field into strips before the whole has been surveyed. One day, perhaps, social explanations may be assimilated to mechanical; or one day, as I incline to hope, the very opposite may come about. In the meantime, however, whilst so much observation remains to be accomplished, let metaphysical questions, so far as they do not immediately bear on the exigencies of practical procedure, remain open. In particular, let necessity and contingency be treated as complementary,

though antithetic, bases of explanatory construction in dealing with a human experience that, in despite of logic, empirically faces both ways at once and together.

II. *Comparative Religion as a Branch of Social Psychology*

There seems, then, to be good reason to respect the British tradition which ordains that Psychology must preside over the investigations of Comparative Religion. It remains to make explicit what anthropologists of the British school have hitherto recognized but vaguely, that a Social, not an Individual, Psychology can alone be invested with this function.

The ordinary Psychology bases itself on the assumption that this soul of yours or mine is something individual. There can be no great harm in this if individual here mean no more than self-contained. What is fatal, however, is to take it—as is often done by inadvertence—in the sense of self-complete.[1] It is absolutely necessary to assume with common sense that souls can communicate—by indirect means, let us say, putting aside the question of the possibility of telepathy—and that by communicating they become more or less complementary to one another in a social system. For certain limited purposes, however, Psychology has found it convenient to make abstraction of the social dimension, as it may be termed. In so doing it can never afford for a

[1] The words "self-complete" and "self-contained" were by an accident transposed in the first edition.

moment to forget that it is dealing with what, being highly abstract, it is safest to term a fiction—to wit, a soul stripped of ninety-nine hundredths of its natural portion of soul-life. Herodotus [1] tells how King Psammetichus of Egypt caused certain infants to be isolated and in their inarticulate babbling sought for the original tongue of man, with results more satisfying to himself than to a critical posterity. Such an incubator-method, as it may be termed, is by no means to be despised in certain psychological contexts. As is well known, the instincts of new-born animals have been distinguished by precisely this means. So, too, in a somewhat similar if less exact way the psychologist who merely observes, having made abstraction of the pabulum provided by society together with such effects on the mental digestion as may be traced to the particular nature of the food, may pay exclusive attention to the digestive apparatus which the individual is supposed to bring with him to the feast. But apply this incubator-method to the origins of language, of law, of morals, of religion, and how is the fallacy of Psammetichus to be escaped? Yet on all sides this application is being made.

To take but the case in which we are primarily interested, namely, that of religion, what is commoner than to imagine a religious instinct, inherent in our individual nature, that out of itself by a sort of parthenogenesis bears fruit in the shape of historical religion? Or if the stimulus to religion is thought of as coming not so much from within as from without, from God by revelation, or from the world by the

[1] Herodotus, ii. 2.

awakening of awe at its marvels, it is still the self-sufficient individual who is thought of as the subject of the experience. An example from a neighbouring field is the claim of various anthropologists to be able to deduce the phenomena of magic from the laws of association as they work in the individual mind.[1] And yet that very incubator-method which is here parodied and abused might have taught these all too simple theorists their mistake. We cannot, perhaps, isolate an infant after the example of Psammetichus, and watch to see whether *proprio motu* it not merely talks but prays. We might, however, transplant the infant from savage to civilized surroundings, or, for the matter of that, might reverse the process. With what result? Would a young totemist notwithstanding evolve in the one case and a young Christian in the other? Or would not the child acquire the religion of its adopted home, of the society that rears and educates it? Even when full allowance is made for the fact that each child reacts on its education in individual fashion, can there be the slightest shadow of a doubt that the supreme determining influence must rest with the social factor?

If religion, then, is pre-eminently the concern of a Social, and not an Individual, Psychology, in what sort of shape will its natural laws or tendencies be exhibited? It has just been pointed out that a religion is so closely bound up with a particular

[1] It is only when a psychological treatment (such as I have myself pursued in Essay II.) claims to be a complete explanation that I object to it.

organization of society that to abandon the one is to break with the other. May we, therefore, go further and say that a religion is identical with a particular organization of society, that it is a social institution? Certainly not, unless we are speaking loosely. We must say that the religion is materialized, incorporated, enshrined, in the corresponding institution or group of institutions. Perhaps an analogy may be drawn (though analogies are always dangerous if pressed) between a religion embodied in a social structure and a piece of literature, the work of many hands, consigned to a manuscript. In either case the one depends for very existence on the other, yet they differ as spirit from outer form; and the spirit is to a greater or less extent functionally independent of the form, since often it palpably governs it, stamps it with its own pattern, makes it the instrument of its own intent. Bad literature, indeed, will conform itself to the manuscript; just so many pages are wanted; the scribe must not be troubled to rewrite. And so bad religion enslaves itself to the outer form, truckles to a usage that imposes bounds, becomes fossilized to suit its ministers' convenience. Judged by which test, it must be admitted, there is a vast amount of bad religion in existence. Nevertheless world-literature and world-religion at their best and most typical are by no means the hacks of publishers and priests. In view, then, of the functional independence of the spirit, that is, the ruling meaning and purpose, of historical religion at its most essential, its laws or tendencies must be described in terms appropriate to spirit, in terms of meaning and purpose. A

Social, no less than an Individual, Psychology is concerned, primarily and directly, with soul only.

But at once the question occurs: Whose soul? Whose spirit? Whose meaning and purpose? For those who recognize the possibility of a Social Psychology, there can be but one answer. Primarily and directly, the subject, the owner as it were, of religious experience is the religious society, not the individual. Now the subject of psychical states and processes as conceived by Individual Psychology is in no small measure abstract and fictitious; and there is no harm in this abstraction so long as Individual Psychology knows what it is about and does not claim substance for its shadow-pictures. It remains to add, in fairness, that Social Psychology too has to operate on a figment—a figment which it is the business of Sociology to exhibit in its true nature, namely, as a methodological device of an abstract kind.[1] Suppose we wish to explain the totemism of an Australian tribe. There is only one possible way to do this appropriately and essentially, namely, to describe its general meaning and purpose by means of what Seignobos would call a *formule d'ensemble*.[2] Do we thereby commit ourselves to the assertion that this meaning and purpose exist? Most certainly yes

[1] I do not mean to say that the two figments in question are in all respects on a par. Thus most people will be ready, on the evidence of introspection, to believe that there is a real individual soul with which Individual Psychology deals, however abstractly; whereas they will be inclined to doubt whether any social or trans-personal soul really exists in its own right at all. But these questions about real existence are better reserved for metaphysics.

[2] *Cf.* Langlois et Seignobos, *Introduction aux études historiques*, 1898, p. 244.

in a sense. For whom, then, do they exist in this sense? Not for the individual tribesman taken at random, nor even for a leading elder, but for the society as a whole. It is absolutely necessary, if we would avoid the psychologist's fallacy, the mistake of letting our own feelings mix with what has to be impersonally observed, that we should fix our eyes throughout on the meaning and purpose totemism has, not for us, but for them, and for them not as so many individuals but as a group. Totemism is one of those psychical effects of intercourse which are methodologically, that is, for the working purposes of our science, specific. In terming such effects specific, however, Empirical Psychology implies no more than that they feel, think, and act in society otherwise than if apart, in a degree and to an extent deserving careful discrimination. It does not pronounce, because it has no methodological interest in pronouncing, on the metaphysical question whether, as common sense inclines to hold, a society as such has no self-contained unitary soul, or, as Green and Bosanquet would affirm, the general will belongs to a collective soul of another and higher power than this soul of yours or mine.

Social Psychology, then, would appear to be immediately concerned with the soul-life of this abstraction or figment, the social subject. It is the business, however, of Sociology, understood as the general philosophy of the social sciences, in which capacity its concern is with method rather than results, to remind Social Psychology of the abstract and conditional nature of its findings; since it is notorious

that in science one is apt to hug one's pet abstraction so devotedly that one's fool's paradise comes in the end to be mistaken for the real world. Sociology, therefore, will do well to insist on that, in dealing with such a subject as religion in the concrete variety of its historical manifestations, Social Psychology should qualify its results by making allowance for those of an applied form of Individual Psychology on the one hand, and for those of Social Morphology on the other.

Thus in the first place, though its interest is primarily in the social subject, Social Psychology must never for an instant ignore the qualifying fact of the existence of the individual subject. We should be very far from the truth were we to suppose that the savage society as such assigns any consistent meaning and purpose to its totemism, or, for the matter of that, were we to impute consistency of view and intention to the most intelligent and organic religious society the world has ever known. Souls communicate, but always imperfectly. They are always more or less at cross-purposes and cross-meanings. It is well to remember this when we feel inclined to deify society, the collective intelligence, the public conscience, the spirit of the age, and the like. Objectively viewed, no doubt, society dwarfs the individual, such is the impressiveness of its sheer mass and momentum. Subjectively considered, however, society compares badly with the best individuals. The social mind is not merely hazy but even distraught, whether we look at it in its lowest manifestation, the mob, or in its highest, namely, the state. At its best it is the mind of a public meeting,

at its worst it is the mind of Babel. It is pointless to retort that society is always right. Society is always actually right (until physical catastrophe occurs), in the sense that whatever happens happens. But it does not know and will the ideally right, the right that is not actual but to-be-actualized, to anything like the same extent as do the best individuals. So much is this the case that the historian of civilization, when he seeks to render the inwardness of some development or movement, will be tempted to abandon the strictly social standpoint for another which may be termed the standpoint of the representative individual. Thus how describe the spirit of the French Revolution? Socially, it is a seething mass of cross-currents. In a representative individual, say Rousseau, at least we can distinguish the general set of the tide. At the level of primitive culture, however, where representative individuals are not easily met with, where, to our eyes at least, one man is very like another, the social method, the method of the composite photograph, may and must have the preference. Yet Social Psychology cannot afford to forget that the individual members of a primitive society find it extremely hard to communicate successfully with each other, to understand what they are severally or together after. Hence there is a danger of ascribing a psychical tendency to a social movement where there is none. The very word tendency is ambiguous. It may stand for a drifting together, which is physical, or for a pursuing or at least a groping together, which is psychical. The latter kind of tendency is the only one that concerns

a Social Psychology as such. If therefore the collective mind of a savage society is asserted to mean and purpose this or that, proof must be forthcoming that there actually is something of a mutual understanding to this or that effect; and it will always be wise to make allowance for the possibility of alternative interpretations in regard to even the most firmly-rooted custom, as well as for the possibility of interference on the part of that bugbear of Social Science, the individual who has a view of his own.

A second qualifying circumstance to be constantly borne in mind when working from the notion of a social subject or collective mind is one that is likely to appeal more strongly than the other to those who are in sympathy with Continental sociology. This is the fact already alluded to that social meanings and purposes exist mainly as embodied in social institutions. We have claimed for the former at their best and most typical a certain functional independence that entitles them to be dealt with as phenomena essentially psychical. At the same time this independence, it is clear, can never be absolute; whilst often it is purely titular, the form, a thing in itself wholly soulless and material, ruling in the place of the spirit. Moreover, religion in particular would seem of all the spiritual activities of man the most subservient to form; ritual is religion's second nature. Hence a Social Psychology must beware lest in religion or elsewhere it pretend to find living purpose where there is none or next to none. The organism may be lying dead in its shell. Or, as is the commoner case, whilst the shell persists intact, the

original owner may have disappeared, and in its place another more or less inappropriate and alien tenant have crept in, to the confusion of honest naturalists unpractised in detecting sports. Nay, to pursue the metaphor, the empty shell may harbour quite a crowd of such casual immigrants. Bad religion is quite capable of saying: This is what you must all do; but each may think as he likes. Now it is perhaps the most characteristic feature of civilization that it encourages the free meaning, giving it the power to dispense, not indeed with form altogether, but with this or that form whenever it is found to hamper. But primitive culture is form-bound through and through. A proof is the extreme difficulty with which ideas travel from tribe to tribe. So integrally are they embodied in the tribal customs that apart from those customs they are but empty ineffectual ghosts of themselves. No wonder that many a sociologist says in his haste that they are the customs, neither more nor less. But Social Morphology cannot rightfully thus supersede Social Psychology any more than grammar can supersede logic. Yet Social Psychology must work with Social Morphology ever at its elbow. Let us remember that social purposing has a psychical nature of a very low order, especially when, as at the level of savagery, it is not continuously fed by contributions from the minds of enlightened individuals. The policy of an enlightened individual may be said to start from some more or less definite character, mental disposition, or whatsoever we like to call it. At least we cannot get behind this, however well-informed we

may be as to the man's heredity and *milieu ;* for us there is in greater or lesser degree spontaneous origination, a fresh cause to be reckoned with. All this is far less true of the action of a society as such. Nevertheless, in a civilized society genuine originators are to be found amongst the prophets and leaders and other representatives of the social tendency to progress, who, apart from their personal contribution to its furtherance, stand as vouchers for the diffused presence in the community at large of the power to originate by conscious and reflective means. Turn, however, to primitive society, and self-caused ideas as moving forces are but rarely to be met with. Instead, we are for the most part thrown back on mental processes of the lowest order—say, Tarde's " cross-fertilization of imitations," or something equally crepuscular in its psychical quality. Meanwhile, lest we civilized observers lose our way in these regions of mist, there before our eyes stands the rite, objective, persistent, of firm outline; and, however much we desire to psychologize, we are bound to cling to it as our makeshift standard of reference. Nor is our convenience the only excuse for working round to spirit by way of form. For the savage society likewise the rite forms a sort of standard of reference. Out of it proceed the random whys; back to it go the indecisive therefores; and at this the common centre the meanings coalesce and grow ever more consistent, so that at last, perhaps, they react as one systematic idea on the supporting custom, and may henceforth rank as an originating psychical force of the higher order. Since, then, it falls to the lot of the social morphologist

to describe the rite as externally presented, his ways and those of the social psychologist can never lie far apart at the level of the lower culture. And, even if the latter has a distinct and from the human standpoint a higher task, at least he must check his account of the tendencies of the social mind by constant use of the data provided by his colleague.

To sum up. Comparative Religion is a branch of empirical science which aims at describing in formulæ of the highest generality attainable the historical tendencies of the human mind considered in its religious aspect. Its method will primarily be that of a Social Psychology; since it will work directly from the implied or explicit notion of a social subject, to which the tendencies it describes will be held to belong essentially. The use of this method will, however, be qualified throughout by a secondary attention to the methods of two allied disciplines, namely, Individual Psychology and Social Morphology. On the one hand, allowance will be made for the effects of the indirectness and imperfection inherent in the communications of the individual members of society with one another, as also for the results of individual initiative. On the other hand, there will be taken into account the influence on sentiments, ideas, and purposes of social forms and institutions in their external character as rallying and transmitting agencies, or again as agencies that fossilize and pervert.

VI

SAVAGE SUPREME BEINGS AND THE BULL-ROARER

ARGUMENT

LANG'S account in that pioneer work, The Making of Religion (1898), *of various savage Supreme Beings was primarily directed against the all-sufficiency of Tylor's animism as a definition of rudimentary religion, in so far as it showed that anthropomorphic theism was in principle distinct; in other words, that these Supreme Beings were magnified, non-natural men rather than ghosts or spirits. Only in his second edition* (1900) *did he propose a general theory of their origin, namely, that their common features are due to ætiology. Such an explanation is not incompatible with the present writer's theory, first put forth in* 1899, *that a special group of these Supreme Beings, associated with the initiation rites of South-East Australia, has likewise in large part evolved out of a personification of the bull-roarer. Indeed, such personification and ætiology together are far from completing the list of originating causes, since, although animism hardly comes in, we must allow likewise for the influence of totemism, perhaps assisted by the clashing of races, and also of a sky-lore and sky-magic. The bull-roarer, owing to the effect of its sound on the emotions, naturally finds a place and use within the sphere*

of the occult or magico-religious. At the initiation ceremonies one of its functions is simply to frighten the uninitiated, and with that end in view it is personified as a terrible Hobgoblin by those who conduct the ceremonies. When, however, the central mystery of the initiation rites has been enacted, which consists in revealing to the novices the means of producing these terrifying sounds, awe of the bull-roarer is in no way quenched and exploded. On the contrary, the element of fear becomes an ingredient in a richer emotional complex corresponding to the sense of being mysteriously helped to accomplish the passage from boyhood into manhood—of being filled with the mana *that makes all things grow and prosper, whereof the bull-roarer is the vehicle. Meanwhile, the material vehicle is dimly distinguished from the indwelling power, the inward grace, which it embodies and imparts, and there has consequently occurred an advance to a more appropriate type of symbolization. An anthropomorphic being, similar in this respect to Hobgoblin but unlike him in being associated with the beneficent power set in motion by the initiation rite, whereof he is held, ætiologically, to be the founder, is supposed to speak through the bull-roarer; and, further, as the bull-roarer is an instrument for making the thunder and rain that make things grow, so its anthropomorphic counterpart is identified with the sky-god who makes thunder in the sky and sends down the actual rain. Where the anthropomorphic ectype is duplicated we may suppose the difference between the esoteric and the exoteric names for the same Supreme Being to have projected itself into myth. In any case, the fluctuating doctrinal representation of the godhead is less vital to this type of religion than is the abiding sense of a power that makes for goodness.*

SAVAGE SUPREME BEINGS

WHEN, in 1898, Mr Andrew Lang published *The Making of Religion*, he did a great service to the science of Man. He called attention to a class of facts to which those who interested themselves in the general theory of "primitive" religion had hitherto been blind. These facts were such as to show that many of the most savage of existing peoples—Bushmen, Andamanese, Australians, and so on—recognize Supreme Beings, who are, in Matthew Arnold's well-known phrase, "magnified non-natural men" rather than ghosts or spirits. It followed that the Tylorian animism would not do as an all-sufficient account of the essential nature of rudimentary religion.

To make this point of general theory clear was, unquestionably, Mr Lang's chief object in setting forth these unnoticed facts with all the literary skill of which he is master. And, considered in the light of pure theory, this point of his is, surely, one of the utmost importance. If there be those who harbour a suspicion that Mr Lang was moved by ulterior motives of a non-scientific kind—that, to employ a current vulgarism, he was "playing to the theological gallery"—they are much to be pitied. Every true anthropologist knows that Mr Lang has deserved well of the science—that no one has shown himself more ready to "follow the argument whithersoever it leads." It might, however, be suggested with more appearance of reason that here and there he had incautiously made use of somewhat perfervid language, as notably when he attributed "omniscience"

and "omnipotence" to certain Supreme Beings hailing from Australia. Yet he was herein but faithfully reproducing the very words of his authorities, at the head of whom stands A. W. Howitt, a cool and accurate observer.[1] And, like Howitt,[2] he has since taken pains to qualify his original presentation of the facts, so as expressly to guard against interpretations coloured by the belief in a primitive revelation—a hypothesis of which he does not avail himself,[3] and one that, rightly or wrongly, is excluded from the present purview of the evolutionary science of Man.

In the first edition of his book Mr Lang was content to demonstrate the fact that many savage peoples are actually found to recognize such Supreme Beings. The origin of these Supreme Beings—in other words, the conditions under which the notion of them first arose—he did not attempt to explain. Where he thus, not unwisely, "refused to tread," the present writer ventured to "rush in" with a guess relating to Mr Lang's prerogative group of instances, namely, the Supreme Beings that preside over the initiation ceremonies of the South-Eastern region of Australia. A paper read before the British Association in 1899 contained a passage on the subject beginning with

[1] *See* especially A. W. Howitt, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, xiii. 458.

[2] Contrast, for instance, Howitt's tone in *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, 488 f., and note esp. 503.

[3] See *Anthropos*, iii. 559 *sqq.*, where Father Schmidt, citing the passage in which Mr Lang rejects the postulate in question, takes his leader to task for this want of speculative courage. The idea goes back to the Rev. W. Ridley; see his *Kamilaroi and other Australian Languages* (N.S. Wales, 1875), 171.

these words: " I have to confess to the opinion with regard to *Daramulun, Mungan-ngaua, Tundun,* and *Baiamai,* those divinities whom the Kurnai, Murrings, Kamilaroi, and other Australian groups address severally as ' Our Father,' recognizing in them the supernatural headmen and lawgivers of their respective tribes, that their prototype is nothing more or less than that well-known material and inanimate object, the bull-roarer." [1] That guess other calls upon his time have prevented the present writer from trying to make good until now.

In 1900, when Mr Lang brought out the second edition of his book, his theory of the origin of savage Supreme Beings was at length given to the world. Arguing from the fact that " it is notoriously the nature of man to attribute every institution to a primal inventor or legislator," he concluded that such Supreme Beings were conceived by way of answer to the question, " Why do we perform these rites? " [2] Now, of this hypothesis it must at least be admitted that it is thoroughly scientific, in the sense of being in complete harmony with the ordinarily accepted principles of anthropology. What the learned know as " ætiological myths," and juvenile readers of Mr Kipling as " Just-so Stories," undoubtedly tend to arise in connection with human institutions no less than in connection with the rest of the more perplexing or amazing facts and circumstances of life. It is " the nature of man " (as it is of the child, the

[1] The whole passage as it originally stood is to be found in the essay on " Preanimistic Religion," p. 16.

[2] *See* Lang, *l.c.*, Preface, esp. xiv.

father of the man) to ask "Why?" and, further, to accept any answer as at anyrate more satisfactory than none at all. Again, it is sound method, in dealing with myth as associated with ritual at the stage of rudimentary religion, to assume that for the most part it is the ritual that generates the myth, and not the myth the ritual.[1] And not only is Mr Lang's explanation constructed on scientific lines. It is probably a true explanation so far as it goes. Nay, more; perhaps it goes as far as any explanation can, that seeks to cover the whole miscellaneous assortment of Supreme Beings, of whom mention is made in Mr Lang's pioneer chapters. It may be that their family resemblance amounts to no more than this, that ætiology working upon ritual, or upon anything else of which the why and wherefore is not obvious, has in every case evolved certain leading features appropriate to the "primal inventor or legislator."

Here, however, it is proposed simply to theorize about the origin of a single, since apparently more or less homogeneous, group of Supreme Beings, that are closely associated with a particular ritual. In this ritual the bull-roarer plays a leading part. Ætiology, therefore, in this case, was confronted by the specific question, "Why do we perform the bull-roarer rite?" If it can be shown that the bull-roarer was already on its way to become a Supreme Being on its own account, before ætiology could be there to provide its peculiar contribution, namely,

[1] The *locus classicus* on this subject is Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, 17 f.

the features of the primal inventor, then in the specific explanation of this Australian group of instances at least one other factor of first-rate importance must be reckoned with besides ætiology, namely, the tendency to elevate the bull-roarer into a personality dominating the rite. If the facts are forthcoming to establish the existence of such a tendency, Mr Lang is the last person likely to refuse to do it justice; for he is bound to keep a soft spot in his heart for that bull-roarer which he was the first, if not to christen, at all events to introduce to polite society.[1]

Let it be fully admitted in passing that thus to reduce the number of the co-operating factors to a simple pair is to resort to a purely provisional simplification of the problem of origin. To anyone who glances at the available evidence, sadly fragmentary as it is, it will be plain that other influences have likewise left their mark on these Supreme Beings of South-Eastern Australia. It is for future investigation—for field-work, so far as it is any longer possible in this region,[2] and at anyrate for the most minute and careful study-work—to decide how far any of these stands out as something more than a merely subordinate and secondary determinant. One of them has certainly all the appearance of a side-

[1] The reference is to Mr Lang's well-known essay in *Custom and Myth* (1884). The first to apply the English folk-word "bull-roarer" to the Australian instrument was Howitt; *see* his appendix on the subject in *Kamilaroi and Kurnai* (1880).

[2] Howitt's "last conscious effort was to dictate from his death-bed a message to anthropologists impressing on them the importance of caution in accepting information drawn from the Australian tribes in their present state of decay" (J. G. Frazer in *Folk-Lore*, xx. 171). The remark applies with peculiar force to the South-East region, though hardly at all to large portions of the North and West.

influence, namely, animism. Whatever else they may resemble, these Supreme Beings in their recorded traits bear little likeness to ghosts or spirits. Mr Lang has made this clear. Various analogies from the Central tribes might indeed afford some ground for the suspicion that what are now clearly defined individuals were once groups of reincarnating ancestors, spirits, or what not. Thus M. van Gennep thinks that *Baiamai* was at first a collective term.[1] Such conjectures, however, cannot be verified so long as Australian philology remains in its present scandalously backward state. There is more to be said for the part played by totemism in one or another of its forms. Unfortunately, this is to seek to explain the obscure by the more obscure. Amongst prominent tribes of the South-East region clan-totemism would seem to have been well on its way to disintegrate from natural causes that for the most part escape our analysis. The matrimonial class-system, on the other hand, was on the whole vigorous, and the animal names therewith connected undoubtedly find their way into the mythology which enwraps these Supreme Beings in a thick haze. Heaven help the inquirer who at this point branches off into speculations concerning the famous theory of a supposed race-conflict for the possession of the country under the rival

[1] A. van Gennep, *Mythes et Légendes d'Australie*, ix. The writer came to know this valuable book only after he had expounded his theory in its present form, only with further detail, in two public lectures delivered before the University of Oxford. He then found that M. van Gennep held similar views on several points, notably on the connection between the bull-roarer and thunder (see *ib.*, lxviii. f.). He is glad to be in such close agreement with an author for whose working principles he has the greatest respect.

banners—or perhaps " badges " would be nearer the mark—of Eaglehawk and Crow![1] He will discover incidentally that opinions differ as to whether Victoria has preserved through untold ages the racial type most nearly allied to the Tasmanian, or was occupied by man for the first time only some few centuries ago. Finally, in connection with the possible influence of totemism, it must not be forgotten that South-East Australia is the classic home of that most puzzling of institutions, the sex-totem. It would not be antecedently surprising, therefore, if the special supernatural protector of the male sex took some interest in the rite that brought the men as such together for the making of men as such. A third source of ideas that may have contributed to the character of these Supreme Beings remains to be noticed. It may be termed comprehensively sky-lore. Certain it is that these Supreme Beings, though in former days they are held to have walked the earth, dwell at present in the sky, and overlook the doings of men from that high place. Such and such a star will be pointed to by a native in proof of this watchfulness of theirs.[2] (The curious will observe that this association with the sky has no small effect in commending the Supreme Beings of Australia to the religious mind of Europe.) Here, of course, is an opportunity not to be neglected by

[1] Recently great weight has been attached to such considerations, and it would be in accordance with the "ethnological method" to suggest that the association between certain Supreme Beings and the bull-roarer is simply due to the fact that they were brought into the country by one and the same people. But this method has yet to justify itself by its fruits.

[2] *Cf.* Howitt, *N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 489, 492.

the votaries of the sun-myth, a school a while ago ridiculed nearly out of existence, but of late given to asserting its claims in a reasonable form that ought to win them a hearing.[1] In this case the main difficulty is to conceive how mere sky-lore, unless a secondary development of totemism, could have moulded the character of Supreme Beings whose relation to a rite is apparently vital. If sky-myth is to count, it might be presumed, it must be associated with what for want of a better term might be called sky-magic. Later on, a suggestion will be made that proceeds on these very lines. In the meantime enough has perhaps been said to show how impossible it would be, in the present state of our knowledge, to take account of all the clues that might conceivably prove of service in this veritable maze, were they in working order. For simplicity's sake, then, let it be assumed that the prime factors are two only—Mr Lang's ætiology, and that tendency to ascribe personality to the bull-roarer which will be illustrated in what follows.

For the benefit of the uninitiated it may be expedient at this point to describe the precise nature of a bull-roarer. No student of the history of religion can afford to remain a stranger to it, seeing that it is, as Professor Haddon has well said, "perhaps the most ancient, widely spread, and sacred religious symbol in the world."[2] Natives of these Islands,

[1] *See* W. Foy, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, viii. 526 f. Father Schmidt develops a similar line of thought with great learning in *Anthropos*, iv. 207 f.

[2] A. C. Haddon, *The Study of Man*, 327. The word "symbol" may strike some as inappropriate, but there is much to be said for it, as will be shown presently.

if country-bred, may have had the opportunity in boyhood of cultivating a practical acquaintance with the bull-roarer under this, or some other, local designation of the toy, such as "roarer," or "bull," or "boomer," or "buzzer," or "whizzer," or "swish"—names one and all eloquently expressive of its function. That function is, of course, to make a noise, the peculiar quality of which is best described by some such epithet as "unearthly." The merest amateur who cuts a thin slab of wood to the shape of a laurel leaf, and ties to one end a good thick piece of string three or four feet long, has only to whirl the instrument on his forefinger and he will at once get a taste of its windy note. Naturally, however, it is the privilege of the expert to command the full range of its music. At Cape York, for instance, where the native employs two sizes, a "male" that growls and a "female" that shrieks, and where, to get more purchase, he fastens the string to the end of a stick, "first they are swung round the head, which produces a buzzing noise, then the performer turns rapidly, and, facing the opposite direction, swings the bull-roarers horizontally with a sudden backward and forward movement of the hand which makes them give out a penetrating, yelping sound." [1] So much for what the artist can do in the way of solo. The possibilities of a concerto are even more overwhelming. Amongst the Kurnai of Gippsland the initiation ceremonies culminate in the following performance. When the novices have been made to

[1] *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, v. 220.

kneel down in a row, with their blankets drawn over their heads so that they are in complete darkness, suddenly there burst in upon them, to the number of sixteen, successive wielders of the bull-roarer, who, after adding each in turn his quota to "the roaring and screeching din," wind up all together in a grand "finale of discordant sounds."[1]

It is not, however, the volume or variety of the bull-roarer's utterance that is noteworthy, so much as its fearsome quality. This may be judged from its effect on animals. Thus a Scotch herdboy was observed to "ca' the cattle hame" by an ingenious, if somewhat violent, method. He swung a bull-roarer of his own making, and instantly the beasts were running frantically to the byre. They threw their tails up, we are told, and rushed with fury through the fields.[2] The same device is employed in Galicia. As soon as the bull-roarer gets to work, first the calves stretch their tails into the air, and kick out their hind legs as if they were dancing; and presently their seniors follow suit, so that there is a general stampede. Indeed, the cattle get into quite an idiotic condition; so much so that the Galician peasant will say of a man who is not quite right in the head, "He has a *bzik*" (whence, by the way, the title of the game *bezique*), the word being, of course, modelled on the bull-roarer's buzz.[3] Similarly, in the Malay Peninsula the little instrument sends the huge marauding elephants packing out of the plantations.[4] Indeed, who knows whether its

[1] Howitt, *N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 629.
[2] Haddon, *l.c.*, 281. [3] *Ib.*, 286. [4] *Ib.*, 298.

earliest use on the part of man was not to drive and stupefy the game, as the primeval Bushman does with it to this day.[1]

Be this as it may, it is more immediately in point here to inquire how and why the bull-roarer came to serve a mystic, or magico-religious, purpose. The "how" of the matter, indeed, will probably be different in different cases; but the "why" is within limits explicable in terms of general psychology. Whereas in the animal consciousness fear and curiosity are alternative, or at most combine momentarily, so as to produce a painful vacillation, it is otherwise with the human mind. Here, if the objective conditions are favourable, the two can unite to form a blend. Even if the fear predominate so as to rout, or else paralyse, the body, the curiosity is capable at the same time of arresting and exciting the imagination. Mystic fear, then, is a fear charged with an overtone of wonder. It has a haunting quality which, with the development of the speculative powers, provides the sympathetic nexus for whole systems of ideas and purposes. Thus, in particular, it is the hotbed of magic and religion—systems that, however we decide to delimit them, have this at least in common, that both alike participate in the occult.

This appears from the experience of those human beings whose feelings towards the bull-roarer must approach most nearly to pure fear. Good care is taken by those who conduct the initiation ceremonies of South-East Australia that the uninitiated, and,

[1] Haddon, *l.c.*, 290.

notably, the women and children, shall have the full benefit of the terrifying noise of the bull-roarer, without having a chance of discovering how that noise is produced. The fact that this part of the performance goes by the name of " Frightening the women " [1] affords an eloquent proof of an intention on their part, which they are doubtless fully competent to render effective. In short, they see to it that the women " have the *bzik*." It is conducive to discipline. Just so at Abbeokuta, in West Africa, the dread god *Oro*, who speaks through the bull-roarer, punishes gadding wives with a thoroughness characteristic of that blood-stained corner of the world.[2] It remains to note that, if feminine nerves are weak, there is likewise a feminine curiosity which is strong and must be satisfied. Hence myth is resorted to, if that be the proper name for a bare-faced piece of " organized hypocrisy." The shuddering sound proceeding from the woods is explained to be the voice of Hobgoblin. No bloodless wraith is he, but an anthropomorphic being if ever there was one. Presently, when the women's heads have been duly smothered under their opossum rugs, he will come tearing into the camp to fetch the boys, and there will be heard not merely his thunderous voice, but the trample of his feet as he hales off the novices by main force, scattering the fire-brands as he

[1] Howitt, *J. A. I.*, xiv. 315; *cf. N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 631. It is noticeable that this took place even amongst the Kurnai, where " the emancipation of woman " had gone further than anywhere else in Australia.

[2] *See* generally Mrs R. Braithwaite Batty in *J. A. I.*, xix. 160-3. *Cf.* Haddon, *Study of Man*, 289.

goes.[1] And throughout the initial stages of the initiation rite the same farce is kept up for the benefit of the novices. It is held to be good policy to daze and terrorize them. Society has got them in its grip, and wishes them to realize the fact. Therefore, when a tooth is extracted, or filth has to be eaten, or something else of impressive unpleasantness takes place at the expense of the hapless youths, the voice of Hobgoblin proceeding from some hidden spot adds a dreadful sanction to the ordeal. At last, when the preliminary work of mortifying the " old Adam " is accomplished, the privileges of manhood are disclosed. What Howitt calls " the central mystery " [2] is enacted. It takes the form of an ἀποκάλυψις. The bull-roarer is shown for what it is, and Hobgoblin is no more. " Here is *Twanyirika*, of whom you have heard so much," explain the blameless Arunta to the newly-circumcised boys, adding (let it not be forgotten), " They are *Churinga*, and will help to heal you quickly." [3] The esoteric cult of the *Churinga* now begins, say they in effect; but, as for that exoteric name of fear, *Twanyirika*, 'tis but a means of keeping little boys, and our female relatives, in order. In the South-East these methods may be less direct than in the centre of the continent, but the transition from exoteric to esoteric doctrine is just as

[1] *See* R. H. Mathews in *J. A. I.*, xxvi. 274. It might be worth while to inquire how far a universal source of anthropomorphic, as contrasted with animistic, that is, wraith-like, characters in supernatural beings is to be sought in personation. Thus there is reason to suspect that the *manitu*, whom the young American goes out into the woods to find, appears to him more often than not in the shape of a masked man.

[2] Howitt, *N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 628.

[3] Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 497.

sharp; nor is the confession of pious fraud less refreshingly explicit. It is solemnly declared that *Daramulun*, the Hobgoblin of the women's camp, behaved in days gone by so badly, making away with the boys and so on, just as Hobgoblin is even now reputed to do, that *Baiamai* killed him. Then *Baiamai* put *Daramulun's* voice into the trees, and told mankind that they might cut bull-roarers from the wood of the trees in order to "represent" *Daramulun*, but that they must not on any account communicate the "imposition" to uninitiated womankind.[1]

So much for the attitude towards the bull-roarer of those human beings who merely hear its sound. Like the animals they are thoroughly frightened. With the animals, however, the process reaches its end here. It is probably quite incorrect to say that the Scotch cattle "think" it is the "bot-fly" or "cleg"; or that the elephants of Malaya "mistake" it for a tiger. It is more likely that they merely hear danger in its note, just as the burnt child, or burnt puppy, comes to "see" that the fire is hot. The human beings, on the other hand, can "think," and insist on doing so. Hence, with a friendly jog from the masculine quarter, the female imagination creates Hobgoblin. But what is the psychological result of the ἀποκάλυψις? That is the next question. When every mother's son of them has been shown the piece of wood that makes the noise, and further has had the instrument in his hands and learnt how to whirl it round, is mystic fear at an end, and the magico-religious character of the bull-roarer as such abolished?

[1] R. H. Mathews, *J. A. I.*, xxv. 298.

It would be easier to reply to this question did we know with approximate certainty how the bull-roarer first came to be used in these rites, or even what precise function it is supposed to fulfil in regard to them now. There is, indeed, evidence enough to show that its use is somehow vital to the initiation ceremony. This might truly be termed the bull-roarer rite. The messenger who summons the meeting carries a bull-roarer. The possession of one constitutes a passport, as Howitt found when he sought entry into the inner circle. In the revelation of its nature the "central mystery" consists. Or again, whereas in other respects Australian initiations are of divergent type (so that, for instance, in the West there prevails circumcision, but in the East the knocking out of a tooth), the use of the bull-roarer is more or less strictly common to all.

What, then, is the secret of this intimate and widely-distributed connection of the bull-roarer with the making of men? In a valuable but perhaps little-known paper entitled *On some Ceremonies of the Central Australian Tribes*,[1] Dr J. G. Frazer puts forward an interesting theory bearing on this subject "When we remember," he says, "that the great change which takes place at puberty both in men and women consists in the newly-acquired power of reproducing their kind, and that the initiatory rites of savages are apparently intended to celebrate, if not to bring about, that change, and to confirm and establish that power, we are tempted to conjecture

[1] *Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science*, Melbourne, 1901, No. 7.

that the bull-roarer may be the implement by which the power in question is supposed to be imparted, at least to males." [1] In support of this view he quotes from Ridley a statement conveyed to the latter as a great favour by a native elder. This was to the effect that the sight of the bull-roarer " inspires the initiated with manhood," or, in other words, " imparts manly qualities." [2] Dr Frazer goes on to cite evidence from Australia, and from the adjoining region of Torres Straits and New Guinea, showing that the bull-roarer is used to promote fertility in general, as represented by an abundance of game-animals, or snakes, or lizards, or fish, or yams, as the case may be; so much so that Professor Haddon has conjectured that, in the Torres Straits at least, the initiation ceremony " is primarily a fertility ceremony, perhaps originally agricultural and then social." [3] Dr Frazer, however, would reverse the assumed order of development, conjecturing for his own part that processes originally directed to the multiplication of the species were afterwards extended, on the principle of sympathetic magic, to the promotion of the fertility of the earth.[4]

Now this hypothesis of Dr Frazer is, unfortunately, in direct conflict with another theory with which his name and authority are associated, namely, the view that many Australian tribes are wholly unaware of

[1] *Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science*, 319.

[2] *Ib.*, 320. Ridley's native informant actually referred to the instrument itself as *Dhurumbulum* (presumably a variant for *Daramulun*), just as amongst the Kurnai of Gippsland *Tundun* is the name both of the bull-roarer and of the eponymous hero therewith connected.

[3] *Ib.*, 321, the reference being to Haddon, *The Study of Man*, 305.

[4] *Ib.*, 321.

the part played by the male in the reproduction of the race. On the other hand, Professor Haddon's attribution of an agricultural origin to the initiation ceremonies will scarcely bear to be transferred from Torres Straits to Australia, where agriculture is unknown to the aborigines. The truth not improbably lies somewhere midway between these rival doctrines. Savages ignorant of agriculture have nevertheless enough sense to perceive that, for things to grow, there must be sun or rain—sun in a rainy land, rain in a parched land like Australia, where a thunderstorm causes the desert to blossom as the rose, truly as if by magic.[1] And in Australia the bull-roarer is, as they call it to this day in Scotland,[2] a "thunner-spell." Its roaring, says Howitt, "represents the muttering of thunder, and the thunder is the voice of *Daramulun*." In the words of Umbara, headman and bard of the Yuin tribe, "Thunder is the voice of Him (and he pointed upwards to the sky) calling on the rain to fall and make everything grow up new."[3] Surely Umbara here puts the whole truth of the matter into a nutshell. The entire object of the initiation rite is to make the youths not merely grow but "grow up new." It is, as M. van Gennep would say, a *rite de passage*,[4] a carrying-over from an old

[1] Compare Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 4.

[2] Haddon, *Study of Man*, 281. In Scotland, by a not uncommon inversion, it is used to keep the thunder away. The word "spell," by the way, may simply be the same as "spill," referring to the thin strip of wood; so at least suggests a writer in the *Aberdeen Free Press* of August 22, 1913.

[3] Howitt, *N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 538.

[4] A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de Passage*, Paris, 1909.

life to a new life which is better and stronger. Hence that *leit-motif* of " dying to live " which, as MM. Hubert and Mauss have abundantly proved, runs right through the initiation ceremonies of Australia.[1] The idea is not merely that the boys may be specifically invested with the " power of reproducing their kind "; not merely that they shall acquire deep voices as the bull-roarer's voice is deep.[2] It is something far more universal, something, it might almost be said, of cosmic import. " What renews, replenishes, reinvigorates, reproduces everywhere and always? The power in the sky. What sets the sky-power in motion? The power in the bull-roarer." Such is the Shorter Catechism implicit in the initiation rite of Australia, unless the hypothesis err.

We are now in a better position to estimate the psychological effect on the novice of that ἀποκάλυψις which is at the same time no small disillusionment. When he is told, nay, sees with his own eyes, that Hobgoblin is a simple cheat, does he thereupon adopt as the religion that is to serve him in his new and better life the enlightened cult of the great god Humbug? By no means. To begin with, the bull-roarer taken in itself is a sufficiently mysterious instrument. Howitt notes the curious fact that, for the Australian, his club and his spear have no " virtue " in themselves. Hence, to render them mystically potent, he anoints them with " medicine." His spear-thrower, on the other hand, which for no

[1] H. Hubert et M. Mauss, *Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions*, Paris, 1909, 131 f., who are, however, primarily concerned with the further initiation of the medicine-man. [2] Compare Frazer, *ib.*, 320.

palpable reason lengthens his cast to a hundred and fifty yards, or the bull-roarer which produces the noise of thunder out of a chip of wood, is magical in its own right. And that, adds Howitt reflectively, is a very good example of how the native mind works.[1] At the same time swinging the bull-roarer is rude exercise, and brings a man into too close quarters with the thunder-maker to afford entire satisfaction to the spirit of awe. Hence the Central Australian, whilst thoroughly believing in the fortifying [2] virtue of the bull-roarer that he actually swings,[3] would seem to reserve the best of his reverence for bull-roarers of wood or stone that are not swung at all, nor perhaps could be swung with any effect;[4] just as the pastoral Toda venerates sacred cattle-bells which are invariably found to lack, or have lost, their tongues.[5] Meanwhile, this want of functional significance does not in the least impair the mystic efficacy of the *churinga*. Mere contact with it, as for instance by rubbing it against the stomach, will make a man "good." The act "softens the stomach";[6] whilst, conversely, to rub the instrument with red ochre (probably a substitute for blood) "softens" the *churinga*, that is, soothes it as if it

[1] Howitt in *J. A. I.*, xvi. 29 *n.*

[2] One way of describing the magic power of the bull-roarer is to say that it is "very strong" (Howitt, *N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 557).

[3] *See*, for instance, Spencer and Gillen, *Northern T. of C. A.*, 342, 373, 497, etc. Compare Howitt in *J. A. I.*, xx. 23.

[4] The writer was able to extract a certain amount of sound from a stone bull-roarer made by an assistant at the Pitt Rivers Museum, but it fell a long way short of the real thing.

[5] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, 424.

[6] On a similar development in modern religion *see* E. Towne, *Just How to Wake the Solar Plexus*, 1904. Cf. *Hibbert Journal*, January 1908, this reference being due to the kindness of the Editor.

had feelings.[1] Or again, the bull-roarer may be regarded as instinct with an immaterial force more or less detachable from it, a man being said to be "full of *churinga*," that is, of the magic power derived therefrom.[2] These instances will suffice to show that in Central Australia the spirit of awe—not to say the religious spirit—is by no means utterly discomfited by the discovery that the bull-roarer, in its outward and visible form, is a thing of wood and string. On the other hand, the native mind struggles hard against materialism, seeking to distinguish the inward grace from its external vehicle, though all uncertain whether to ascribe to this indwelling vitalizing force a personal or a quasi-impersonal nature.

Now in the South-East they would appear to have felt the same difficulty concerning outwardness and inwardness, but to have cast about for a solution in a different direction. All true magic is aware of the symbolic character of its procedure—in other words, that make-believe thunder is not real thunder, even if the appearance can represent the reality so effectively as somehow to set the sky rumbling.[3] There is always a tendency, therefore, for means and end to fall apart in thought, and religious interest will sometimes concentrate on the one (as in Central Australia, where the instrument, as has been shown,

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *ib.*, 265. Outside Australia we find the bull-roarer carved into the human form, *e.g.* in New Guinea (*see* specimens in Pitt Rivers Museum; also Figs. 100-103 in Haddon, *Royal Irish Academy, Cunningham Memoirs*, No. X., 1894), or in North America (Haddon, *Study of Man*, 293).

[2] Spencer and Gillen, *ib.*, 293.

[3] *Cf.* p. 41.

is all in all) and sometimes on the other.[1] In the South-East, then, *Daramulun*, the bull-roarer, gave way to *Daramulun*, the thunder-god of the heavens. Real thunder is awe-inspiring enough in all conscience for mystic fear to provide the ground-work of the conception. Anthropomorphism supervenes, one, if not the sole, cause of this being doubtless ætiology, which, as the story-telling habit of mind, has recourse to forms that fill the eye. And since, for the initiated at least, *Daramulun* himself abides above, an image of him recalling his human shape has to do duty for him on earth. Round this the old men dance, shouting his name, and with gestures drawing magic influence from him to themselves;[2] just as with similar gestures they hand on the influence to the novices to make them "good."[3]

Meanwhile, *Daramulun*, the Supreme Being on high, has trouble to preserve his dignity, because of his association with two discredited aliases of his own, namely, the material bull-roarer and again Hobgoblin, the women's bugbear. Hence, although amongst some tribes he retains his high position as best he can, amongst others he is found to yield to a superior. Ætiology provides *Daramulun*, or his homologue *Tundun*, with an anthropomorphic double, who in the first instance is probably no more than a circumlocution used in order to avoid mention of his secret name, so magically potent as this is, and hence so dangerous; and with abundant play of

[1] For examples of the deification of the end, as contrasted with the instrument or means, see p. 68.

[2] See R. H. Mathews in *American Anthropologist*, ix. 336.

[3] Howitt, *N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 535.

fancy a myth explains how *Daramulun* was killed by *Baiamai*,[1] or how *Tundun* was obliged to turn into a porpoise because *Mungan-ngaua* sent a great flood.[2] The type of the Supreme Being, however, remains unaltered. He is always the personified power that is manifested in the initiation rite. This power causes everything, including man, to "grow up new." It is a power of making "good," that is, full of vitality and manly qualities, and luck and magical gifts, and whatever else the heart of man craves from a Universe, of which the "central mystery" perhaps is that those who seek shall find.

[1] R. H. Mathews in *J. A. I.*, xxv. 298. The derivation of the word *Baiamai* is uncertain. In Kamilaroi there is a word *baia*, "cut," hence "make" (Ridley, *Kamilaroi*, 34); so that *Baiamai* has become the missionary term for "the Creator." In Euahlayi, according to Mrs K. L. Parker, *Byamee* means literally "great one" (*The Euahlayi Tribe*, 4). In the *Australian Legendary Tales*, 94, of the same authoress, *Byamee's* tribe are the *Byahmul*, "black swans." Is this the source of M. van Gennep's supposed "collective term"? Compare *Mythes et Légendes d'Australie*, ix. and 164.

[2] Howitt, *N. T. of S.-E. A.*, 493. *Mungan-ngaua* means "father-our." It was not a secret name (N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, 219, makes a slip on this point), but known to the women (Howitt, *ib.*, 492), and hence comparable to *Papang*, "father," and *Wehntwin*, "grandfather," circumlocutions applied to *Daramulun* and *Tundun* respectively (*ib.*, 493, 628-30). One and all are terms of group-relationship; these founders of the mysteries are naturally "Elders," just as they are "Grand Masters" (*Biamban*, *ib.*, 507), and "Worshipful Brethren" (*Muk-brogan*, *ib.*, 628).

VII

THE BIRTH OF HUMILITY

ARGUMENT

A REVIEW of modern developments in Anthropology shows, on the one hand, a tendency to refer the facts of human history in the name of Social Psychology to certain primary impulses to which the study of the emotions affords a key, as according to M'Dougall's theory; and, on the other hand, a corresponding tendency to abjure intellectualism, whether the counter-stress be laid on the influence of the emotions, as by Westermarck, or on the influence of the social environment, as by Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl. Now when Dr Frazer makes humility the distinguishing mark of religion, as contrasted with magic, he is right; but in tracing the birth of religion, and consequently of humility, to a change of mind consequent on the recognized failure of a certain pseudo-scientific theory of causation, he is wrong, because too intellectualistic, too inclined to treat emotion, whether in its individual or its social manifestations, as the offspring of thought instead of as its parent. If we analyse the religious experience of the savage, which is characteristically mobbish, we find a predominantly emotional and motor interest reflected in the character which he assigns to the object of his religious regard. This object may be termed the sacred (or super-

natural). *Let us consider it first statically, then dynamically. Statically viewed, then, the sacred, in its negative aspect, is usually more or less uncanny, often more or less secret, and always more or less* tabu. *Such qualities in the object imply in the subject of the experience asthenic emotion, or heart-sinking, which may be regarded as the psycho-physical basis of humility. In its positive aspect the sacred is always* mana, *usually ancient, and often personal. Even when personality is not predicated, however, the mystic potency attributed to the sacred is such that the experient feels himself strong, wise, glad, and good upon contact with it according to the approved form of religion. Dynamically viewed, experience of the sacred resolves itself into a passage out of depression through a chrysalis-like passivity into renewed vitality. Those rites of passage first noted and described by van Gennep involve such an inner movement, initiation being the typical instance of the needful socializing process, while matrimony, parenthood, and even birth and death are likewise the occasions of rites involving spiritual transitions and transformations of a similar nature. The upshot of these considerations is to prove that humility, as the child of fear and misgiving, is born of emotions and impulses forming basic elements in the experience of the magico-religious. These elements, being moralized by association with social customs of a salutary kind, beget a mood of chastened striving which, psychologically, will serve better than any system of doctrine as the differentia of genuine religion; though it must be added that to attempt a final account of religion is beyond the competence of psychology or of any form of science.*

THE BIRTH OF HUMILITY

WHEN a savage launches a canoe, or lays the foundations of a dwelling-place, or starts forth on the chase, or samples his harvest of ripe yams—when, in short, he takes the first step in any enterprise of importance—he is accustomed to perform a ceremony of inauguration. The moment is critical, or in other words he feels nervous. Therefore he performs a ceremony, the object of which would seem to be, in all cases alike, to bring him into communion with something sacred, something full of *mana*, that is to say, supernatural power or "grace"; for, thus strengthened, he can face the future with good hope. The ways of effecting such communion, to judge by the known diversities of savage ritual, are almost infinite in number. The simplest of all, perhaps, consists in making solemn mention of that with which communion is sought. Conformably, then, with principles that every anthropologist is bound to respect, let this inaugural lecture be devoted to the subject of humility. Humility is a virtue full of saving grace; and for the student who gazes diffidently on the vast field of Social Anthropology that lies before him, a region full of mists and briars and pitfalls, there is positive assurance to be gained from the thought that in science, and especially in Anthropology, it is well to walk humbly, when the alternative is to ride the high horse of prejudice and dogmatism to a certain fall.

Apart from its suitability for inaugural purposes, the subject of humility is one to which the attention of anthropologists should be directed, in view of the

latest developments both of Social Psychology and of Comparative Religion.

Thus, on the one hand, Mr M'Dougall has recently instituted a method of studying the facts of society which has for its point of departure a new theory of the human instincts.[1] According to his hypothesis, our emotions correspond to the relatively stable and " central " part of a system of instinctive processes that are more or less common to mankind. He therefore attempts by analysis to reduce the endless shades of man's emotional experience to a few primary tendencies, from which the former result by a sort of fusion or blending; just as the many delicate varieties of the colour-sensations are produced by the compounding of a few primary colour-qualities in all kinds of proportions. Now such a chemical method, as it might be termed, of studying our higher and more complex emotional states is doubtless liable to abuse. It may easily come to be exploited in favour of a " psychology without a soul," namely, a psychology which represents the synthetic power of the mind as no better than a superfluity and a sham. Nevertheless, a given method of science, though invariably a bad master, can yet prove exceedingly useful as a servant. Its function is to simplify; and, though to simplify must always be in a sense to falsify, yet it is only by the use of complementary methods of simplification that we can attain, if at all, to a complete grasp of the many-sided truth. From

[1] W. M'Dougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, see especially 26 ff.

Mr M'Dougall's method, then, we may hope to learn much, though of course not everything, concerning the nature of the human emotions, whether as individually or as socially manifested.

On the other hand, modern research in Social Anthropology reflects in various ways a more or less conscious effort to counteract what can only be termed the " intellectualism " of the past generation of theorists. Dr Westermarck, for instance, has sought to show, by means of a most extensive induction, that our moral judgments have an emotional origin and foundation.[1] Incidentally, his results confirm Mr M'Dougall's contention that the emotions represent that part of human nature which changes least; for he proves that, despite variations on the surface, the moral feelings of man are remarkably uniform in type all the world over. More significant still is the widespread movement, which the school of sociologists led by Professor Durkheim has done so much to initiate, in support of a method of Anthropology that lays due emphasis on the social factor. The old way was to arrive at the savage mind by abstraction. The sociologist of yesterday was content to picture what the outlook of a man like himself would be, should the whole apparatus of civilization have been denied him, including a civilized man's intellectual and moral education. Naturally his results bordered on romance. The new way, on the contrary, is to proceed constructively. Whilst full account is taken of the effects both of heredity and

[1] E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, chap. i., etc.

of the physical environment, yet the effects of the social environment are reckoned to be determinative in an even higher degree. The mass of cultural institutions, it is held, embody and express a kind of collective soul. In this social selfhood each individual must participate in order to realize an individuality of his own. It is a corollary that no isolated fragment of custom or belief can be worth much for the purposes of Comparative Science. In order to be understood, it must first be viewed in the light of the whole culture, the whole corporate soul-life, of the particular ethnic group concerned. Hence the new way is to emphasize concrete differences, whereas the old way was to amass resemblances heedlessly abstracted from their social context. Which way is the better is a question that well-nigh answers itself.

Nevertheless, there are signs that the social method is being pursued to extravagant lengths. Thus Professor Lévy-Bruhl, in a recent work of consummate ability,[1] seems prepared to substitute for the old-fashioned assumption of the absolute homogeneity of the human mind a working hypothesis to the effect that there are as many distinct " mentalities " as there are distinct social types, since each social type possesses a " mentality " that is wholly its own. Such a view is tolerable only if it be conceded that what is here called a " mentality " is a good deal less than a human mind proper. It would be fatal to deny to the anthropologist the right to project himself

[1] L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures*, 7 ff.

into the spiritual life of others of his kind, simply because he and they are members of different societies. After all, it is not impossible for the same man to be an efficient and sympathetic member of different societies in turn. Now the fundamental characteristic of savage society and savage mentality is that they are mobbish. But every civilized man has at some time felt and cared as a member of a mob. Granted that the difference of conditions is considerable. For instance, a mob is occasional amongst civilized people; whereas the savage mob is permanent and has a tradition. At the same time, there is enough of the savage in the civilized man, or of the civilized man in the savage—for as much is to be said for putting it in the one way as in the other—to render possible a genuine introjection, that is, a sympathetic entry into the mind and spirit of another.

Thus the new method of Social Anthropology comes not to destroy but to fulfil. It does not quarrel with the old method for making introspection, or self-analysis, its *terminus a quo;* since that is inevitable. Its novelty consists merely in its greater insistence on the control of introspection by objective methods. "Realize the social conditions," it says in effect; "for instance, take firm hold of the fact that the savage does not preach his religion, but dances it instead: then put yourself in his place as best you can." If this were not possible, because the mentalities of different men at different levels of culture are in all respects as incommunicable as their passing dreams, then Social Anthropology would be utterly inconceivable.

To approach a stage nearer to the subject in hand, let a single illustration be given of the intellectualism deprecated by the upholders of the social method of which mention has just now been made. In his famous book, *The Golden Bough*, Dr Frazer has propounded a theory—and there is no reason to think that he has subsequently withdrawn from it—which deals with the way in which what he calls an age of magic has been everywhere followed and supplanted by an age of religion.[1] As not a little turns on the meaning given to the words magic and religion, it will be necessary to examine Dr Frazer's notion of each. To take his definition of religion first, on the ground that it is less open to criticism: he understands by this term "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."[2] Here Dr Frazer says in effect that humility is the differentia of religion.

This point is brought out more clearly by the following passage: "Religion, beginning as a slight and partial acknowledgment of powers superior to man, tends with the growth of knowledge to deepen into a confession of man's entire and absolute dependence on the divine; his old free bearing is exchanged for an attitude of lowliest prostration before the mysterious powers of the unseen. But this deepening sense of religion, this more perfect submission to the divine will in all things, affects only those higher intelligences who have breadth of view enough to comprehend the vastness of the universe

[1] *See* J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*,[2] i. 75 ff. [2] *Ib.*, i. 63.

and the littleness of man. Small minds cannot grasp great ideas; to their narrow comprehension, their purblind vision, nothing seems really great and important but themselves. Such minds hardly rise into religion at all. They are, indeed, drilled by their betters into an outward conformity with its precepts and a verbal profession of its tenets; but at least they cling to their old magical superstitions, which may be discountenanced and forbidden, but cannot be eradicated by religion, so long as they have their roots deep down in the mental framework and constitution of the great majority of mankind." [1] Now this passage is not only a fine piece of rhetoric, but, in seizing as it does upon humility as the distinguishing mark of the religious spirit, it probably touches the heart of the truth. Yet Dr Frazer surely errs in confining the capacity for humility and for religion to the " higher intelligences," as well as, conversely, in finding nothing but a narrow self-complacency, the tap-root of magical superstition, when he seeks " deep down in the mental framework and constitution " of the average man.

Let us pass on to consider Dr Frazer's definition of magic. To reach this, some scattered statements must be brought together. Magic is the same thing as sympathetic magic,[2] being " nothing but a mistaken application of the very simplest and most elementary processes of the mind," namely, the association of ideas by virtue of resemblance or contiguity.[3] Its fundamental presupposition is identical with that of science, consisting of " a faith, implicit, but real

[1] *The Golden Bough*,[2] i. 78. [2] *Ib.*, i. 9. [3] *Ib.*, i. 70.

and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature." [1] As dealing therefore with a matter subject to immutable laws which act mechanically, it neither propitiates nor conciliates, but coerces and constrains. Its spirit is one of haughty self-sufficiency and arrogance.[2] It remains to add that, "knowing or recking little of the theoretical inconsistency of his behaviour," man at a relatively early stage of culture is apt to perform magical and religious rites simultaneously; [3] though Dr Frazer discovers grounds for thinking "that this fusion is not primitive, and that there was a time when man trusted to magic alone for the satisfaction of such wants as transcended his immediate animal cravings." [4] Now it may perhaps be granted that a certain masterfulness is inseparable from the attitude of one who more or less consciously sets out to establish control by means of suggestion. Since suggestion works almost entirely by means of the automatic association of ideas, owing to the temporary paralysis undergone by the higher powers of thought, such a view of the magical function would seem to agree in the main with that of Dr Frazer. Thus understood, however, the magical frame of mind is perceived at once to be utterly distinct from the scientific. Nay, if science were indeed but another sort of magic that happened to work, then presumably the "haughty self-sufficiency" of the old magic would survive, justified after a fashion, perhaps, but certainly in no way diminished by success. Happily it is far otherwise with the spirit of true

[1] *The Golden Bough*,[2] i. 61.
[2] *Ib.*, i. 64
[3] *Ib.*, i. 65.
[4] *Ib.*, i. 70.

Science—that spirit which breathes in Bacon's phrase *Homo Naturæ minister.*

We have still to take note of Dr Frazer's highly speculative history of what he calls "the great transition" from the age of magic to the age of religion. His full account would be lengthy to quote,[1] and, besides, is familiar to all. Suffice it to say, then, that, according to his hypothesis, "a tardy recognition of the inherent falsehood and barrenness of magic set the more thoughtful part of mankind to cast about for a truer theory of nature and a more fruitful method of turning her resources to account." Certain "shrewder intelligences" hit upon "a new system of faith and practice" in the following way. If, they argued, the great world went on its way without the help of man, "it must surely be because there were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed its course." Before these mighty beings, then, mankind, abashed by failure and misfortune, bowed in a new-found spirit of humility. Such, in brief, is Dr Frazer's theory of the birth of religion, and, by implication, of the birth of humility as well.

What, then, if anything, is wrong with this theory of Dr Frazer? Clearly it does not fail altogether to fit the observed facts. An indefatigable and accomplished student such as Dr Frazer, by sheer dint of hanging over his stirabout and watching the evidence collect of itself into masses, is bound to acquire a special intuition of the relative values of these masses. For instance, the known facts certainly

[1] *The Golden Bough*,[2] i. 75-8.

tend to create the impression that the Australians, as compared, say, with the North American Indians, both represent a lower, and presumably earlier, stage of cultural evolution, and at the same time display an attitude towards " the mysterious powers of the unseen " which is on the whole more magical and less religious, more dictatorial and less humble. So long as Dr Frazer judges cumulatively, then, we may hold him to be right, assuming, as we surely may, that the evidence to which he trusts is in quantity and quality sufficient. On the analytic side of his thinking, however, there may be weakness notwithstanding. He may have duly appreciated the effects, without sufficiently discriminating the conditions. Given, therefore, an improved method of psychological explanation, may it not be possible to refine on this intellectualistic theory of the birth of humility?

Now the fallacy of intellectualism consists in magnifying the intellect at the expense of feeling and will. It is quite possible, however, for the psychologist to succumb to the opposite fallacy, and to make too little of the function of thought in religion. A predominantly rational habit of mind must be counted as one at least amongst the possible varieties of religious experience. Indeed, it would surely be appropriate on the whole to speak of the Prophets of Israel as " higher intelligences " and so forth. The difficulty here is simply that Dr Frazer antedates the age of the Prophets. The civilized thinker in his study must somehow get into touch with the mind of another type of man who, as it has been put already, does not reason out his religion, but dances it out instead.

To express the same thing more technically, the emotional and motor elements in close combination prevail over the element of conceptual thought at the lower stages of religious evolution. There is another point on which the new method would insist, as being pre-eminently a social method. At the level of the rudest culture society could not use the intellectual genius, did he happen to arise. Even the higher barbarism finds its religious leader in a Mahomet, half thinker and half dervish. Savagery, on the other hand, which dances its religion, follows a leader of the dance who is wholly dervish, who lives with his head in a perpetual whirl. Negative and positive considerations alike support this view. Negatively, the languages of savage peoples do not promote the communication of universal ideas; whilst, again, a purely oral form of tradition is not suited to the perpetuation of notions that are at all above the comprehension of the many. Positively, savage folk are mobbish; their mode of existence admits of no true privacy. Now, for those who are never away from the crowd, imitation is the mainspring of education; and the well-known law of crowds, that with them emotions propagate themselves more readily than ideas, is explained psychologically by the ease with which a mood can be acquired by imitating its outward expression. That ritual, or in other words a routine of external forms, is historically prior to dogma was proclaimed years ago by Robertson Smith and others. Yet Social Anthropology is but to-day beginning to appreciate the psychological implications of this cardinal truth.

In the light of the foregoing principles, then, how will it be possible, in a short space, to show that humility and religion are neither the discovery nor the private possession of a few "higher intelligences," but are bound up with the native tendencies and with the social development of ordinary humanity? It will, perhaps, be "sufficient unto the day" if proofs are sought in two directions.

On the one hand, it should be worth while to try to analyse that sense of sacredness of which even the most uncivilized peoples are well known to be capable. What the subject of the experience perceives is of course not directly ascertainable. The savage is no hand at describing his feelings. Besides, even the trained observer is hard put to it to analyse such states of his own mind as are mainly affective. In all such cases, then, the working rule of the psychologist must perforce be to deduce the subjective experience from the qualities attributed to the corresponding object. The heat attributed to the red-hot poker is a replica of the feeling of being burnt. The beauty ascribed to a work of art reflects the nature of the æsthetic impression. Similarly, therefore, the group of qualities that make an object sacred for the savage ought to prove a faithful counterpart of that grouping of psychical elements, predominantly emotional and motor, which constitutes his mobbish type of religious experience.

Viewed thus, however, as the duplicate of the qualities grouped in the object, the psychical elements in question will necessarily display a purely static order of arrangement. Any succession of

stages that there may be in the development of the total phase of consciousness is likely to escape notice. Hence, on the other hand, some endeavour should be made to trace the passage of the human soul, under conditions of the rudest culture, through a typical phase of religious experience from its first inception to its culminating moment. It is an axiom of the modern psychologist that in the last resort any given mental state must be construed dynamically, that is, by reference to the mental process of which it is part. Thus it may well be that the state of mind known as humility represents, in a religious context, but one stage of a complex process; and that there normally follows as the further stage of the same process a second state of mind which is actually in sharp contrast to the other, being related to it very much as the feeling of being lifted up is related to the feeling of being down.

In what follows, then, the attempt, necessarily brief and general, will be made to analyse the primitive experience of sacredness under these two complementary aspects; the static view being taken first, the dynamic afterwards.

Amongst peoples of the lower culture, sacredness attaches to all sorts of objects—to inorganic things and their manifestations; to plants, and animals and their parts or products; to men and whatever they make, wear, do or say; to incorporeal agents and influences; and, finally, to bare conditions such as time and place. Or, to speak collectively instead of distributively, everything is sacred in so far as it

in any way belongs to the sacred world. This world exists as it were side by side with the profane world, so that it is possible to pass backwards and forwards from the one to the other. Sacred objects, then, as thus understood, have certain features in common. One group of qualities may be distinguished as negative, the other as positive. This can best be shown by rapidly reviewing each in turn.

Negative qualities of the sacred are that it is usually more or less uncanny, often more or less secret, and always more or less *tabu*.

Of these attributes uncanniness is perhaps the most elementary. It corresponds to the mental twilight which circumscribes the experience of beast and man alike. Whatever is marginal is strange, and as such preys on the imagination and troubles the nerves. Some things, being highly unusual, are weird in themselves; such as the ghosts that flit, or the comets that flare. Moreover, even everyday things, according as the situation or the mood varies, may come to wear an unnatural appearance. Just as dogs, when familiar objects loom under the moon, are moved to howl dismally, so men are daunted by half-lights, whether they express their disquietude in this vocal manner or otherwise. Answering, then, to this root-feeling there is a world of awesome mystery through which all men walk at times, and the savage at frequent intervals. In this way, then, uncanniness represents negation, being a danger-signal and little more.

When, however, the sacred is conceived as secret, though negation still predominates, it is qualified by

a positive interest. For purposes of psychological explanation it is no longer enough to take stock of root-feelings. Social conditions become important. A relation is implied between those members of the tribe who are not, and those who are, in intimate touch with the sacred world. Sex, age and social standing, as well as special capacity for experience of the mystic type, help to divide the community more or less sharply into religious leaders and their followers. The former, usually a minority, and themselves not infrequently subdivided into grades according to some hierarchical principle, are, in regard to the rest, the more or less exclusive repositories of the tribal stock of sacred lore as apprehended, so to speak, from the inside. Yet the nature of their esoteric enlightenment hardly permits us to speak of "higher intelligences" in this context. The expert is mostly concerned to perpetuate the niceties of sacred custom. "Thus and thus did the men of old," he says, "wherefore go ye and do likewise." If he innovates at all, that which is originated is not so much a doctrine as a ceremony; and the mode of its origination he describes accurately enough when he explains that it came to him "in a vision." [1] Meanwhile, the attitude of the relatively unenlightened layman, though negative and as it were passive, is by no means wholly incurious, as is proved by the need of providing him with some exoteric version of the purport of the mysteries. The difference in the mode and extent of spiritual insight

[1] *Cf.* B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 451.

is one of degree. In the case of each class the main force at work is an emotional and motor suggestibility; only the people follow their leaders, whilst the leaders directly follow tradition.

Hence for all alike the sacred is pre-eminently *tabu* and the occasion of *tabu* observances. It is hedged round with a sanctity that in its proximate aspect appears as a categorical injunction to submit, to become passive and suggestible. Not only has primitive ritual a negative side, but the negative side decidedly predominates. A full discussion of the function of *tabu*, however, may be conveniently deferred until we come to examine the dynamic phase of primitive religion.

How do the foregoing considerations bear on the subject of humility? Three instincts of a highly negative type are observable in the frightened animal. It runs away, or it cowers in its tracks, or it prostrates itself in abject self-surrender. Now it would, perhaps, be fanciful to say that man tends to run away from the sacred as uncanny, to cower before it as secret, and to prostrate himself before it as *tabu*. On the other hand, it seems plain that to these three negative qualities of the sacred taken together there corresponds on the part of man a certain negative attitude of mind. Psychologists class the feelings bound up with flight, cowering, and prostration under the common head of " asthenic emotion." In plain English they are all forms of heart-sinking, of feeling unstrung. This general type of innate disposition would seem to be the psycho-physical basis of humility. Taken in its social setting, the emotion

will of course show endless shades of complexity; for it will be excited, and again will find practical expression, in all sorts of ways. Under these varying conditions, however, it is reasonable to suppose that what Mr M'Dougall would call the "central part" of the experience remains very much the same. In face of the sacred the normal man is visited by a heart-sinking, a wave of asthenic emotion. If that were all, however, religion would be a matter of pure fear. But it is not all. There is yet the positive side of the sacred to be taken into account.

Positively viewed, whatever is sacred is always mystically potent, usually ancient, and often personal, or at least closely connected with personal beings.

The mystic potency of the sacred is perhaps ultimately grounded on the fact that by its strangeness it causes trepidation. By simple reason of the asthenic condition it excites, it appears, if not actively aggressive, at least to have the upper hand. Yet a merely fear-causing and therefore wholly noxious potency does not attach to the sacred, unless possibly in extreme cases. That which is uncanny, or, in an even more obvious way, that which is secret, attracts at the same time that it repels; so that a shy curiosity may come in the end to prevail over the first fright. Besides, there is no getting away from the sacred in many of its forms—for instance, from bewildering and potent things such as disease or death. Society must somehow live them down, the braver and more ingenious spirits showing the way. Thereupon it is found that crisis may turn to good. As-

sociation with the sacred as conditioned by the discipline of *tabu* breeds a social habit of obedience which by steadying the nerves and bracing the will becomes a source of spiritual relief. Being now valued for its own sake, obedience rises from mere cowardly subservience into a freely-accorded respect as towards the sacred powers. Correspondingly these gradually abandon their character of occasional and portentous visitations to become integral elements in the social order.

Thus the sacred becomes typically the ancient and traditional. It now stands for the power that accrues to those who faithfully hold by their old-time customs. This power tends to be immanent in the tribal tradition as a whole. Therefore it is never safe to say of savage institutions that sacredness is here but not there; for it is more or less omnipresent, although not always equally manifest. Even its most striking manifestations, however, testify to its latent ubiquity; for they are subject to a perpetual shape-shifting, which is a standing puzzle to those civilized observers whose logical minds demand fixed points of reference. Now it is the whole body of ancestors that appear to have the tribal luck in their keeping; now it is some legendary personage in particular; now it is a living functionary; and now it is a material cult-object, or a rite, or a verbal formula.

One more aspect of the sacred calls for notice: to assert that the sacred as it is for the savage is always in the last resort personal or connected with personality would be to require consistency where there is none. At most a strong tendency can be discerned to identify the power behind the laws of

society with some sort of will, or, one might even say, some sort of good will, since good is gained in its service.

A conspicuous instance of such personification, at the level of what in most respects is the lowest culture, is afforded by those gods of the mysteries hailing from South-East Australia, which head the list of savage supreme beings of benevolent tendency compiled by Mr Lang in *The Making of Religion*.[1] There can be no doubt that Daramulun, Baiamai and their compeers are on the whole conceived after the likeness of some tribal headman, with his supernatural gifts raised as it were to infinity. Such a divine superman has ordained the tribal laws in the beginning, and insists to-day upon their due observance. Alike in life and in death the tribesmen are his care. In particular, he presides over the ceremony which converts the boys into responsible men, his power being supernaturally communicated to them so that they enter the new life "strong" and "good."[2] It remains to add that, whilst the religion of these tribes is morally stimulating and noble in the extreme, their theology is intellectually bewildering in its contradictions. Totemic animals, or the sun, the stars, and the thunder, or, again, the bull-roarer whose windy roar is the sign that the mysteries are in process—all these are aspects, or, one might almost say, aliases of the sacred power that is also like unto a great headman in the sky. Moreover, there reigns

[1] A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*,[2] 175 ff.

[2] A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, 535, 557, etc.

a large and liberal confusion of ideas touching the means whereby communion with the sacred power is achieved. Civilized theorists may with admirable clearness draw a logical line between conciliation and control, religious worship and magical manipulation. These undiscriminating savages, however, indulge little if at all in prayer, for us the foremost criterion of true religion; nor do they know the somewhat more ambiguous rite of sacrifice. They set up anthropomorphic images, indeed, if that be a mark of religion rather than of magic. But their favourite habit is dancing to the sound of the sacred name. Such a practice is usually reckoned magical. Yet they perform the ceremony in no masterful or arrogant way, but solemnly, earnestly, in short, in a spirit of reverent humility which is surely akin to homage.

Now it is possible to convince ourselves that such a spirit is naturally evoked by contact with sacredness as such, and is not simply a consequence of the attribution of personality. For we have only to turn to another instance from Australia, namely, that afforded by the now famous Arunta of the central deserts. As is well known, their cult, whether it be classed as magic or religion, centres in the ceremonies connected with certain objects of stone or wood that they call *churinga*, the word meaning "secret" or "sacred." A theology abounding in terminological inexactitudes enables all sorts of other sacred things to be somehow associated by the Arunta with these *churinga;* for instance, totem animals, their legendary ancestors, and their own personal names. Never-

theless the fact remains that the material objects taken in themselves are reckoned as a means of grace of altogether superlative importance. Now when the civilized observer watches the black-fellow rub one of these sacred stones against his stomach he is apt to smile, or perhaps weep, at so crude a ritual act. Let him, however, mark the black-fellow's earnest and devotional manner. Better still, let him attend to the account he gives in his halting language of the inward experience accompanying the rite. For he asserts in so many words that it makes him "strong" and "wise" and "glad" and "good."[1] This is not prayer, of course. Yet in a very real sense the savage asks humbly and is answered.

We now pass to the dynamic aspect of the primitive man's relations with the sacred. From this quarter ample evidence might be produced, did time allow, in confirmation of the view that, under normal and healthy conditions of savage society, the religious life involves a sort of progress from strength to strength, with serious recognition of vital need as its efficient cause. In a dynamic context it becomes plainer than it could be made before how the very expectancy of benefit, and felt need to be improved, carry with them a certain depression, a certain relaxed tension, which is, however, but a prelude to restored innervation and fresh adjustment.

M. van Gennep in his *Rites de Passage* argues with

[1] B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 165, and *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 264 ff., 293, etc.

much force that a persistent—we may almost say the leading—motive of primitive ritual is the ceremonial enactment of a passage from the profane world of workaday experience into and through a sacred world of religious experience. The book, close packed as it is with illustrative matter, is a mere preamble to a vast theme; and it is much to be hoped that the ingenious author will hereafter be at pains to drive the argument home. In particular, there is at present lacking to his account of these organized periods of retreat a theory of the psychological needs out of which they arise and to which they afford satisfaction. Abstractly considered as rites, they are merely so much external mechanism for bringing about a pause in the ordinary life of the tribe or of its individual members. Here let us rather inquire briefly into the inward springs of these customary processes, with the special object of discovering whether humility in one or another shape is germane to the mood of which they are the outward expression. Why does a primitive society undergo at certain times a communal *tabu*, as in the well-known case of the Nagas of Assam? [1] Or, again, for what reason is the novice *tabu* during initiation, or the candidate for priestly office, or the person about to be married?—to cite but a few of the most striking instances of a *tabu* affecting the individual as such. Now to be *tabu* is to be *sacer*, or consecrated. In its more prominent aspect, this condition appears as the purely negative state of being banned or put into

[1] T. C. Hodson, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, xxxvi. 92 ff.

quarantine. The positive implication, however, must not be overlooked, namely, that the subject of the ban is for the time being in contact with some source of *mana* or supernatural power. All such power as conceived by the primitive mind is something of an ambiguous and two-edged force, a power to bless or to blast. Nevertheless, even in the religious vocabulary of the backward Australian, there is ample evidence that the distinction is already in the making between a good and a bad kind of supernatural influence, that is, between holiness on the one hand and spiritual uncleanness on the other. We therefore have a perfect right to put into a class apart such a *tabu* as that upon the homicide or upon the violator of the sacred marriage law. Such persons are not consecrated, but rather execrated. The " sacralization " or sacrament that applies to them is like commination intended to hurt, not like penance intended to heal. Concentrating our attention, then, on the other set of cases, in which those who pursue objects approved by society are notwithstanding subjected to enforced withdrawal from intercourse with their neighbours and from all secular pursuits, let us see if we can possibly divine a reason for such strange customs. This is not, indeed, the occasion to inquire what reason, in the sense of ultimate justification, there may be for practices that doubtless are bound up with all sorts of outworn superstitions. Such a question must be reserved for Philosophy and Theology. The task of Social Anthropology is at most to suggest the psychological reason, the tendency induced by certain special con-

ditions of mind and of society considered simply in themselves. Of course, if it were to turn out that such sacramental observances, as they may fairly be termed, answer to some permanent need of the human spirit, we should have established a point that could scarcely fail to influence the final evaluation of the philosopher and the theologian.

Let us start our psychological inquiry, then, from the fact that, in the case of a consecration, as distinct from an execration, the *tabu* is as a rule a mutual affair. The common account of the matter, which assumes the man in a state of holiness to be banned by the rest simply because holiness is an unpleasant thing and likely to be catching, overlooks a good half of that which has to be explained. For the tabued person himself conversely practises many a *tabu* as against the profane world. If society closes the door of his cell upon him, certain it is that he likewise shoots the bolt on the inside. So it is, for instance, in all conditions of society, with the mourner. Those who are not near enough to participate in his grief turn respectfully away, whilst it comes just as naturally to him to avert his face. Is it too much to say that, whether original or by degrees evolved, a genuine respect for the privacy of those who journey through the sacred world is in no small part responsible for the attitude of the lay world towards them?

Expressed in terms of Individual Psychology, the inward state of the tabued man may be described as one of spiritual crisis. The candidate for initiation affords a test case. Researches such as those of

Professor Starbuck[1] have made it clear that adolescence is a period of psycho-physical change, when mind and body in intimate conjunction undergo the disturbances incidental to a veritable moulting-season. To speak in this connection, as savages do all over the world, of a re-birth is hardly to exaggerate the facts. Again, the *tabu* incurred by motherhood corresponds without question to a period of psycho-physical transformation. That the candidate for matrimony is in the same way normally subject to a crisis of nerves may not be so clear, though even amongst civilized persons calf-love and the sheepishness that follows in its train are not wholly unknown. Mr Crawley has, meanwhile, collected much telling evidence in regard to the feelings of the savage about to marry; though his doctrine of a " physiological thought " as the source of this special kind of crisis loses much of its force through not being combined with the qualifying considerations to be drawn from Social Psychology.[2] Or, once more, it may be hardly obvious that the candidate for priestly office passes through a more or less violent convulsion of his mental and even his bodily nature, until we remember that the capacity for ecstatic experiences forms amongst the ruder races the chief passport to holy orders. Without further citation of instances, then, it will perhaps be taken for granted that the psycho-physical study of the individual discloses sundry types of well-marked derangement of the vital equilibrium, under stress of which a

[1] E. D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion.*
[2] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 22, 57, 179, 200.

characteristic inertia or brooding is normally induced. The physiological explanation of this would seem to be that the organism needs to lie dormant whilst its latent energies are gathering strength for activity on a fresh plane. It is important, moreover, to observe that, so long as there is growth, the fresh plane is likewise a higher plane. Regeneration, in fact, typically spells advance, the pauses in the rhythm of life helping successively to swell its harmony.

So much for the mere psycho-physics of the matter. Until Social Psychology lends its aid to the interpretation, we are far from being able to explain the facts of religion—even as they are for the anthropologist who confines his attention to their purely evolutionary aspect. The contribution of Social Psychology to the subject consists especially in the proof that society provides arrangements for dealing with these times of psycho-physical crisis, whereby in the end their nature is profoundly modified. A single instance will make the point clear. It has been shown at length by M. van Gennep that, whereas most primitive societies organize initiation ceremonies at intervals of a few years, these do not and cannot coincide with the actual arrival of puberty in the case of the vast majority of the individual candidates. Whether this or that novice happens to be feeling unhinged and "broody" at the moment or not, into retirement he must go on the appointed day for the appointed period, in accordance with the immemorial usage of his tribe. At first sight this absence of strict correlation between psycho-physical demand

and social supply might seem to presage nothing but absolute fiasco. The novice, one might imagine, will simply be induced by social pressure to profess a " conversion " that he does not feel. By extension of the same argument the intending priest, or the bridegroom, or the mourner, might be supposed to have emotional stress dictated to him by convention from without, rather than by his personal sentiments. Now doubtless some grain of truth lurks in this objection. Be they, on the face of them, periodic or occasional, public or private, there are socially-organized occasions for the retreat into the inner sanctuary of self which are never so well adjusted to individual needs that in particular cases they may not fail to meet with a genuine response. On the whole, however, it is surely for better rather than for worse that social routine interposes, as it were, between a man and the brute propensions of his body. To socialize the psycho-physical crisis goes a long way towards spiritualizing it. The force of social suggestion being simply enormous, the soul that is invited and expected by society to pass through sickness towards increased strength does so, though in an ideal and moral way, rather than under literal compulsion of the animal nature. Pause is the necessary condition of the development of all those higher processes which make up the rational being. The tendency of pent-up energy to discharge itself along well-worn channels or quite at random must be inhibited at all costs; and the ritual of *tabu* is, of all the forces of social routine, the greatest inhibitor, and therefore the greatest educator, of that explosive,

happy-go-lucky child of nature whom we call the savage.

What, then, of humility? It is unfortunately impossible in this barest sketch of a vast topic to illustrate in due detail the psychology of the various well-marked forms of passage through the sacred world, which begin with the negative experience of *tabu*, and are consummated in the positive fruition of *mana*. That the earlier stage is through a veritable valley of humiliation is directly indicated by the *tabu* observances themselves. For instance, in the typical case of initiation the novice is starved, purged, made to confess his sins, and, in particular, thoroughly frightened. The natural shyness that may be in him is so aggravated by art that, as all observers agree, he spends much of his time of spiritual retreat in what appears to be an utterly dazed condition. Not until the days of this period of chrysalis life have been painfully accomplished can he emerge a new and glorified creature, who, by spiritual transformation, is invested alike with the dignities and with the duties of manhood. Now the psychological affinities of humility are, as we have seen, with fear and the other closely related forms of asthenic emotion. An element of fear or misgiving has always been recognized to be of the essence of religion as historically manifested. But the function of this element as a spiritual lever has been far less generally understood.

The suggestion here made, then, is that the heart-sinking, the loss of tone, the aloofness, inertia and disorientation, which are the well-known symptoms of all psycho-physical crisis, and especially of such

crisis as accompanies organic growth and transformation, have been with more or less success dissociated from their physiological base by a system of religious ritual covering the whole life of primitive man. The physical means of ministering to crisis that consists in humouring prostration and passivity whilst the recreative processes are coming to a head has been, in the course of social evolution, transferred into the moral sphere, so that spiritual crisis comes to be furnished with an analogous remedy. The individual tribesman and the tribe as a whole must, by a usage that they respect if they do not understand, seek retirement from the world on the eve of any fresh start in the onward movement of life. Initiation, matrimony, parenthood, even birth and death, which on the cyclical view of life are construed as preparations, have each their appropriate sacrament or consecration which prescribes rest, abstinence, and isolation for the sick soul. More especial or occasional calls upon the individual, as when he is about to enter the priesthood, or join in battle, or take part in solemn sacrifice and converse with the gods, involve a similar treatment. So, too, the community as a whole, both at stated times, as before the planting or gathering of the crops, and at sudden junctures, as when face to face with drought or plague, betakes itself to its spiritual sick-bed for a stated term of days.

Now to look for clearly-defined ideas behind these observances of the savage is, as has been said, false method. It is chiefly the emotional and motor factors that provide the key to the psychological problem.

To cease from active life, and consequently to mope, as it were, and be cast down—such during the early and unreflective stages of religion is no subtle device of the " higher intelligences," but the normal tribesman's normal way of reacting on a world that is ever making serious and fresh demands upon his native powers. By sheer force of that vital experience which is always experiment, he has found out—or rather society has found out for him—that thus to be cast down for a season means that afterwards he will arise a stronger and better man. *That* this happens, or tends to happen, he knows; *how* it happens he also knows, in the sense that the traditional machinery of ritual retreat can be unfailingly set in motion by the tribal experts. But *why* it happens, that is to say, what the ultimate meaning and purpose may be of this widespread human capacity to profit by the pauses in secular life which religion seems to have sanctioned and even enforced in all periods of its history—such a question lies utterly beyond the range of the savage. Neither is it within the province of Social Anthropology to venture on a final answer.

Enough has, perhaps, been said to show that, amongst peoples of rude culture, who possess no Theology worthy of the name, and can scarcely be said to pray, whilst they are given over to ritual performances which to us seem mechanical, inasmuch as we can discern no clear ideas behind them, nevertheless there is at work in every phase of their life a spiritual force of alternating current; the energy flowing not only from the positive pole, but

likewise from the negative pole in turn. The savage is a healthy animal with plenty of rude energy to dispose of. At times, however, a vital spurt dies out and the outlook is flat and dreary. It is at such times that there is apt to occur a counter-movement, which begins, paradoxically, in a sort of artificial prolongation and intensification of the natural despondency. Somehow the despondency thus treated becomes pregnant with an access of new vitality. Moreover, this counter-movement would seem, historically and psychologically, to be the characteristic process or phase of life corresponding to religion —or at least to what deserves to be called religion as soon as the associated content of ideas becomes sufficiently explicit to make good its place in the rational life of mankind.

Finally, a word concerning arrogance, the vice which is antithetic to the virtue of humility. Arrogance, alas! is not the peculiar attribute of primitive magic. Rather it is the nemesis attendant on all forms of the positive output of vital force which are not occasionally chastened and purified by means of a pilgrim's progress through the valley of humiliation. Philosophy, since the days of Socrates, has held it essential for the inquirer to pass through doubt and despond. Science, too, and not least of all the Science of Man, should beware of the arrogance that is a defect of its very qualities of courage and the desire to push ahead. Thus Sociology in the past has indulged in facile generalizations that have done its cause much harm in the eyes of thinking men. To-day, when concrete methods have at last come to

the fore, there is every hope of success for the sociologist, if he can but endure that confusion and bitterness of spirit which must be his lot for a season whilst the regenerative processes are slowly maturing. Or again, in another and a no less important respect it may be that the Science of Man is still insufficiently penetrated with humility. It perhaps is a little unwilling to allow that the plane on which it works is not the highest plane. Science is not Philosophy, nor Science of Religion Theology. The horizon of thought is altogether narrower, being bounded by assumptions which for their full justification need to be accommodated to the rest of knowledge. The principle of the economy of labour excuses the man of science as such from this synthetic task. Thus, in the present case, whilst in the name of Social Anthropology a psychological explanation of certain functions of religion has been hazarded, no claim is made, nor could legitimately be made, to account for the facts completely. It is proper and right that, in an inaugural lecture, these limitations of competency should be frankly and humbly acknowledged. It only remains to add that universities might well imitate the customs of savagery by imposing a strict *tabu* on the lecturing activities of newly-appointed Readers; such *tabu* to be removed only when the bemused faculties of the novice should have recovered tone, after long and disconsolate brooding in the darkest corner of his workshop.

VIII

IN A PREHISTORIC SANCTUARY

ARGUMENT

A VISIT to certain prehistoric sites of France will suffice to persuade us that there was rudimentary religion amongst ancient no less than there is amongst modern savages, and that its spirit was essentially the same. At Niaux, for instance, there are pictographs and paintings which, so far as can be made out, are connected with rites intended to secure good hunting. The fact, too, that they occur deep within the dark recesses of a mountain, where a certain awe is felt even by a modern mind, afford an additional proof that solemnities were being celebrated; that fine art in this case was but the secondary product of religion. Again, at Gargas, the hand-prints stencilled on the walls possibly record some charm or vow; while the arabesques on the ceiling may have some totemic significance. Our present knowledge does not enable us to establish the meaning of such symbols with any precision; but on the face of them they bear a close analogy to those sacred designs which the Australians employ to-day in their magico-religious ceremonies. Hence we may justly speak of prehistoric sanctuaries. In entering one of these caves to encompass his hope by means of its solemn prefiguration the ancient savage was crossing the threshold that divides the world of

the workaday from the world of the sacred; and these rites, whether the mechanism of spell or of prayer predominated in them, were genuinely religious in so far as they involved a mood and attitude consisting in a drawing near in awe, according to approved traditional usage, to an unseen source of mana.

FOR a week it had been warm work in the Onzième Section. Toulouse under an August sun was hot. Hotter still, however, was the daily discussion in the Lycée. Does the Aurignacian horizon antedate the Solutrian? Are eoliths man-made, or can mere earth-pressure produce their like? Such questions fire the blood, especially if there is a strain of the South in it. Decidedly it was time that the protagonists of the prehistoric department of the Association Française should betake themselves to the cooler air of the mountains.

So long as its train-service lasts, France is secure against national decadence. The *rendezvous* was for 5 a.m. We all turned up at the station notwithstanding. A few of us are strangers, the much-honoured *invités du Congrès*. The rest, our guides, are a band of the foremost archæologists of France led by the veteran M. Cartailhac. At that hour it was deliciously cool. Yet, as we rolled through the plain by the Garonne, an unclouded sun already lit up the white backs of the oxen straining at the wheat-cutting machines, and glittered from the surface of the cisterns from which the long rows of vines draw their freshness. We thread the valley of the Ariège,

and, a little after Foix, catch sight of the piled-up blocks of a long moraine. It is a grim reminder that we are about to step back into the neighbourhood of the great Ice Age. We leave the train at Tarascon. This is not the home of the immortal Tartarin. Far away by the Rhone is the sleepy provincial town where the Tarasque is stabled, that last of prehistoric monsters. The other and smaller Tarascon of the Little Pyrenees nestles amongst greenery under crags and mountain masses at the confluence of the Ariège and the brawling Vic-de-Sos. Thrice-blessed stream, whichever of the two it was that furnished those excellent trout wherewith our breakfast at the inn was graced! The ancestor of these well-born fish was to appear presently.

After breakfast, business. We must mount several miles up the valley of the Vic-de-Sos to our left. There wait on us conveyances of a sort. The leading vehicle under the weight of four prehistorians—brain is heavy—collapses. The prehistorians are flung into the dust. But no bones are broken. We are soon on our way up the defile. It is a scene of desolation. On every side are the remains of deserted iron-works. These were formerly nourished by the " Catalan " system of wood-fuel, but alas! it no longer pays. The mountain walls on either side are scored and polished for the greater part of the way up—say, for 500 metres above our head, that is, about 1000 metres above sea-level—by the action of former glaciers. The cave we are about to visit, Niaux, is at least 200 metres below the high-water mark left by the ice. Clearly, then, we have here

an upper limit of time for its wall-paintings. While the cave was below the level of the glaciers, torrents must have torn through its galleries, scarifying the sides from top to bottom.

But this is to anticipate. There remains for us the problem of reaching Niaux from the halting-place of the carriages. It is solved—*scrambulando*. If the intrepid M. Daleau, owner and explorer of the famous *Grotte de Pair-non-pair* at Bourg-sur-Gironde, near Bordeaux, can manage the climb, lame as he is, we others have no excuse. The sun blisters our backs, but as a compensating boon it has filled the rocks with wide-open white daisies, and has brought out the smell of the wild lavender. Besides, as we ascend, we rejoice in an ever-widening prospect, as, for example, up the valley, where the ruins of the mediæval castle of Miglos are seen sitting crestfallen upon their lonely rock.

To stand at the door of Niaux yields no foretaste of a mile-long subterranean cathedral with pillars, side-chapels, and confessionals all complete. It is only fair to state that nature designed a more imposing entrance somewhere to our left. This, however, it closed again with a landslip, as it likewise closed many another cave, about the time when the curtain was rung down on the last act of the drama of pleistocene humanity—*l'époque du grand détritique*, as M. Rutot has ventured to name it. Nevertheless the present rat-hole of a mouth is of respectable antiquity. For it has been fenced round with a cyclopean wall by men who here sought shelter from an enemy, Visigoth or Roman or still earlier invaders.

Moreover, within the cavern, near the opening, coarse sherds of neolithic or bronze-age pottery are to be found. To post-palæolithic man, however, the ingress to the inner sanctuary was not improbably barred. A little way in there is a drop in the level, which rises some 25 metres on the further side, and in even moderately wet weather the dip becomes a lake. If, then, the holocene epoch was ushered in, as there is reason to believe, by a " pluvial period " of considerable duration, the chances are that the spirits of the Magdalenian men were free to carry on their mysteries undisturbed long after their bodies were dust; nay, probably right up to the day when modern science burst in upon the darkness with its acetylene lamps.

The lamps in question took some time to light. In the meantime some of us donned as a protection against wet and slippery places the local *espadrilles*, rough canvas shoes with soles of string. Others prudently turned their coats inside out, a simple and effective device for keeping clean, but with a countervailing tendency to cause inside pockets to void their contents. Thereupon we bow our heads that we may clamber down a precipitous descent into the grave-like depths that gape for us. Very chill these are, away from the summer sun, and very still, but for the occasional dripping of water. Behind the wavering lamps of our guides we stumble over stepping-stones across what remains of the lake. Then, leaving a mass of boulders and erratic blocks behind, we steer our way amid fantastic stalactites and stalagmites along an exceedingly narrow passage known as *le passage du diable*. Next, more boulders

have to be tackled. We note in passing that we are in the channel of a former rushing river. Especially at the junction of two arms of this many-branched cave can it be seen how a conflux of swirling streams has carved out a mighty basin, using stones and sand as its excavating tools. So far there are no signs of man. At last, at a point about 500 metres from the entrance, where an opening in the vault above our heads affords a glimpse of a set of upper galleries, our guide cries Halt!

The demonstration opens quietly. On the wall to the left, at about shoulder-level, underneath a glazing of stalactite, are five round marks such as might be made by the end of a finger dipped in paint—that and nothing more. We are bidden to possess our souls in peace and move forward. A short way on, to the right, are more of these marks, some black, the product of manganese, others a warm red, showing ochre to have been used. Nor is it a question of round marks only. There are likewise upright lines, not unlike those whereby the Australian natives represent throwing-sticks in their caves and rock-shelters. Other similar upright lines have a boss on the upper part of one side, and recall the shape of a certain type of Australian throwing-club. Finally, there is a thick oblong smudge indented at one of its narrow ends. Just as the upright marks have been classified as "claviform," so the oblong mark enjoys the unconvincing designation of "naviform." Similarly, in remoter parts of the cave we are shown other marks to which distinguishing names have been assigned. For instance, uprights with many branch-

ing lines on both sides at the top or bottom are called "dendriform," though it is almost certain that we are dealing here with the representation of missile weapons and not of trees. Or, again, an arrangement of crossed lines, not unlike the skeleton of a sledge, is termed "tectiform." Lastly, it may be mentioned here that the round dots, with which lines, circles and other patterns are composed, go by the name of "Azilian points," because of their undoubted resemblance to the marks on the painted pebbles of the decadent pleistocene people who inhabited the cave, or rather river-tunnel, of Mas d'Azil.

Such names are necessarily bestowed "without prejudice." Doubtless there is meaning in these marks. All analogies support the view that they are signs, symbols, pictographs, embodying veritable inscriptions. But we are quite unable, at present, to read their message. At most in one instance is this at all possible. When we proceed along the main artery of the cave, 100 metres or so past the place where the vast ante-chapel of the Salon Noir opens to the right, we are presented with a *rebus*, as M. Cartailhac might well call it, which is not entirely beyond conjectural interpretation. Reading from right to left, we have what look like one throwing-stick of the straight kind and two of the sort furnished with a boss. A multitude of "Azilian points," thirty-one in all, grouped more or less irregularly, follow, then an upright throwing-stick, then eight more points in two parallel rows, then fourteen other points enclosing a central one, an arrangement probably to be discerned also amongst some of the preceding thirty-

one points. Last of all comes a cleverly-designed little bison, the dorsal line of which is merely a projecting ridge of rock. A natural accident has been utilized—nay, has perhaps suggested the representation. This bison, unlike any other that is figured in this cave, has its legs drawn up close to the body, and this rearing position, so suggestive of a death-struggle, together with the large red mark on the flank, for all the world like an open wound, makes the intention of the primitive artist passing clear. He here portrays the slaying of the bison. The other marks are presumably meant to lead up to this, and signify the weapons that are to deal the blow, the circling movements of the hunters, and who knows what besides? But why such a hunting scene at all? Let us defer the discussion of this question until we have had time to finish our visit of inspection.

Pursuing the main artery, we encounter few drawings but many symbols, until, about 1100 metres from the mouth, we are pulled up short by a lake into which the vault dips. It is possible by diving to penetrate into still remoter recesses of the cave, which, moreover, are not without their prehistoric designs. M. l'Abbé Breuil has done it. We prefer, however, to trouble neither the lake nor the inhabitants thereof. For M. Viré, an expert in subterranean biology, finds in the water four kinds of myriapods, all blind. So we retrace our steps, and brace ourselves for the culminating experience, the sight of the Salon Noir.

This side gallery is truly magnificent. As one mounts steadily up a long slope of billowy sand, the

walls fall back till they are beyond the range of the lamps, whilst overhead there is positive nothingness, not a glimmer, not a sound, no motion, no limit. Suddenly M. Cartailhac scares us out of our senses by kindling a Bengal light. Not only are we scared; we are slightly shocked. Is this a place for pyrotechnics? But we see by this means what we could never have seen with our powerful lamps, and what primitive man could certainly have never seen with his feeble ones; for a hollowed pebble holding grease, with a piece of moss for wick, was all he had. We behold a cathedral interior such as a mediæval architect might have seen in his dreams, aerial, carven, and shining white.

We reach our destination, an immense rotunda. The circular wall descends almost vertically until it is a little more than the height of a man from the ground. At this point it breaks back into concave niches with smooth surfaces, thus forming, as it were, a series of side-chapels all waiting to be adorned. Here the primitive painter worked at ease. On the contrary, to produce the beautiful ceiling-pieces in the cave at Altamira, in Spain, he must have lain more or less on his back, as Michael Angelo did in the Sistine Chapel. Again, at Niaux he did not, as the Altamira artist, seek polychrome effects, but was content with simple black-and-white. In a hollow stone he mixed oxide of manganese with charcoal and a little fat, and laid it on with such an apology for a brush as the modern savage uses to-day. What matter the materials, if the artist sees? This man had the eye.

We were led straight up to the *chef-d'œuvre* of the Salon Noir. Under a low vault is a snub-nosed horse, or rather pony, of grand workmanship, measuring about a metre and a half from the forehead to the root of the tail. Back, belly and legs are outlined in thick black. Muzzle, neck, throat and saddle are covered with shaggy hair, indicated by no less bold, but finer strokes, so blended as to convey the happiest impression of muscular chest and glossy barrel. It is the living image of Prjewalski's wild horse of the Mongolian deserts. The picture stands out strongly, despite the fact that it is cluttered up with not a few rival frescoes. A springbok (*bouquetin*), a brace of bisons, and a couple of smaller horses independently compete for the scanty room available in this apparently much-coveted corner. As the primitive artist has no notion of grouping, but concentrates on the single figure, so he likewise seems to ignore the rights of prior occupancy, and is apt to paint right over another work of art. The caves of the Bushmen of South Africa present similar palimpsests, though we are told that with them a masterpiece was inviolate until three generations had passed. In Niaux, exigencies of wall-space could hardly account for the crowding and over-lapping of animal designs, unless indeed there was more mystic virtue attaching to one spot than to another. Thus it is easy to suppose that where the rock bulges out in the likeness of an animal's body, with all the effects of bas-relief, so that only a little paint is required to help the illusion out, or again, where a hole in the rock may be converted with a stroke or two of

a stone chisel into the front view of a stag's face, to which antlers are added in colour—devices which are both to be met with in the Salon Noir—the lead given by nature to art should be regarded as full of good omen.

We have been the round of the wall-paintings from right to left, and studied them carefully, as their merits deserve; for, of some seventy or eighty as there are in all, hardly one shows a lack either of care or of downright skill. Let us note before we leave them that nearly all have what look like weapons—spears of various shapes or a throwing club—attached to their sides or overlying the region of the heart. But the best wine has been kept for the end of the feast. Away to the left the wall bends back a little above the level of the floor and overarches a small tract of sand, by this time of day coated with stalagmite, though not thickly. We stoop, and behold traced on the sand the unmistakable forms of two trout, own brethren to this morning's trout of tender memory. At last we were in touch with the spirit of our pleistocene forerunner. He knew those trout, we knew those trout, and his emotion was ours. But a stranger thing was at hand. Hard by, similarly sheltered by an overhanging ledge, might be seen the much-bestalagmited print of a naked human foot —rather a small foot, it seemed. Silently and in awe we turned to retrace the long journey to the outer world. At last we had met the ghost of prehistoric man.

And now that at length we are back again in the light and warmth of the good sun, which by this time

is westering redly, we talk theory. And the question that seems to sum up all the others is, In what sense, if any, is this painted cave a sanctuary?

For the more cautious of us, the answer to this question was not formulated all at once. Our education in prehistoric art and its purposes had scarcely begun. Next day we must be spirited off from Toulouse by a no less early train in quite another direction—into the department of Hautes-Pyrénées, to view the cave of Gargas, near Aventignan, in the valley of the Neste, in a hill surrounded by all the débris of the Ice Age, moraines, rolled stones, and erratic blocks. Afterwards we abandoned Toulouse for Périgueux as our centre, and under the guidance of M. l'Abbé Breuil crawled painfully through the long narrow gully of Les Combarelles to inspect its numerous rock-engravings of animal and human, or at least semi-human, forms; whilst at Font-de-Gaume the impressive, if somewhat obliterated, polychromes were made clear as noonday for us by their discoverer, M. Peyrony. To describe our delightful experiences in detail is impossible here. It must suffice to draw freely upon them in order to assist the suggestion that such a cave as Niaux is truly a prehistoric sanctuary.

First of all, how is a sanctuary to be defined? A sanctuary is a sacred place, whether sacred in its own right, or because sacred ceremonies are there celebrated. And sacred, in its primary meaning at least, is equivalent to *tabu*, that is, " not to be lightly approached." Was such a cave as Niaux a place of mystery, a place to be entered only when solemn and

esoteric rites were to be accomplished? That is the question.

Let us approach the subject of Niaux by way of Gargas. At Gargas we are amongst the pioneers of pleistocene art, the so-called Aurignacians. An hour's exciting excavation in the remains of the hearth near the mouth of the cave made me the happy possessor of a very typical Aurignacian scraper; and, without going further into the evidence, I may refer the reader to the paper on Gargas of Messrs Cartailhac and Breuil[1] for sufficiently persuasive reasons for thinking not only that the Aurignacians had set to work on the cave walls, but further that, before the later Magdalenians could even aspire to improve on their designs, a fall of rock hermetically closed the cavern from that early date up to the present day. Now, the Aurignacian was no great hand at drawing. He makes the child's mistake of confusing what he knows with what he merely sees. Thus at Gargas we noticed the side-face of a bison surmounted with two branching horns such as could only go with the full face. Similarly, the artist was apt to pause as soon as he had made his intention manifest. Thus a horse's head stands for the entire horse. In particular, he neglects to finish off the legs of his animals. Now, this principle is excellent in magic, if questionable in art for art's sake. Magically, the part can stand quite well for the whole.

Perhaps it is an application of the same rule, in its magico-religious bearing, that will account for the numerous hands, a hundred and fifty at the least,

[1] In *L'Anthropologie*, xxi. (1910).

stencilled in red or black on the cave-walls. It is provoking that, when the Australian is found to do the like at the present day, it should be so hard to be sure of his motives. Thus Mr Roth informs us that his Queensland natives told him that this practice, which they called *kapan-balkalkal*, "mark-imitate (or make)," was a mere amusement, though one that is special to boys and young men.[1] Even if it be an amusement now—and the savage is an adept in disguising his mysteries—it does not follow that it was always so. Undoubtedly at Gargas a good many of these stencilled hands occur near the entrance, where the well-developed hearth shows that the people camped. Yet the designs are even here mostly in dark corners and alcoves, whilst other examples are met with in devious recesses far from the mouth. It is at least possible that primitive man was here registering, so to speak, by contact with a holy spot, some charm or vow making for his personal betterment. It may be asked, too, at this point why so many of the hands appear to lack one finger or several. My friend, Sr. Alcalde del Rio, the explorer of so many Spanish caverns, has made the rather gruesome suggestion that the owners of the imperfect hands were sufferers from leprosy.[2] It is to be remembered, however, that Australians and Bushmen maim their hands for ceremonial reasons. Besides, is it so certain as the French archæologists suppose it to be that a man with a sound hand cannot produce these effects of stencilling? Professor Sollas

[1] W. E. Roth, *N. Queensland Ethnography*, Bulletin No. 4, 12.
[2] "Apuntes sobre Altamira," *Limia*, No. 5, Fev. 1911, 2.

of Oxford, without sacrificing a single finger-joint in the cause of science, has by straightforward stencilling admirably mimicked the mutilated hands of Gargas, as I can personally vouch.

Again, what is the meaning of those strange arabesques or " meanders " with which the walls and roof of Gargas are decorated in its remoter depths? Sometimes they appear to have been made simply with the fingers in gluey clay which has since been mostly glazed over by stalactite, and sometimes they are traced by means of an instrument shaped like a trident. These marks are so uncommonly like the scratches which the cave-bears have left in the same cave, as a result of sharpening their great claws, that one is almost tempted to wonder whether Aurignacian man had a cave-bear totem, or otherwise had a ritual reason for assimilating himself to a creature so full of obvious *mana*.

Enough of Gargas and its problems, with their hint of magical, striving with purely decorative and artistic, purposes. At Niaux we are amongst later Magdalenian artists who could, and did, draw true to life. Did they live at the mouth of their cave? It appears not. Certainly, if their art was play, they sought a remote playground, penetrating half a mile or more into the underground world, with narrows to squeeze through which even in the mind of modern man are associated with the devil. At Font-de-Gaume there is a similar needle's eye to negotiate, for which fasting would be a very suitable preparation. Les Combarelles, again, is literally inaccessible except on one's knees, and no artist ever graved animals, or

men with the heads of animals—masked dancers, it may be—for simple fun in such a place. These, then, must have been sanctuaries, if only because no one would dream of hedging round a mere picture-gallery with such trying turnstiles.

The great difficulty is to make intelligible to ourselves the spiritual motives that could lead men in dark and remote places to celebrate mysteries that involve the designing of animal forms, the use of symbols, and so forth. Our hope of one day throwing light on these obscure matters lies in either of two directions. The prehistorians, by comparing together all that remains of this widespread culture—one might almost say civilization—of late pleistocene times, may inductively acquire a set of clues. The material is, in its way, rich. There are some nineteen painted caves known in France, and the discoveries in Spain, which every day increase, bring up the total number of such caves and rock-shelters to at least fifty. Nor must we forget that there are innumerable other sites which, though without paintings, illustrate the customs and ideas of the same period.

Or, again, there is possibly assistance to be afforded by the student of existing savages. These are so much alike in their fundamental ways of action and thought all the world over, that it is not extravagant to conclude that the inhabitants of prehistoric Europe had likewise the type of mind that to-day seems to go regularly and inevitably with a particular stage of social development. On such a working hypothesis, those ceremonies, best known to ethno-

logists in their Australian form, whereby savages, by magico-religious means, including the use of sacred designs, endeavour to secure for themselves good hunting and a plentiful supply of game animals, take us by analogy straight back to the times of prehistoric artistry.

Magdalenian man drew better, it is true, than does the Australian, though perhaps not better than the Bushman, about whose ceremonies we unfortunately know so little. And, sad to say, it is too often the case that good religion and good art tend to thrust each other out; so that the religious man turns towards his ugly Byzantine Madonnas, while the Florentine artist makes glorious pictures and statues for popes and cardinals who are men of the world in the worst sense. We may allow ourselves to conceive, however, that sometimes religion and art may go together, that the artist may try to serve God by drawing nobly. Perhaps, then, the artist of Niaux may have felt in a vague way that the better he drew his beast the surer he was to have at his back the kindly powers that send the spear straight at the quarry.

For man of the primitive pattern there are two worlds, a workaday and a sacred. Whenever he needs help in the one, he resorts to the other. The threshold between the two is clearly marked. He crosses it always in a ceremonial way, with nice attention to the traditional details of behaviour; and his ceremonies enhance, as they certainly reflect, the mood in which he draws near to the unseen source of his spiritual comfort. It matters not at all whether

we classify as magic or religion the practices that result, so long as we recognize that all genuine rites involve one and the same fundamental mood and attitude, a drawing near in awe. Thus, then, we must suppose it was at Niaux. The man who left his footmark there had drawn near in awe, whether it was spell or prayer that accompanied his painting. And perhaps the best proof of all is that the spirit of awe and mystery still broods in these dark galleries within a mountain, that are, to a modern mind, symbolic of nothing so much as of the dim subliminal recesses of the human soul.

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Native words in italics. Proposed technical terms in inverted commas.

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